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The history of coastal engineering projects is fraught with problems. In this thesis
I examine the federal navigation project at Wells, Maine. In Wells, an incomplete
understanding of the coastal setting led to a faulty engineering design responsible for a
poorly functioning inlet and harbor and damage to neighboring beaches and wildlife
habitat. Project planners and designers did not account for all unforeseen problems that
arose. Reviewing the history of Wells Harbor demonstrates how proper attention to the
natural setting, economics, and the political environment is essential to a successful
project and enables agencies and stakeholders better to address contingencies when they
arise.
An embedded case study of the Wells Harbor Navigation project examines the

project's different components separately and holistically. Additional embedded case

studies were constructed for the Saco River Navigation Project in Saco, Maine, and the
Cold Spring Inlet Navigation Project in Cape May, New Jersey. Cross-case analysis of
the two Maine projects reinforces findings while differences observed with the New
Jersey project offer robust results of interest to a wider range of coastal managers.
Analysis of the natural setting at Wells Harbor reveals that engineering designs
were based on misconceptions of coastal processes in the project areas. Subsequent
design changes and mitigation efforts recycled the original flawed data, hence creating
larger projects with larger problems. Economic analysis highlights a history of underestimated cost and over-estimated benefit projections at Wells.

Traditional benefit-cost

analyses did not account for all possible costs, or for uncertainty of benefits, and
therefore poorly measured changes to social well-being. As a result, an economically
marginal project was authorized. Once the project began and problems surfaced, federal
economic guidelines and a lack of community and state resources limited the possible
response options. A series of interviews and a review of the Wells Harbor Project history
depict a contentious political environment. Special interests applied political pressure to
get authorization of the marginal project. As problems arose during construction,
relationships between local, state, and federal interests deteriorated, impeding consensus
on a plan to address the community's problems. Cross-case analysis with both the Saco
River Project and the Cold Spring Inlet Project support these findings.
Results stress the importance of policy makers and coastal managers encouraging
continued research on coastal settings to improve their understanding of local and
regional coastal processes. These studies reveal the limitation of traditional benefit-cost
analysis as a decision-making tool. Other economic models that incorporate the

uncertainty of the setting and the value of non-market amenities are more appropriate for
coastal projects. Sound partnerships between agencies, the participation of all
stakeholders, and fbll disclosure of information is necessary for addressing problems
when they arise and avoiding fbture complications.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We, as a civilization, have long tried to mod@ our surroundings and control the
natural processes that shape the Earth in order to better suit our lives. The great
engineering projects of the 1 9 ' ~and 2othcenturies serve as excellent examples of these
grand ambitions. Railroad tracks spanning North America joined the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans. Engineers crossed deserts, forded canyons, and tunneled under mountain ranges
to reach their destinations. Western expansion in the U.S. brought multitudes of people
to dry and inhospitable lands. Massive water diversion projects were designed to bring
nourishment from thousands of kilometers away. Areas that received little to no annual
precipitation became agricultural oases. Monstrous dams tamed raging rivers and created
reservoirs that flooded millions of acres and provided power and water to the population.
These development efforts were also prevalent along our coastlines.
For thousands of years, prior to modern times, the great cultural and economic
centers of the world emerged near oceans and seas. The proximity provided a means of
trade with the rest of the world and a bountifd source of food for the people. This
continued into modern times. As more people moved toward the coast, the demand for
developable land and the infrastructure to accommodate the new inhabitants increased.
Land was reclaimed from the sea via dikes and the filling of wetlands. Shorelines were
reinforced and river mouths and lagoons were transformed into armored inlets and
commercial harbors.
Today much of the coastline of the lower 48 United States shows some sign of
anthropogenic development. Many of the U.S. coastal engineering projects of the 2oth

century were federal projects aimed at improving the economic condition of the nation.
These were difficult and expensive endeavors that were not always successfd due to the
problems and challenges this dynamic natural setting presented engineers. For as many
successfd coastal engineering projects there were a number of documented failures
(Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). It is essential to learn from these failures, not only for the
people directly affected but also for future management efforts. As population migration
into the U.S. coastal zone continues (Bartlett et al., 2000), the pressure to develop
increases. With more people than ever before utilizing the coast and its limited resources,
planners must be absolutely sure of the potential ramifications their actions may have.
Wells Harbor in Wells, Maine, serves as one example of a problematic coastal
engineering project. In the 1960s, the Town of Wells, a community along Maine's
southern sandy coast, was granted a federally fimded navigation project for a tidal
estuary. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed two jetties to stabilize the inlet
and dredged an anchorage in the basin backing the town's two beaches. The harbor was
designed to service both recreational and commercial fishing boats.
Almost immediately there were problems with the project. Engineering design
did not account for the tidal nature of the setting. Shoaling within the inlet and anchorage
restricted travel and limited mooring space. Orientation of the jetties allowed for waves
to travel down the axis of the inlet. The two beaches bordering the inlet readjusted after
jetties had blocked the flow of sediment through the system. Some properties near the
jetties accreted while others along the beaches experienced accelerated rates of erosion
that eliminated much of their dry beach (Kelley and Anderson, 2000).

Efforts to remedy the situation were not successfd. Engineering and economic
constraints limited the number of mitigation responses. A divided and contentious
political environment strained relationships between local, state, and federal interests
(Humm, 1984). This prevented any cooperation between parties resulting in an in ability
to reach consensus.
Problems continue presently, and there is the possibility that some issues may
ultimately be resolved in court, which is in no one's best interests. It is therefore
important for coastal managers to understand how this project progressed to where it is
currently and why they have been unable to move forward on an agreed upon response
plan. The purpose of this thesis is to answer these questions and present the findings to
coastal managers.
The Wells Harbor Project and other projects like it are comprised of three
components: natural setting, economics, and political environment. I propose the
following theories as explanations for the problems experienced at Wells.

1. Flawed engineering design was based on a partial understanding of the natural

setting and is the source of many of the problems associated with the project.
2. The coastal processes within the natural setting limit the response options

available to the community and the state.
3 . A series of incomplete Benefit Cost Analyses underestimated costs and inflated

benefits leading to the justification of an economically marginal project and its
subsequent alterations.

4. Economic conditions and constraints limit the response options available to the

community and the State.
5. Special interests exerted political pressure to get authorization of the project after

it was initially turned down.
6. Ideological differences created a contentious political environment that prevents

consensus on any resolution.

A case study of Wells Harbor is created to demonstrate these theories. Case
studies of the Saco River Navigation Project in Saco, Maine and the Cold Spring Inlet
Project in Cape May, New Jersey are also created and used for cross-case analysis. The
Saco River Project has a very similar physical and socioeconomic setting to the Wells
Harbor Project. It is used to reinforce the findings from the Wells Harbor case study and
make general comments about projects in Maine. The Cold Spring Inlet Project has a
markedly different physical and socioeconomic setting from the Wells Harbor Project,
and similarities and differences provide robust results of interest to coastal managers
outside of Maine.
The thesis begins with an overview of coastal management issues in Maine and
the U.S. and is followed by a review of the existing relevant literature. A methods
chapter that explains the structure of the case studies and the objectives of the analysis
follows this and is followed by the three case studies. The next chapter is a cross-case
analysis of the two Maine projects and a cross-case analysis of a general Maine case and
the New Jersey project. The thesis concludes with a policy recommendations chapter.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK

Introduction to the Problems
Jetties at the mouth of the Webhannet River were designed by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers in 1959 to provide a safe inlet and anchorage for the surrounding
communities. The project has a history of problems that remain unresolved. Problems
include sediment shoaling within the inlet and anchorage, dangerous wave energy, and
altered sediment flow in the littoral system. These conditions produce accelerated rates
of erosion at the adjacent beach communities of Wells Beach and Drakes Island and an
improperly functioning harbor and inlet. The Army Corps conducted numerous studies
reviewing the project and is unable to arrive at a solution that satisfies federal, state, and
local interests.
Planners and managers in Maine must understand how these problems arose and
why they still exist, which entails a review of the coastal management issues facing
southern Maine in addition to a review of the issues surrounding federal civil works
projects and the interaction between stakeholders and the different agencies. Coastal
managers need this knowledge better to serve the stakeholders of Maine in the future.
This chapter begins with a look at coastal activities and management issues on a
broad scale. The focus narrows to Maine coastal issues, issues specific to the southern
Maine beach region, and finally to the community of Wells. This is followed by a review
of the issues raised in the literature on Army Corps civil works projects. The chapter

concludes with a review of the research on stakeholder involvement and agency
interaction in a coastal management setting.

Coastal Resources and Activities

Two thirds of the Earth's surface is covered with water with 15% of its land
considered coastal zone, with 50% to 70% of the world's population living on this land
The number of people living in the coastal zone will grow as the world population
approaches the 8 to 12 billion range (Rahman and Huq, 1998). In the U.S. alone, 75% of
the population is predicted to live in a coastal county by 2015 (Bartlett et al., 2000).
The high concentration of people is due in part to the many resources and
activities associated with the coastal zone. Rahman and Huq (1998) identi@ the
following six categories as some of the major coastal zone resources and activities.

Navigation and Communication
Coastal waterways serve as travel routes for commercial and recreational vessels
around the world. Networks of communication cables lie along the ocean bottom,
connecting people and continents.

Living Marine Resources
Over 100 million people in the world depend on fisheries for their income, with
95% of the world's fish harvest coming from the oceans (Rahman and Huq, 1998). In the
U.S. alone, total landings for 2001 were over 4.3 million metric tons at an estimated
value of $3.2 billion (NMFS website, 2003).

Mineral and Energy Resources
Oil and gas exploration are expanding in coastal zones as more fossil fuel is found
under the Continental Shelf. In the U.S., the state of Louisiana's coastal zone alone is
host to 30,970 oil and gas wells, 3 1,000 workers on offshore platforms, and 21,000 miles
of pipeline (Kelley, 2002a).

Tourism and Recreation
Beaches and ocean offer a variety of recreational activities to vacationers. More
people are visiting coastal areas with a percentage relocating permanently.1 Tourism
revenue is a vital part of regional and national economies. New Jersey's coast generates
$10 billion in tourism related revenue annually. This accounts for half of the state's
annual revenue (MMS, 2003).

Infrastructure Development
With industry and a growing population concentrated in the coastal zone,
adequate infrastructure is needed to accommodate residents and commercial interests
This includes roads, harbors, utilities, and waste treatment facilities, to name a few.

1

The Town Ofice of Wells. Maine reports that of the homes along their beaches, 44% are seasonal, and
more of them are being converted to year-round residences. There are 274 mobile housing units arriving
each year with more people occupying them year-round (Carter, 2002). York and Cumberland Counties

Waste Disposal
Estuaries and open water absorb much of our waste, both unintentionally and
intentionally. A recent EPA study reports that 44% of the nation's estuaries are
considered impaired in that they don't hlly support drinking water, recreation, and
aquatic life (USEPA, 2001). Before 1972 and the advent of modern federal
environmental legislation, the U.S. was dumping considerable amounts of waste into the
ocean. In 1968 figures show 38 million tons of dredged materials and 9 million tons of
combined industrial and sewage waste dumped into the ocean. Today this is mainly
dredged material with some biological waste and vessels (USEPA, 2003). Title 33,
Navigation and Navigable Waters, of the U.S. Code, lists a number of statutes2 that
outline acceptable waste disposal practices in U.S. coastal waters (LII website, 2003).

Coastal Conflicts and Management Issues
This level of activity concentrated in a relatively small area creates conflicts and
problems. The job of the coastal manager is to address these problems in a way that
satisfies the greatest number of stakeholders while maintaining the productivity of the
coastal zone.
Problems arise in the coastal zone due to poor resource utilization and stakeholder
conflict. These user conflicts fall into three basic categories: limited space, adverse
effects of one use on another, and adverse effects on an ecosystem (Cicin-Sain and
Knecht, 1998).

are home to Maine's sandy beaches. York experienced a population growth of 13.5% from 1990-2000 and
Cumberland experienced a population growth of 9.2% during that same time (US Census, 2001).
2
Marine Plastic Pollution Research and Control Act and the Ocean Dumping Act are two examples.

The coastal zone is also subject to the effects of a steady worldwide sea-level rise
(SLR). SLR predictions for the next century range from approximately 0.1 meter to 1.0
meter with substantial regional variations (IPCC, 2001a). SLR amplifies the effects of
natural processes like storms and erosion that already cause damage to development.
This, in turn, complicates existing user conflicts.
Both user-conflict and SLR manifest themselves in the issues confronting coastal
managers. Although there are many issues, the following partial list covers some of the
more critical ones confronting U. S. managers as identified by various authors (Beatley et
al., 1994; Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 1998; Hershrnan, 1999; Rahman and Huq, 1998). It is
clear in review that the issues are all interconnected in some form, which requires that
managers not only consider individual issues but also how each affects the others.

Shoreline Erosion
Over 75% of the U.S. coastline is eroding (Pilkey and Thieler, 1992). This is
most prevalent along soft coast where natural processes (storms, waves, winds, currents,
and tides), amplified by SLR, eat away at beaches and bluffs. There is also an
anthropogenic component to erosion. Manmade structures like jetties block natural
sediment flow while dams prohibit rivers from supplying sediment to the coast (Beatley
et al., 1994). Erosion is a particular concern for U. S. barrier islands, faced with increased
settlement trends, and limited space (Bartlett et al., 2000).

Coastal Hazards
Hurricanes, tropical storms, and Northeasters bring destructive waves, winds, and
flooding to coastal areas, damaging development and infrastructure (Beatley et al., 1994).
Increased frequency and force of these events are connected to SLR and a changing
global climate (IPCC, 2001b). Shoreline erosion removes natural buffers, exposing
development to coastal hazards. This is a concern for coastal areas with dense
populations.

Habitat and Land Loss
Habitat and land are lost to a combination of natural and anthropogenic processes
(Beatley et al., 1994). SLR will claim a portion of coastal land. In a "do nothing" policy
environment, a one-meter SLR event over the next 50 years would cost the U.S.
approximately $65.6 billion (Yohe, 1990). This figure does not factor in the loss of
coastal habitat like wetlands. Anthropogenic activities like tourism can greatly degrade
those systems (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 1998), and coastal settlement jeopardizes
endangered species habitat (Bartlett et al., 2000). Agricultural and industrial pollution
add additional stress to the system (Beatley et al., 1994).

Access
In the U.S., state and federal government view the coast as a resource open to the
public. Accessibility differs from state to state and is a challenge for managers. States
like Oregon maintain that the coast is public domain and actively protect access (NOAA,
1998). A state like Maine grants more rights to the private property owner, giving them

more control of a greater portion of coastal land, which makes it more difficult for the
public to gain access to the coast. Access becomes an issue of managing a public
resource while acknowledging the rights of private property owners.

Community Character and Identity
Changing economies and demographics along the coast lead to changes in a
community's identity. Towns once dependent on fishing might move toward tourism.
Towns and managers must decide the direction they want to head and plan accordingly.

Agencies and Regulatory Tools

U.S. coastal management takes place on multiple levels: local, state, and federal.
On the federal level there are a number of regulatory agencies that bear some
responsibility for portions of the coastal ~ o n e . ~ operate
~ h e ~within the guidelines and
regulations established in federal

statute^.^ States have a similar agency and regulatory

framework that works within the minimum federal standards to address the needs of their
stakeholders. The management framework and approach differs from state to state. On
the local level, municipalities operate within the state's guidelines and manage through
zoning and development regulations. Eficient and productive management requires that
the three levels work together toward common goals.

3

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the divisions of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the divisions of the Department of the
Interior (DOI), are just some.
Examples include the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), and the River and Harbors
Act.

Initiatives like the Chesapeake Bay Program (CBP) and the National Estuarine
Program (NEP) helped make cooperative coastal management a reality in the U. S. They
combine the resources of federal and state agencies and engage stakeholders in the
planning and implementation process (Imperial et al., 1992). The Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA) of 1972 and its subsequent amendments outline the
cooperative relationship that currently exists between federal and state government in the
coastal zone (CZMA, 1972). The act provides federal finds to states that develop
management plans addressing federal management objectives. This agreement provides
the framework for each individual state's coastal management plan.

Coastal Management in Maine
Maine has over 4000 km of coastline (USACE, 1971). The coastal zone is used
for a variety of activities. The natural deep ports and inlets make the Maine coast a
desirable location for shipping and industry. Portland harbor is one of the larger oil ports
in the nation. Shipbuilding continues as a part of Maine's coastal heritage. Both
commercial and recreational fishing are important to communities' economic and cultural
identities. The Maine coast is a favorite tourist destination for people around the country
and world. The economic activity and amenities draw people to the coast. Settlement
trends follow national predictions, even outpacing them. In the 199O's, 92% of Maine's
population lived in the 16 NOAA designated coastal counties in the state, accounting for
over 1 million of the 1.2 million people living in Maine (Van Arsdol et al., 2000).
The highest settlement concentration is along the southern coast. This is an area
approximately 80km in length situated in between Portland and Portsmouth and within

commuting distance of Boston (MSPO, 1998). Its two counties, Cumberland and York,
host the majority of Maine's sandy beaches and beach resorts. They support a key yearround population and summer tourism business essential to local and state economies
(MSPO, 1998).
Of Maine's 1,286,670 residents, 459,692 lived in Cumberland and York counties
alone in 200 1. From 1990-2000, Cumberland County had a population increase of 9.2%
and York County had a population increase of 13.5%. This growth was higher than the
state average of 3.8%. Population density is also at higher levels in these counties than
the rest of the state. In 2001, Cumberland County's population density was 3 19 people
per square mile and York County's population density was 194 people per square mile.
The state average was 42 people per square mile (U.S. Census Bureau: Maine, 200 1).
Maine coastal managers are faced with many of the same issues other U.S. coastal
managers must address. The Maine State Coastal Plan (MSPO, 2001) identifies the
following as "high priority" issues: fishery resource management, aquaculture, habitat
(wetlands) preservation, coastal hazards, shoreline erosion, coastal development, and
public access. Past plans also focused on oil spill mitigation (MDEP, 1994), "watershed
management", and non-point pollution from storm water and agriculture (MSPO, 2001).
Again, at the heart of these issues, are user conflict and SLR. Not all activities are
compatible, and conflicts arise. SLR fbrther complicates issues by amplifjling the
destructive effects of natural forces. Average SLR in Maine between 1932 and 1992 was
2.2 mmlyear (Kelley et al., 1996). According to the IPCC, this may increase as rates
around the world accelerate over the next century (IPCC, 200 1a).

Policy Tools and Management Framework
Maine became a coastal zone management state under the CZMA in 1978
(MSPO, 2001). It receives approximately $2.6 million each year in federal money to
support their coastal management programs. This is matched by state fbnds (Kelley,
2002b; Leyden, 2003). A retreat policy was adopted statewide as a means of addressing
fbture SLR and of preserving the natural character of the coast. Retreat allows the state
to manage SLR proactively in a way that works within economic constraints and the
social environment. The approach has been compared to other state plans and is
considered very progressive and well developed (Lameka et al., 2000).
The state of Maine uses a number of statutes5, enforced by state agencies,6 to
guide management in the coastal zone. Maine has a bottom-up management style, where
the individual municipalities, working in conjunction with the state planning office, are
responsible for the management of their lands (Lameka et al., 2000). Municipalities must
abide by state minimum standards and are responsible for projects both administratively
and financially, for the most part. The state does lend assistance through grants and
programs but mainly acts as a regulatory body.

Management Issues for Maine's Southern Coast
Regional planning groups formed in southern Maine during the 1990s with the
assistance of the Maine State Planning Office. Participants pooled their resources and
collective experiences to address the issues coastal communities in southern Maine.

'

Some examples include the State Coastal Zone Management Act, Coastal Sand Dune Rule, Natural
Resources Protection Act (Lameka et al., 2000)
6
Examples include the Department of Conservation and Department of Environmental Protection

Priority issues were identified as beach erosion, coastal hazards, property damage, public
access, and balancing habitat preservation with fishing and development activity (MSPO,
1998; SBPC, 2000). They are very similar to management issues identified on the
national and state levels, reflecting user conflict and a need to accommodate natural
processes. They also reflect the character of the southern coast.
These are beach communities with a dependence on tourism revenue. Wells is
representative of this region with 44% of the town property in seasonal ownership. The
majority of the owners reside in the greater New England region (Carter, 2002). Their
concerns focus on the preservation and fiture development of the region as a tourist
destination. They also wish to preserve their maritime heritage including a history of
commercial fishing.
Another common coastal management issue specifically identified in regional
reports is the need for better cooperative management between the municipalities and the
state of Maine (MSPO, 1998; SBPC, 2000). They cite a willingness of the state to
regulate, but not accommodate, municipalities with specific problems and needs.
Municipalities feel that their voices and concerns are not being heard.
Individual communities voice similar concerns (Higgins Beach Public
Improvements Ad-Hoc Committee, 1999; WHPC, 1991). Stakeholders have the
perception that state and federal agencies are not doing all they can to help alleviate
community problems. This view is reinforced in a study conducted by Lameka et al.
(2000). A series of interviews with a variety of Maine beach stakeholders revealed a
perception that stakeholder concerns are not being addressed by state or federal agencies

and that there exists a communication barrier between stakeholders, further complicating
effective management.

Problems in Saco and Wells
Wells faces the same problems identified by regional planning groups and other
southern Maine communities. The community has a variety of stakeholders, commercial
fishing operations, and wildlife habitat to maintain. The residents of Wells Beach and
Drakes Island must deal with shore erosion and exposure of development to coastal
hazards. In some places no dry beach can be found during high tides (Kelley and
Anderson, 2000). Additionally, Wells Harbor is difficult and dangerous to navigate due
to sand bars and high wave energy.

A defining piece of their problem is the role the federal navigation jetties play.
Wells Beach and Drakes Island residents coexist with a federally designed inlet and
anchorage. Erosion rates, harbor failings, and exposure to coastal hazards are linked to
the design and presence of the jetties (Kelley and Anderson, 2000). The jetties created a
use conflict between harbor and the beach users that remains unresolved.
A similar navigation project exists to the north of Wells Harbor on the Saco
River. Jetties there caused many of the same problems for the beach community of Camp
Ellis. The authors of an SLR study in Maine attribute the erosion and loss of property at
Camp Ellis to a combination of faulty navigation project design and natural processes
(MSPO, 1994). A second study of Camp Ellis makes a case that its problems are
common to other federal navigation projects experiencing difficulties. A comparison of
several federal project histories leads the author to identie faulty economic analyses,

poor knowledge of coastal processes, and contentious relationships between the federal,
state, and the local stakeholders as the underlying problems associated with problematic
federal coastal projects (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).

A multiple case study by Kelley and Anderson (2000) draws upon the similarities
of the two projects and compares the project histories of both Saco and Wells to identifjr
common factors responsible for the problems each community experiences. The study
documents a similar pattern of a poor understanding of coastal processes, faulty
economic assumptions, and an impasse in current mitigation efforts due to an
environment of desperation and distrust among stakeholders and government agencies.

A smaller case study of the Wells Harbor project focuses on the relationships
between stakeholders within the community (Humm, 1984). A mediator was brought in
to help reach a consensus and formulate a plan to address their harbor and beach
problems. A productive relationship was never established between the different
community interests, and the formulated plan fell apart prior to implementation. The
mediator painted a picture of irreconcilable differences.
There are two common themes in these studies. First, there was a problem with
the design and construction stages of these projects. Second, stakeholder and agency
relations are not productive. Reviewing case studies of other Army Corps projects
provides evidence that these are not isolated events. General patterns emerge in the
history, and they help explain what is happening at Wells. The same is true for a review
of the literature on agency and stakeholder participation in coastal management. The
following sections summarize some of these patterns.

U.S. Army Corps of ~ngineers'

From their beginnings, the U.S. Army Corps of ~ n ~ i n e e rand
s ' their projects have
been targets for criticism. In 1830, Former West Point superintendent Alden Partridge
called the Corps "a privileged order of the very worst class, a military aristocracy"
(Shallat, 1994). Accusations of corruption, political favoritism, flawed projects, and
questionable economics plagued the organization. The Corps took it upon themselves to
answer the accusations through internal review, a tactic they still use today (Hillyer,
1996). The internal reviews were questioned heavily by critics, but the Corps maintained
that they were accurate and impartial and moved on (Shallat, 1994). They became
involved in civil works during the 1800's. Their role along the coast began with
maintenance of navigation channels. In 1930 the Rivers and Harbors Act expanded their
presence in coastal management by charging them with the task of studying coastal
erosion and shoreline protection (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). This is the basis for their
involvement in coastal projects today. Currently, there are many Army Corps projects
along Maine's coast (Figure 2.1).
The Corps still bears a striking resemblance to its original form. They remain an
organization of engineers under the supervision of military officers answering to

' It should be noted that the following critical review of Army Corps projects represents the common theme
in the literature. Most reviews were prompted by some problem that arose as a result of a project. By
nature they are critical. Although the objective of this component of the research is to present a balanced
and objective case, there are very few positive Army Corps critiques. The ones that exist are produced by
the Army Corps and must be read with that in mind. This does not affect the value of the information in the
author's view. Valuable points can be drawn from the reviews and are representative of what is happening
at Wells and Saco.
8
The Army Corps of Engineers date back to the 1600s in France where engineers designed and built
military fortifications to protect the king and his army. Engineering technology advanced and these skills
were applied to civil works expanding France's urban centers (Shallat, 1994). George Washington
employed several of the French engineers during the Revolutionary War to build fortifications for the
Continental Army (Pilkey and Dixon. 1996; Shallat, 1994). In 1802, the Army Corps became and official
and permanent department of the military through an act of Congress and became based out of West Point
Academy (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).

Congress. Criticism continues. Federal coastal projects are a source of controversy still
associated with questionable economic forecasting (Griswald, 2000a; Hayes, 1995;
Milon, 2002; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996), improper engineering design (Kelley and
Anderson, 2000; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996), and manipulation by special interests
(Griswald, 2000b,c; Kelley and Anderson, 2000; Milon, 2002; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).
In response to these controversies over the past decade there has been an increased
demand for review of these projects.

The Army Corps Response
Oficial review of federal coastal projects is limited by design. Congressional
guidelines acknowledge only the Corps as the designated reviewer of federal coastal
projects.
An example of internal review was project performance reports requested by the
Ofice of Management and Budget (OMB) for federal shore protection projects. In
question were the accuracy of predicted costs and economic trends, the true value of
benefits received, and whether shore protection was actually inducing the risky
development it is designed to protect. The Corps answered these questions with two
internal studies followed by a large internal review (Cordes and Yezer, 1995; Hillyer,
1996; Hillyer et al., 1996). Surveys and economic models show acceptable economic
performance (Hillyer et al., 1996), no additional development in risky areas (Cordes and
Yezer, 1999, and justification to continue shore protection (Hillyer, 1996). Results are
presented in general terms with no easy means of replicating methods or analysis.
Assumptions and decisions were made with little explanation. The Corps even

acknowledges problems with their data and studies. Incomplete records make it difficult
to definitively answer the OMB's questions (Hillyer, 1996).

Outside Review

Critics of the Army Corps are not satisfied by these internal reviews. Some
groups outside the Army Corps have taken it upon themselves t o review Army Corps
projects in order to offer another perspective. A number of patterns arise with federal
civil work projects both on and off the coast. In general these patterns fall under three
broad categories: natural systems, economics, and political environment.

Understanding the Natural System
Army Corps projects exist within a natural system. Engineers and designers must
understand the effects projects will have on the system in order to properly design and
construct them. This is particularly true in a dynamic water setting. The potential
consequences of not hlly understanding the natural systems include unexpected
economic costs, ecosystem and community damage, and ultimately project failure.
Problems range from underestimating potential effects to not understanding the
system at all. The Saugus River Flood Protection project is an example where the Army
Corps understood the estuarine system but greatly underestimated the potential effects of
the project (Hayes, 1995). The Army Corps assumed that a floodgate would periodically
disrupt the flow of salt water into the river during storm surges. They underestimated the
frequency of storm activity and the effect of additional closures on the estuary. It was

shown that the productivity and health of the estuary might have been drastically altered
if the project had gone forward as planned.
When the Army Corps began the Central and Southern Florida Project, they
studied the effects of diverting water from the Everglades. They acknowledged that there
would be disruption but underestimated the extent. Today, a large percentage of the
habitat has been destroyed and the current restoration project is the most expensive
ecosystem restoration ever undertaken in the U. S., costing billions (Griswald, 200 1b;
Milon, 2002).
The proposed deepening of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal is a documented
example where the Army Corps proceeded with engineering plans despite the fact they
did not understand the processes at work. Two separate engineering reports listed the
flow of water in the canal in two different directions. This misunderstanding was also
conveyed verbally during public meetings with different Army Corps managers and local
stakeholders. Their data determine project design, ultimately affecting the surrounding
habitat and communities (Griswald, 200 la).
Bregman (1983) depicts a similar misunderstanding in her case study of
maintenance of dams and locks on the Upper Mississippi. The foundation of the lock and
dam structures was compromised because they were built in high velocity zones of the
river with shifting mud and silt as a foundation. Engineers identified the problem, and
yet the Army Corps proposed to solve it by building a bigger structure in the same
location.
Bregman's 1983 case study highlights another point of criticism. Army Corps
projects based on faulty environmental data are often corrected through bigger

engineering efforts based on the same faulty information. The problem perpetuates itself
resulting in large engineering projects, with increasing construction costs that multiply
the negative effects on the natural setting.
Pilkey describes this pattern of behavior along the coast as engaging in "dogmatic
science", treating all coastal areas the same (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). Both Pilkey and
Dixon (1996) and Kelley and Anderson (2000) provide an example of this along Maine's
coast. The jetties on the Saco River were designed without a proper understanding of the
coastal processes. Faulty assumptions that prompted the original design were recycled
throughout the life of the project, amounting to 25 studies and 17 models at considerable
economic cost and damage to the community of Camp Ellis.

Criticizing the Economics
Critics also point to errors in the economic analyses. Inaccurate benefit and cost
predictions are at the heart of most criticism. Several reviewers have shown great
disparity between projections and real values, which can have dire consequences. These
projects are accepted and rejected based on these predictions. Inflated benefits or
deflated costs can just@ spending public hnds on a disastrous venture. Once a project is
started it is legally difficult to stop, and the scale of the engineering does not allow for
easy dismantlement.
Milon's (2003) review of the Central and Southern Florida Project reveals
inaccurate cost predictions for flood control and water management projects. Actual
population settlement trends far outpaced the original projections, leading to bigger
projects and higher construction costs. A similar pattern is found in a number of coastal

shore erosion and navigation projects around the U.S. and Maine. Reviews show inflated
benefit figures and underestimated costs that drove questionable projects and encouraged
large-scale engineering solutions (Kelley and Anderson, 2000; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).
Griswald (2001a) documents similar issues in his review of the Chesapeake and
Delaware Canal. The Army Corps calculated very optimistic economic benefits for
Baltimore Harbor contingent upon increasing the capacity of the Chesapeake and
Delaware Canal. Citizen groups showed that this was far from the case and argued that
the predictions were fabrications and they were also able to show that construction costs
were deflated and did not accurately address the full scope of the project.
The Army Corps' own economists and engineers indicated that benefit predictions
for the Snake River Dams were greatly exaggerated. The navigation and energy benefits
would never be realized. Additionally, they claimed that the Army Corps discarded
recreational benefits calculated for a free flowing river. Cost calculations for the dams
were incomplete. The projections ignored the cost of regulatory compliance needed to
satis@ guidelines in the Clean Water Act, an act that the Army Corps enforces (Griswald,
2001d).
The Army Corps' proposed repairs and expansions of project design for the dams
and locks of the Upper Mississippi were justified by projections of increased barge
traffic. Opponents, mainly environmentalists and trucking interests, were able to show
that projected barge traffic and commerce predictions were overestimated and optimistic
at best. Actual benefits would not have justified undertaking the project (Bregman,
1983).

Sullivan and Hitchner (1978) reviewed the benefit calculations for the proposed
Tocks Island Dam that would have flooded the Delaware Water Gap area of New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. The project was touted as a flood control project with recreational,
water supply, and energy benefits. Flood control benefits were overestimated. Past flood
damage had occurred to homes within the established flood plain and were not even
supposed to be there. The water benefits for New York City and Philadelphia were
overstated. Other sources of water existed, and the cost of breaking existing water
contracts and agreements was not considered in the calculations. Energy benefits were
unfounded. People were receiving energy for less money than energy that would be
produced by the project. Recreational benefits were extremely optimistic and did not
consider the effects of the many substitutes within the metropolitan area.
The Tocks Island case study brings to light another criticism of project
economics. Projects are approved if they can perform economically, meaning that
benefits outweigh costs. Benefits can be inflated with inaccurate data or by
misrepresenting the facts. They can also be inflated by expanding the scope of the
project.
This pro-development approach can have long-lasting negative effects on the
project area. The Tocks Island Dam project was originally a flood control project
proposed in response to the death and property destruction following a flood in 1955.
Considering only the flood protection benefits, the project costs could not be justified.
Planners expanded the size of the project and incorporated recreational, power, and water
supply benefits. The costs increased somewhat while the benefits grew exponentially.
This pattern of project expansion to produce added benefits is also seen in the Central and

Southern Florida Project (Milon, 2003) and the Upper Mississippi maintenance projects
(Bregman, 1983).
The expansion of Army Corps projects is also driven by a directive in the
guidelines urging planners to undertake projects that maximize net benefits (USACE,
2000). Maximization makes sense and is in the best interest of the public; however, a
problem arises when there are several plans with acceptable benefit to cost ratios.
Simpler and less intrusive projects may not even be considered based on a large-scale
engineering project's greater economic return. Greater economic return does not
necessarily mean the best option for communities and the environment.
Hayes (1 995) demonstrates this point in her review of the Saugus River flood
control project in Massachusetts. The floodgate met economic guidelines by having a
benefit to cost ratio greater than one and by maximizing project benefits. Hayes points
out that the uncertainties with a project that size carried the potential for large-scale
damage to surrounding communities and estuarine ecosystems. Smaller-scale options
that included non-engineering initiatives satisfied project objectives but were not
considered due to the benefit-maximizing criterion. This encourages expensive
engineering projects that place a substantial economic burden on the local sponsor.
Critics point to the Army Corps' tendency to rely on engineered solutions as a
fimdamental flaw in the overall process (Bregman, 1983; Griswald, 2002b; Kelley and
Anderson, 2000; Pilkey and Anderson, 1996; Sullivan and Hitchner, 1978).

The Political Environment
Army Corps projects are fimded with Congressional appropriations and therefore
are subject to the politics behind the fimding. Congressmen and senators are elected
officials serving their constituents and will stand behind or block a project based on the
public's opinion. This allows special interests such as environmental groups and industry
lobbyists to play a role in federal projects. They will exert pressure on congressional
representatives to vote in line with their interests. The outcome can go two ways.
Pressure can lead to constructive decisions that choose projects benefiting society or
pressure can override better judgment and lead to poorly designed projects.
Public opinion can push through questionable projects. The Tocks Island Dam
was originally a flood control project that expanded in order to justifjr federal
participation. Originally, the Army Corps did not feel it was a justified flood control
project and turned it down. Public pressure, stemming from fear of another deadly flood
prompted Congressional representatives to convince the Army Corps to reevaluate the
project and make the economics work (Sullivan and Hitchner, 1978).
Special interest groups are just as powerful. The shipping and barging industry
were key proponents and major backers of the redevelopment projects along the Upper
Mississippi (Bregman, 1983) and the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal deepening
(Griswald, 200 1a). The oil industry has considerable power in the state of Alaska.
Congressional delegates and state officials fast tracked expansion of oil drilling
operations along Alaska's North Slope. The projects destroyed wetland habitat with
undetermined consequences. The state has only restored a fraction of the wetlands that
are required by law. Officials who voiced opposition to the projects were relocated out of

the region (Griswald, 2001 c). Agricultural interests in Florida were the force behind the
expansion of water supply and flood control projects responsible for the destruction of
the Everglades (Milon, 2003).
Groups also have the power to block projects. Citizen groups in Maryland have
successfUlly held up efforts to deepen the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal (Griswald,
2001a). Private property owners wield some power along the coast. The community of
Wells successfidly blocked hrther dredging of their harbor in the 1970's when they
suspected a connection between the project and the increased erosion along their beaches
(Humm, 1984).
Another aspect of the political environment that drives projects is the relationship
between the Army Corps, other agencies, and stakeholders. The Corps is frequently
presented with scientific and anecdotal data from other government agencies and
stakeholders regarding the natural setting of projects (Bregman, 1983), but choose to
proceed as planned (Milon, 2003) sometimes with dire consequences for the ecosystem.
The Everglades serve as an example. The National Park Service expressed
concerns early on in the Central and Southern Florida Project. They suspected water
diversion would have negative effects on Everglades National Park. They asked for more
time to investigate, but the Army Corps chose to proceed and not honor their request
(Milon, 2003). Pilkey and Dixon (1996) presents a number of examples where state
agencies and stakeholders expressed concerns over the effects of coastal projects but
were ignored by Army Corps.

Stakeholder Involvement
An inability or unwillingness of the Corps to work with different stakeholders is
present in many of the case studies (Bregman, 1983; Griswald, 2000a,b,c,d; Kelley and
Anderson, 2000; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996; Shallat, 1994). This includes local property
owners (Griswald, 2000a; Kelley and Anderson, 2000; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996), nongovernmental organizations (Bregman, 1983), other federal agencies (Griswald 2000c;
Milon, 2002), and state agencies (Kelley and Anderson, 2000; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).
This is not a problem specific to the Army Corps. Problems arise between property
owners, state agencies, and non-governmental agencies that ultimately hinder efforts to
find solutions. This seems to be present in both southern coastal Maine communities
(Humm, 1984; Kelley and Anderson, 2000).
Studies of coastal management programs show that cooperation and involvement
of stakeholders are essential for successfbl implementation of projects. A study of two
shoreline management plans in the U.K. demonstrates this. The study shows that within
a complex multi-use socioeconomic, environmental, and political problem it is essential
to have participatory consultation, an inclusive process, and stakeholder involvement.
Consensus must be reached early and often, and public participation is the core of this
decision making process (O'Riordan and Ward, 1997).
Another cross case analysis of several European coastal management programs
shows that stakeholders want to participate and care about the issues but they sometimes
doubt the sincerity of others. They believe that their input is valuable but often times not
considered when making decisions (Davos et al., 2002). This creates an environment of
mistrust and frustration (Davos et al., 2002; O'Riordan and Ward, 1997).

These findings hold true for the U.S. A review of the National Estuary Program
(NEP) and other U.S. joint coastal management programs come to similar conclusions
and offer some additional points. Beyond what the European case studies reveal, success
also depends on political saliency, adaptive plans, and the ability of the program or
project to learn from past experience and respond accordingly (Imperial et al., 1992).

A second review of the NEP adds to this argument by focusing on the local and
state government officials (Tuler et al., 2002). Interviews show officials demand the
same respect and input when working with other agencies or stakeholders. This affects
their level of participation and ultimately the success of the project.
Two studies comparing Maine and California's beach management policies
reiterate these points. Interviews with a variety of Maine stakeholders reveals a number
of concerns including poor communication between stakeholders, a perception that
officials do not care about stakeholder concerns, a lack of stakeholder education on
coastal issues, conflicting policies between preservation and development, and an
exclusion of stakeholders early on in the process (Lameka et al., 2000; Ricci et al., 2000).

A ~ ~ l v This
i n ~to Wells
Wells has much in common with other coastal communities in the U.S. They are
managing their town and resources locally under guidelines established in state and
federal statutes. The community faces development issues, multiple user conflicts, and
an influx of people in search of coastal amenities. They must also contend with natural
forces driven by an accelerating rate of SLR. Wells is attempting to balance these factors
while moving forward and maintaining their identity as a harbor and beach town.

Problems over the past 43 years with the federal navigation project on the
Webhannet River have been stumbling blocks the community has not been able to clear.
Local, state, and federal governments have not been able to work towards a common
goal. Many of the patterns highlighted in the Army Corps case studies are present at
Wells. A charged political environment and poor understanding of the natural system
drove poor economic decisions. The town now has two jetties that do not hnction as
they were intended. The poor relationships that evolved between stakeholders and
agencies, prevents the reaching of consensus on a solution. Reviewing the case in greater
detail, taking into consideration the points made regarding federal engineering projects,
and stakeholder participation along the coast, will offer more insight into Wells'
problems and will provide coastal managers with valuable knowledge needed to better
serve their communities.

CHAPTER 3
METHODS

Introduction

The problem at Wells Harbor is complex, consisting of different components
interacting with each other to produce the current situation. Understanding the problem
requires examining and analyzing each part separately and together, holistically. The
case study format provides the means to view the problem as a whole and observe the
interaction of its components.
Case studies have proved usehl in the coastal zone management setting. Suman
(2001) compiled six case studies of coastal zone management issues, three from the U.S.
and three from outside the U.S. The case studies provide perspective on a wide range of
management issues. Cross comparison of the studies in and outside the U.S. allows for
"rich comparisons", particularly when examining the "economic, institutional, and
environmental" components of the management issues. Comparisons illustrate
similarities and differences and allow for effective policy evaluation.
Other examples where case studies were used to illustrate coastal management
issues include Kelley and Anderson's (2000) multiple case studies of the Wells Harbor
Project and the Saco River project in Maine. They were able to demonstrate how the
events at Wells follow a similar path to the history of the Saco River project and alluded
to questions about the economic and political environment as driving factors in both.
Pilkey and Dixon (1996) used a multiple case study to demonstrate common patterns in
Army Corps coastal projects around the U.S. Mike Griswald (2000a; b; c; d), constructed

similar studies in his series for the WashingtonPost examining a number of Army Corps
projects, coastal and non-coastal, to illustrate patterns common to federal engineering
projects.

Case Study Model
The case study takes either a single or multiple form. Both can achieve the same
goals of the researcher. The multiple case better addresses external validity concerns and
allows for more robust results through comparison. Within both forms, Berg (2001)
makes three further distinctions: intrinsic (to better understand a situation), instrumental
(provide insight into an issue), and collective (group of instrumentals). A multiple case
study may exhibit a combination of all three.
This research uses an embedded explanatory multiple case study form as defined
by Yin (1994) to present the information. The explanatory structure is designed to
answer questions of how and why. It is particularly useful for identieing causal
relationships (Berg, 2001). Each case study is comprised of several embedded units.
This allows for a focused examination of key elements and a holistic view of their
interaction as they define the problem (Yin, 1994).
Three cases are reviewed. The main study is of the Wells Harbor Navigation
project. The other two studies are the Saco River Navigation Project in Saco, Maine and
the Cold Spring Inlet Navigation project9 in Cape May, New Jersey. The Saco River
project has a very similar setting to Wells as shown by Kelley and Anderson (2000)
Wells follows a similar history to Saco. The Cape May project has a very different

9

Cold Spring Inlet is now often referred to as Cape May Inlet.

setting, with a different regulatory, socioeconomic, and coastal environment, although the
problem is still one of a federal navigation project responsible for damage to adjacent
shoreline. The unit of analysis for each study is the navigation project, defined by its
starting dates to present. All projects have a variety of stakeholders and all levels of
government agencies involved in the process. The ability to compare the Wells project to
another Maine coastal project and a project outside of Maine provides robust results in
analysis.

Embedded Case Study Structure
Each of the case studies is comprised of three embedded units. The choice of
these units is based on patterns and factors identified in previous research (Bregman,
1983; Griswald, 2000a,b,c,d; Hayes, 1995; Kelley and Anderson, 2000; Milon, 2002;
Pilkey and Dixon, 1996; Sullivan and Hitchner, 1978). The first unit is the natural
setting, covering coastal process pre and post-jetty construction. The second unit is
economics, summarizing the benefit and cost forecasts throughout the life of the project.
The third unit is the political environment, covering the political history that shapes the
project. The following describes in detail the data used to construct each unit and the
analysis performed.

Natural Setting
This unit draws a picture of pre and post-jetty construction conditions.
Specifically, it covers how engineering has altered processes in and around the project
area. Information and data are gathered from a number of sources including Army Corps

reports, work of non-Army Corps researchers, field observations, and interviews. Pilkey
and Dixon (1996) used a similar method of analysis in commenting on the effects of
engineering decisions in their review of federal coastal projects.
Analysis aims to determine the extent to which engineering decisions are
responsible for the current conditions. The written record from Army Corps reports
depicts a history of engineering decisions and their justification. This is compared to
body of information on coastal processes prior to and throughout the project's life.
Causal relationships are identified in this comparison and provide the ability to comment
on the extent engineering decisions are responsible for the current situation.

Economics
This unit employs a technique used in Milon's (2003) economic review of the
Central and Southern Florida Project. A history of benefit and cost predictions, as
reported in Army Corps studies, is compiled to present a summary of economic decisions
over the life of the project. Data come directly from Army Corps feasibility studies,
interviews, and administrative documents.
Analysis looks for patterns in the benefit and cost predictions. The objective is to
determine whether the true benefits and costs were accurately measured or whether they
were over and under valued. This is determined by comparing the original predictions to
the current present values when possible. Once this is established we ask whether
planners were able to accurately predict trends and, if not, why. This information is used
to comment on the effectiveness of the benefit-cost analysis as a decision-maker in
coastal zone projects and management.

Political Environment
This unit consists of two parts. The first part is modeled after Tuler et a1.k (2002)
review of the factors influencing local governments' participation in the National Estuary
Program. Open-ended interviews are conducted with people who are representative of
the different groups and agencies involved in the project. The interviews are designed to
establish people's perception of the problem, perception of the quality of relationships,
and their perception of success. Analysis entails of determining the compatibility of
perceived problems and solutions. This serves as an indicator of the state of the political
environment and identifies inconsistencies and roadblocks in the negotiating process.
The perception of relationships serves as an indicator of the ability of the process to move
forward. Poor relationships between stakeholders and agencies imply a difficult
environment for negotiation.
The second part constructs a written history that chronicles the changes in
attitudes, policy, and relationships over the life of the project. This is based on a similar
technique used by O'Riordan and Ward (1997) in their study on the value of stakeholder
participation in the two U.K. shore management projects. The history is constructed from
the written record namely Army Corps documents, personal correspondence, and
interviews. Analysis entails of connecting shifts in the political environment with
decisions and changes made in the project in order to establish causal relationships.

Interviews
Information from interviews is used throughout the studies. All interviews are
open-ended and take "semi-standardized" format, where there are several set questions,
and subsequent probe questions are used to extract more information (Berg, 200 1). The
open-ended structure has several benefits. The format allows for more in-depth
explorations. Open-ended interviews preserve the voices of the subjects and they are
appropriate for small subject fields where statistical analysis is difficult10(Tuler et al.,
2002).
The initial subjects are chosen based on the record of their involvement in the
project. Subsequent subjects are identified during the course of interviews. Whenever
possible, interviews are conducted in-person. When not possible, interviews are
conducted via telephone or email. Interviews are designed to identify the perceptions of
people. They are not intended to obtain quantifiable information, although some do.

Cross-Case Analvsis
Upon completion of the cases studies, two stages of analysis are conducted. A
cross case analysis will be completed for the Wells Harbor and Saco River projects.
Similarities and differences will be highlighted in order to explain how and why projects
have followed their specific histories. From this, a short narrative, summarizing both
cases will be created to represent the general experience in Maine. This approach is
modeled after Denzin and Lincoln's (2000) interactive synthesis method. The purpose is

10

Tuler et al., (2002) had subject fields of 17 or less.

to create a narrative that could be applied to a majority of case studies of federal coastal
projects in Maine.
This narrative is used to conduct a cross case analysis with the project at Cape
May, New Jersey. The purpose of this is to identify similarities and differences between
a "general" Maine case and one from outside the state. This helps hrther explain how
and why the projects in Maine proceeded the way they did. The use of a case outside of
Maine provides robust results. The results and findings from the cross case analyses are
used to develop policy recommendations, specific to Maine and to other U.S. coastal
regions. These findings and recommendations are important to coastal managers facing
similar situations.

CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY 1: WELLS HARBOR

An Improved Harbor
The Town of Wells was a recipient of a federal navigation project in the early
1960s. Jetties were constructed at the mouth of the Webhamet River along Maine's
southern coast to create a safe inlet and anchorage for the community (Figure 4.1). Local
interests endorsed the project, seeing it as beneficial to the community and region and
providing both recreational and commercial benefits. Congress approved the project and
appropriated the necessary federal hnds while the community committed their share of
the cost, establishing a partnership between them and the federal government.
Project design was altered several times during the construction phase, adding
costs and delaying completion. Early designs did not achieve the navigation goals as
specified in the overall plans. Episodic modifications were made to correct problems
with limited success.
Beach property owners did not want dredge spoils placed on their land and
effectively blocked dredging during the 1980s (Humm, 1984). Efforts to address
community problems had little success. Tension between local stakeholders, the State of
Maine, and the Army Corps of Engineers created problems. Limited h n d s and
unfavorable economic conditions prohibited several mitigation options while Maine state
regulations prohibited other affordable options. Currently, there is an impasse on how to
proceed and conditions continue to deteriorate, both in the physical setting and the
political environment.

Figure 4.1 Map of Maine's southern coast and location of the Wells Harbor Project
(Kelley et al., l989b).

Wells Harbor Proiect Construction Historv 1953 - Present

Formal requests for a harbor and inlet began in 1953 (Smith, 1994). The U. S.
Army Corps of Engineers and local interests agreed on a design in 1961. Document HD
20218611 (USACE, 1959), submitted July 16, 1959, authorized by The River and Harbor
Act of 1954, granted permission to construct two jetties at the mouth of the Webhannet
River inlet. The south jetty was to be 287 meters long and the north jetty was to be 195
meters long. The entrance was to be dredged 30 meters wide and 2.5 meters deep with an
inner channel 30 meters wide and 2 meters deep. The inlet and channel led into a 7.4acre anchorage with a mooring capacity for 150 vessels (Figure 4.2).
The town of Wells was responsible for moving a shallow waterline, which
interfered with construction and the building of a public launch. This hlfilled the federal
government criterion that federally hnded projects be public in nature. Favorable
responses came from a number of federal agencies and the Maine Governor's office.
A design memorandum submitted in August 18, 1961, expanded upon
engineering plans. The project goals remained the same: provide an inlet and anchorage
for recreational and commercial fishing vessels. The first stage of construction began in
November 1961 and ended in August 1962 (USACE, 1962). Both jetties were completed
during this time. Dredging began on the inner channel but stopped short of the entrance
to the anchorage. The dredger was unable to keep up with the sediment shoaling in
behind it. Rapid erosion along the northern tip of Wells Beach resulted in a sand-spit
forming and blocking the anchorage site behind the inlet (USACE, 1962; Byrne and
Zeigler, 1977). A sand bar formed at the seaward end of the north jetty. This forced sand

Figure 4.2 Aerial photo of Wells Harbor and adjacent beaches, 1991
(Photo courtesy of J.T. Kelley).

around the end of the jetty and posed a problem to dredging because of waves pushing
the sand into the inlet (USACE, 1962).
A supplement to the original design memorandum was accepted on September 2 1,
1962 (USACE, 1962). The supplement proposed a design change to correct the shoaling
problems. The changes included a 207-meter stone revetment around the northern tip of
Wells Beach, a 30-meter stone riprap wave absorber along the inner channel on the
southern side of the inlet, a 30-meter extension of the north jetty, and a 122-meter groin
at Drakes Island.
Alterations began in December 1962 and continued to June 1963 (US ACE,
1965a). All alterations were made with the exception of the groin, which was blocked by
public opposition. In its place, the north jetty was extended another 30 meters to create a
60-meter extension. This brought the north jetty's total length to 255 meters.
Dredging of the channels resumed in July 1962. Problems arose with the
dredging company management, and work was halted during the winter due to stormy
conditions. The contract with the dredging company was terminated in November 1963
(Byrne and Zeigler, 1977). A second company was brought in to continue the dredging.
Dredging began in August 1964 and ended in May 1965 when the contractor withdrew
because of high shoaling rates and loss of a dredger, sunk during a storm (Byrne et al,
1977). Only 75% of total dredge had ever been completed and that was subject to
constant infilling by sediment (USACE, 1965a).
A second supplement to the design memorandum was submitted on August 13,
1965 (USACE, 1965a). This supplement proposed lengthening the jetties and orienting
the additions to the south to block incoming easterly waves. The supplement proposed to

re-dredge the entire project to original specifications and to dig an additional retention
basin for sediment south of the anchorage location.
Construction was completed in 1967 (Table 4.1). The south jetty was lengthened
by 396 m and the north jetty was lengthened by 373 m (Bottin, 1978).

1

1

Years of
Construction
1961-1962
1962-1963

North Jetty

1

1

Total Length

60 m

1

I

1

628 m

287 m
0m

Description

1

683 m

Reason

I Original design I Start of project I

1

396 m

373 m

1965-1967

1

195 m

South Jetty

Adjustment

I

Shoaling and
wave hazards

Adjustment

1

Shoaling

1

Table 4.1 A summary of Wells Harbor Jetty construction from 196 1 - 1967 (Bottin,
1978; USACE, 1959; 1962; 1965)

The anchorage and channel were dredged again in 1970, 1971, and 1974 (Smith,
1994). In response to accelerated beach erosion, property owners organized to stop
dredging operations in 1974" (Humm, 1984).
Shoaling continued in the inlet and harbor creating an unsafe environment for
boats. Sediment shoals blocked boat passage at low tide and high wave energy within the
inlet made travel dangerous (Bottin, 1978). Figure 4.3 shows an example of the shoaling
problems experienced in the harbor.

''

In mediation stakeholders expressed a desire for the Army Corps to gather better coastal process data
before proceeding. The fact that some property owners forbid access for pipes and pumps, effectively
blocking any future dredging, revealed an underlying desire to end the project all together (Humm, 1984).

I

Figure 4.3 Shoaling in Wells Harbor, 1988 (Photo courtesy
of J.T. Kelley)
The Army Corps commissioned a study of Wells Harbor to understand better the
processes creating the problems (Byrne and Zeigler, 1977). Past efforts and alterations
were deemed unsuccessful. The Army Corps, in partnership with U.S Army Corps
Waterways Engineering Experiment Station, constructed a concrete model of the harbor
and shoreline at their research center in Vicksburg, Mississippi, to observe the wave
processes. The final report determined that the inlet design was too wide and could not
self-scour. They proposed construction of stone spur dikes in the entrance of the inlet to
narrow the inlet and a breakwater to reduce direct wave energy and help promote selfscour (Bottin, 1978).
The proposed alterations were not constructed, and the project remained inactive
until the late 1980s, although the harbor remained used. During the interim, dredging
was considered but never started. The intended sites for spoils disposal were the eroding
beaches at Wells and Drakes Island. Beach property owners denied the town access to
their properties (USACE, 1980a), and the Rachel Carson Wildlife Refuge surrounded the
original spoils site within the marsh and the USF&WS would not allow disposal within

the Rehge (Kelley and Anderson, 2000). Beach property owners changed their stance in
the late 1980s as their beaches continued to erode. By this time a general concern over
eroding salt marshes blocked any hrther dredging plans. The town was allowed two
small dredges in 1990 and 1991 to clear the entrance of the inlet (Smith, 1994).
The issue was revisited in 1996 and the state of Maine required that the Army
Corps conduct a dredging alternatives analysis in 1997 (USACE, 1997a). A
reconfiguration of the channel and anchorage design was negotiated, and all parties
agreed to a compromise plan in 1998. The new plan reduced the footprint of future
dredges. It involved reconfiguring the mooring design and moving the anchorage off the
flood tidal delta and to the natural tidal channel. Spoils were placed on Wells Beach and
Drakes Island. As part of the deal, the Town of Wells provided a conservation easement
for a portion of the flood-tidal delta deemed critical to the future health of the marsh, and
they agreed to implement and pay for a 5-year monitoring program in the marsh area.
This was designed to determine clearly if a significant link between dredging in the
harbor and inlet and erosion of the marshland existed (Cost and Carter, 1998). The
dredge and nourishment took place in 2000 after more negotiations (Kelley and
Anderson, 2000). An emergency dredge to clear the inlet entrance took place in 2002
(Table 4.2). All parties are currently awaiting the results of the monitoring program in
2005 to determine what the future of dredging will be at Wells Harbor.

Year

I

1962
1964
1967
1970-197 1
1974
1990
1991
2000
2002
TOTAL

Volume of Dredged
Material Cubic
Disposal Site
Meters
190,374
Open Water
18,579
Open Water
145,265
Upland
29,568
Upland
10.169
Near shore
1
11.174
I Beach
3,823
Beach
137.620
Beach
N. A.
Beach

1
I

> 546.572

Table 4.2 Dredging history of Wells Harbor, 1962-2002 (Maine
Geological Survey, 2003; US ACE, l98Oa; 1997a)

Wells Harbor - The Natural System
A summary of the construction history gives some indication of what has
happened at Wells Harbor over its history. To understand better the specifics and answer
the question of why there continues to be problems, it is necessary to break the project
down into its different components. The following section begins with a review of the
Maine coast and specifically the Wells Harbor Project region. This is followed by a
comparison of pre and post-jetty conditions.

Background on the Maine Coast
The Maine coast is approximately 4,000 km long (USACE, 1971). The climate is
northern temperate. Average temperatures range from 5 to 10 degrees Celsius. Severe
conditions are common in winter. Three to five extratropical storms12 strike the coast
12

Commonly referred to as Northeasters

each year bringing high winds and large storm surges. On average, prevailing winds in
the Gulf of Maine are north to northwest during fall and winter and south to southwest
during spring and summer. Tides are semidiurnal with greater tidal ranges in the north
(Kelley, 1987).
The Maine coast is classified into four compartments: northeast, north central,
south central, and southwest (Figure 4.4). Rocky cliffs, high relief, and the largest tidal
range characterize the northeast compartment. Granitic islands scattered throughout
broad deep estuaries characterize the north central compartment. The south central
compartment is comprised of deep, narrow, elongated estuaries. The southwest
compartment has low-relief topography with estuarine embayments and the majority of
the state's sand beaches (Kelley, 1987).

Southwest Compartment
This compartment extends from Kittery in the south to Cape Elizabeth in the
north and includes Wells and Saco Embayments (MSPO, 1983). Sandy beaches cut by
tidal inlets and separated by rocky headlands characterize the southwest compartment
setting (Kelley et al., 1995a). These beaches are part of a discontinuous barrier system in
northern New England that extends 100 km south of Wells Beach and 50 km north to the
barrier system fed by the Kennebec River (Fitzgerald et al., 2000; Kelley et al., 1995a).
Ninety percent of the beaches in southwest coastal Maine are bamer spits (Kelley,
1987). Most of these barrier spits are backed by extensive marshland (MSPO, 1983).
Their sediment sources are mainly submerged glacial deposits, eroding headlands, and
existing shoreface deposits. There is minimal river input of sediment for Maine's barrier

beaches (Kelley et al., 1995a,b; Kelley et al., 2002; MSPO, 1983) other than the Saco
River (Kelley et al., 1995b) and the Kennebec River in the southcentral compartment
(Fitzgerald et al., 2000).

Figure 4.4 Maine's four coastal compartments (Kelley, 1987)

Headlands interrupt longshore currents blocking the transfer of sand across
compartments. Wave refraction reworks shoreface deposits into curved beaches
commonly found along this section of the coast (Nelson and Fink, 1980).

Quaternary History
Coastal Maine was glaciated during the Wisconsinan Ice Age (Nelson and Fink,
1980). Glaciers reached their maximum extent 20,000 years ago in Maine (Kelley,
1987). They began receding, and ice reached the current Maine coast between 13,000
and 14,000 years ago (Kelley et al., 1995a; Kelley et al., 1996; Kelley et al., 2002; Miller,
1998; MSPO, 1983; Thompson, 1978). The retreating ice sheets leR moraines and other
coarse-grained glacial deposit formations (Kelley et al., 1996; Kelley et al., 2002; Miller,
1998). Erosion of those sand and gravel deposits provided the sediment for the area
beaches.
Retreat was followed by a period of transgressive seas. Seas advanced up to 100
km inland and formed the DeGeers Sea (Kelley et al., 1996). The muddy Presumpscot
Formation was deposited during the retreat of the last ice sheet in the late Pleistocene
(Bloom, 1963; Kelley et al., 1995a) and ranges in thickness from zero meters over
outcrops to 30 meters in the valleys (Thompson, 1978). It is described as a "gray sandy,
silty clay of marine origin...poorly sorted, glacially abraded deposit" (Bloom, 1963).
Following deglaciation, rebound of the land occurred and relative sea level fell
with a low stand 10,700 years ago. Deposits at approximately 60 m depth mark the
extent of the regression (Kelley et al., 2002). Sea level has risen at varying rates since
then. Recent records from the Portland tidal gauge show a steadily increasing average
rate of sea-level rise (SLR) of 1.99 mm per year since 1912 (Gehrels et al., 2002).

Formation of Beaches in Wells and Saco Bays
A late Holocene slowdown in SLR (approximately 8,000 years ago) allowed for
sediment from reworked glacial deposits to consolidate into beaches and dunes. In Wells
Bay, sediment anchored to glacial deposits like present-day Moody Point and Drakes
Island as spits. SLR continued to erode deposits, and longshore currents extended the
spits north and south, forming barrier spits. Barrier spits moved inland drawing sand
from eroding glacial deposits and headlands. Not all glacial deposits were eroded. Some
were overtaken by SLR and are currently submerged (Miller, 1998). Their sand is locked
up and out of the system (Kelley et al., 2002).
A similar course of events took place in Saco Bay. The Saco River was the major
source of sediment for the bay, feeding adjacent beaches and beaches in the northern end
of the bay (Farrell, 1970; Kelley et al., 1989a; Nelson and Fink, 1980). Longshore
currents reworked glacial sediments and formed spits that extended both north and south
(Kelley et al., 1989a; USACE, 1955). From the start of beach formation to present, there
is evidence of the landward movement of beaches in both bays due to SLR (Barnhardt et
al., 1997; Kelley et al., 2002; MCP, 1979; Nelson and Fink, 1980).

Study Area - Wells Harbor and Beach Areas

Wells Harbor and adjacent beaches lie within the Wells Embayment of the
southwest compartment. Wells Embayment extends from Cape Neddick in the south to
Cape Porpoise in the north (Smith, 1994). The harbor is 32 km north of Portsmouth and
48 km south of Portland (Hussey, 1970). The study area (beaches and harbor) begins at
Moody Point, continues north to the Webhannet River inlet, through Drakes Island and

Figure 4.5 Map of Wells Embayment and the Wells Harbor Project area (Heinze,
2001).

Figure 4.6 A map of the Wells Harbor Navigation Project
area, including Wells Beach, Drakes Island, and the estuary
(Byrne and Zeigler, 1977)

Laudholm beaches (Hussey, 1970). The harbor itself is located within the Webhannet
estuary, behind Wells Beach and Drakes Island (Figures 4.5, 4.6).
Wells Beach is segmented into smaller compartments by rocky outcrops. Marsh
backs the beach system from Moody Point through Drakes Island (Hussey, 1970). The
dune system is relatively small at Moody Point, becoming larger and more established
north through Drakes Island and Laudholm beach. The frontal dune system is
extensively developed with homes and seawalls from Wells beach through Drakes Island.

Coastal Processes AtTectina Wells Harbor and Adjacent Beaches
The orientation of the beaches lies between the approach of northeast and
southeast storm hazards (Barringer and Ten Broeck, 1978). The majority of the waves
reach the area from the southeast due to the dominant winds, parallel to the axis of the
inlet. Observations show three waves from the south for every wave from the north
(Smith, 1994). Miller's (1998) estimates offer a more detailed breakdown of wave
direction. He reports that 32% of the waves come from the east-southeast direction, 3 1%
come from the south-southeast direction, and 16% come from the north-northeast
direction.
The tide is semidiurnal averaging 2.6 m with a spring tide of 3 m and a neap tide
of 2.1 m (Mariano and Fitzgerald, 1989; Miller, 1998). The discharge from the
Webhannet River is minimal at 0.6 m3 per second (Mariano and Fitzgerald, 1989; Smith,
1994). The low level of freshwater input creates a tidally dominated estuary (Mariano
and Fitzgerald, 1989; Miller, 1998; Smith, 1994). Ebb currents reaching average
maximum velocities of 110 cm per second dominate the channel thalweg. Flood currents

reaching average maximum velocities of 76 cm per second dominate shallower areas of
the inlet (Mariano and Fitzgerald, 1989).
Along the beaches currents are shore-normal (Smith, 1994). They deposit
sediment in the summer and remove it during the winter (Miller, 1998). Profile data for
beaches in Saco and Wells Bays supports this statement. There is berm build-up in June
and July, peaking in late Fall, then declining by December and January (Heinze, 2001).
Longshore currents driven by winds travel both north and south. Observations possibly
suggest a net longshore movement to the north (Byrne and Zeigler, 1977; Smith, 1994).
Dominant storm activity comes in the form of extratopical storms, 3 to 5 times a
year. Beaches are sheltered from direct attack from the north and northeast but they are
open to forces from the east. Storms may last 12 hours and span 2 high tides with surges
of 1.56 m (Kelley, 1987; Nelson and Fink, 1980).

Sand Sources
Presently sand sources for the beaches are limited. The Webhannet River does
not contribute to the system (Kelley et al., 1995a; Smith, 1994). There are submerged
sand deposits at 60 m depths and between 30-40 m depths. These deposits have not been
eroded, and their sand is locked up adding nothing to the system (Kelley et al., 2002).
Sediment sources for the beaches include existing sand located in the shoreface deposits
and eroding headlands. The shoreface deposits at Wells and Drakes Island have much
less sand then other beaches in the embayment, most of which are also considered sand
starved (Kelley et al., 2002).

Pre-Jettv Conditions
The current Little River estuary system north of Wells Harbor is representative of
the littoral system at the Webhannet River estuary prior to jetty construction (Figure 4.7).
Sand is exchanged between Laudholm beach, Crescent beach, and the inlet (MSPO,
1983; Nelson and Fink, 1980). The system maintains a natural equilibrium, balancing
sand budgets along the shoreface of the beaches and within the estuary.
Prior to the jetties, there was a circular sand movement from the beaches, into the
Webhannet River Inlet, and back into the beach system (Figure 4.8). Sand traveled both
north and south along the beaches at Wells and Drakes Island. Sand was pushed into the
inlet and the estuary by waves during flood-tidal periods, forming a flood-tidal delta.
During ebb tide, sand was pushed out through the inlet and back into the beach system
where it was redistributed along the shoreface and formed ebb-tidal sand bodies. Sand
was also able to bypass the inlet and travel from beach to beach (Byrne and Zeigler,
1977). Mariano and Fitzgerald's (1989) work on sediment transport and hydraulics in
Wells Inlet also supported this interpretation of sand circulation.
Sand bodies were present seaward of the inlet, in the inlet, and within the estuary.
The system maintained equilibrium by exchanging sand from one area to another. Sand
bodies would migrate along the shoreface, through the inlet, and into the estuary (Byrne
and Zeigler, 1977; MSPO, 1983; Nelson and Fink, 1980; Timson and Kale, 1975).
Historically, travel in and out of the inlet was possible only by small boat and during the
highest tides due to the presence of these sand bodies (Kelley and Anderson, 2000).

Figure 4.7 A 1986 aerial photo of the Little River Inlet. The
setting is representative of the Webhannet Estuary prior to jetty
construction (Photo courtesy of J.T. Kelley)

Figure 4.8 A representation of sand movement around the Webhannet
River Inlet prior to jetty construction. Flood tidal currents transported
sand down the sides of the channel depositing it in the estuary, forming a
flood tidal delta. Ebb tidal currents transported sand down the middle of
channel, seaward. Longshore currents transported sand both north and
south along beach faces (Byrne and Zeigler, 1977)

Post-Jetty Conditions
AAer jetty construction, longshore movement across the inlet was blocked (Byrne
and Zeigler, 1977). The ebb-tidal bodies that migrated toward the inlet became
impounded along the outsides of both jetties (Smith, 1994) (Figure 4.9). Some of the
sediment impounded along the jetties traveled to the inlet entrance and blocked passage
of vessels (Mariano and Fitzgerald, 1989). Sediment was inferred no longer to easily
bypass the inlet and travel from beach to beach (Smith, 1994).
The jetties are oriented parallel to the direction of the dominant waves and winds.
These waves transport sediment into the inlet, down the sides of the channel, and into the
estuary and anchorage during flood-tidal periods. The tidal prism travels straight through
the original anchorage area (Timson and Kale, 1975). The wider anchorage slows the
water down and the sediment is dropped (Byrne and Zeigler, 1977). During ebb-tidal
periods, sediment is carried from the estuary and straight down the middle of the channel,
depositing within the inlet, especially at its mouth. Ebb and flood tidal sand bodies
formed in the north and south ends of the anchorage (Byrne and Zeigler, 1977; Timson
and Kale, 1975). The flood tidal delta did not allow the original anchorage placement to
accommodate the number of vessels for which it was designed (Byrne et al., 1977; Smith,
1994; Timson et al., 1975). Travel in the inlet continues to be hazardous due to the
presence of sand bodies and the direct exposure to easterly waves.
Dredging the inlet and anchorage has posed problems. The location of the
original anchorage and later settling basin was over the flood-tidal delta. By 1980 the
Army Corps assumed a shoaling rate of 16,820 m31year, much greater than their original
estimation of 3,058 m31year (USACE, 1980a). When sand was removed from the delta

Figure 4.9 Photographic comparison of the Webhannet River Inlet in 1953
and 1995. The aerial photo on the left is fiom 1953 and the photo on the right is
from 1995, after the jetties were constructed. Accretion along the outsides of both
jetties is apparent in the 1995 photo (Photo courtesy of J.T. Kelley).

body other sand bodies within the estuary began to erode. The flood delta was
replenished with this sand and with sand from the inlet. Once the flood delta
reestablished itself, the donor sand bodies began a period of accretion. This sand came
from both the inlet and inside the estuary, implying that the salt marshes surrounding the
anchorage were eroding (Byrne and Zeigler, 1977; Timson and Kale, 1975). This is how
the system maintained equilibrium. Further removal of sand prompts the system to begin
replenishment, repeating the entire process and hrther eroding surrounding salt marshes
(Smith, 1994).
Beaches along the jetties accreted, giving some property owners more land.
Trending north and south away from the jetties, Wells Beach and Drakes Island have
eroded considerably. The current shoreface provides little protection for development
(Smith, 1994; Timson and Kale, 1975). These sections of the beaches are submerged
during high tides, with water at the base of the seawalls (Kelley and Anderson, 2000).
Accretion and erosion occurred shortly after completion of the jetties. By the late
1970s the beach system reached equilibrium (Dickson, 2002; Mariano and Fitzgerald,
1989; Smith, 1994). The jetties now act as headlands and form two separate
compartments with minimal exchange of sand between the two beaches. Existing
shoreface deposits within each compartment are the primary source of sand for each
beach. Sand impounded along the jetties is effectively removed from the system and
does not redistribute itself (Smith, 1994). The beaches within the compartments are
reshaped by wave refraction and resemble the other crescent shaped beaches within the
embayment. This was not predicted in the original design memorandum. There was to
be accretion along 396 meters of Wells Beach and along 309 meters of Drakes Island

(USACE, 1959). Byrne and Zeigler (1977) showed that this was more or less correct in
their study. The problem was that beach, beyond these zones of accretion, were
supplying this sand and no new sand was replenishing them. Gains in storm protection
from this accretion were diminished due loss of beach in other areas.
Future extension of the jetties might eliminate any exchange of sediment that still
occurs across the inlet mouth. This would be detrimental to Drakes Island, inferred
recipient of the majority of longshore sand transport (Byrne and Zeigler, 1977). Removal
of the jetties would also bring changes as equilibrium reestablished itself. This would not
necessarily help the beaches due to the fact that dredging has removed anywhere from
366,986 to 573,416 m3 of sand from the system (Dickson, 2003) (Figure 4.10). Beaches
are not able to revert back to the pre-jetty days, with so much of the sand missing. As a
result, development would be jeopardized.
During the 2000 dredge, the anchorage was moved from the tidal delta into the
natural channel of the estuary. The new configuration requires less dredging within the
estuary and allows the flood tidal delta to remain untouched. Shoaling conditions are still
prevalent within the inlet and its entrance. Dredge spoils were used for nourishment
along Wells Beach and Drakes Island. Most of this sand was removed from the beach
system or impounded along the jetties in a short period of time (Wells Beach fieldtrip,
2003)
The results of the 5-year erosion-monitoring program will determine the extent of
hture dredges. Until then, waves will continue to enter directly into the inlet, depositing
sediment and creating a hazardous boating environment. Short of artificial nourishment,
the beaches will continue to erode. Even though they are in a state of equilibrium, SLR

1964,120,000 cy to intertidal
(beach?) disposal site from K.R.
1975-1995, -40,000 cy to offshore
dump site frorn Kennebunk River.
1960-1968, -10,000 cy to upland
frorn Kennebunk River.

1962-1970,100,000to 240,000 cy accretion
next to north jetty.
1962-1970,200,000to 580,000 cy accretion
next to south jetty.

1990s. 30,000 nearshore disposal of dredged inlet sand
1962-1964,250,000 cy dumped
offshore in "open watef from
Wells Harbor dredge. .

in the last 40 years.
OG-2, 1975, 74,000 cy glacial gravel added to dunes.
G-1, 1974, vol?, flood-tidal delta scraped into dunes.

Figure 4.10 Historical anthropogenic sand transport for Wells Bay from the 1960s to the
1990s (Dickson, 2003)

and natural erosion will continue to remove sand. With no sediment source outside the
shoreface, the high water mark will migrate toward the seawalls until no beach is lea.

Wells Natural set tin^ Analvsis

I see two characteristics of the natural setting that are key to understanding the
problems associated with the project design. The first is that the beaches of Wells
Embayment are sand starved. The configuration of these crescent-shaped compartments
does not allow sediment to enter the system from the outside. The rocky headlands block
any exchange. Within the compartments there are no substantial sources of new
sediment. Fluvial input is minimal, and all till bluffs are armored. Drowned glacial
deposits were not given sufficient time to erode while exposed sub-aerially, locking up
their sediment from the system. The main source of sediment for beaches is the
shoreface deposits within the system. This situation leads into the second characteristic.
This area maintains a dynamic equilibrium with its existing sediment supply. There was
a circular exchange of sediment from the shorefaces through the inlet into the estuary and
back. The area is tidally dominated. Both ebb and flood tidal bodies existed within the
entire system. If one body was altered, it triggered an adjustment within the system to
reestablish the balance.

Problematic E n ~ i n e e r i nDesign
~

In general, the construction of the jetties and anchorage had two major effects on
the system. First, construction removed a considerable volume of sediment from a
system that has no current source of sediment (Dickson, 2003). Second, construction

impeded the exchange of remaining sediment between the beaches and the estuary. In
effect, the jetties operate as two new rocky headlands forming two compartments out of
one (Dickson, 2002). Shoaling sand in the inlet now originates from the backbarrier and
estuary. A new equilibrium has been established where two new crescent shaped beaches
were formed from wave refraction and impoundment of the original ebb tidal bodies.
The result is accretion along the jetties and erosion farther down the beach.
Functionally, the design of the jetties is also flawed. The orientation of the jetties
exposes the inlet to direct attack from a heavy easterly wave component and storm
surges. This allows waves to travel parallel to the axis of the inlet creating hazardous
conditions for boats. The placement of the inlet and anchorage over ebb and flood tidal
bodies also creates problems. Based on the fact that the system will actively reestablish
equilibrium if disturbed, digging out the sand bars and delta bodies would only result in
them filling in again.

Was There Sufficient Information to Avoid These Problems?
It would be difficult to believe that the engineers made the decisions they made
hlly understanding the nature of the system. This is evident both in their initial belief
that storm protection would be provided for Wells Beach and Drakes Island, and their
gross underestimation of the sedimentation rate within the inlet and anchorage.
Dr. Stephen Dickson of the Maine Geologic Survey acknowledges that the
existing body of information on the sediment transport and budgets may have been
lacking at the start of the project, but he is quick to add that this was remedied soon after
the emergence of erosion and shoaling problems (Dickson, 2002).

Today there is

substantial information and data on the coastal processes in the Wells Embayment, from
both the Army Corps and independent researchers. It is reasonable to hope that a more
in-depth feasibility study might have occurred during the conception of the project.
Subsequent studies of the area were able to identi@ the critical sediment budget and
transport issues missed during the planning stages. It is also not fair to say that there was
absolutely no indication that problems would arise. During the earliest visits to the site,
state and federal officials voiced concerns over dredging on a flood tidal delta. The
common belief was that any dredged basin would fill right back in (Dickson, 2002;
Kelley, 2003; Lang, 2003).

Knowing What They Know, Would it Have Made a Difference?
It is not clear whether the project would have gone ahead as it has if the current
information on the area had been available from the start. One would like to think that
some design specifications would have been different, but recent activity does not
necessarily back up this assertion. The true nature of the system was well understood by
the Army Corps' own planners, shortly after completion of the jetties (Byrne and Zeigler,
1977). Yet up until recently they continued to promote a fill dredge of the original
anchorage area, over the flood delta. They continued to deny any connection between
dredging and the speculated erosion of the surrounding salt marshes. It wasn't until 1997
that they considered moving the anchorage off the flood delta into the natural channel of
the estuary.
The overall pattern of design and construction mirrors patterns observed at other
federal engineering projects. An incomplete and inaccurate understanding of the natural

setting produced poor engineering decisions that lead to complications. These
complications were identified, and the design of the project was revisited. Unfortunately,
the same data and assumptions used to design the original project were used to make the
adjustments to the design. This began a cycle of expanding engineering projects to
address problems brought about by the original engineering solution.
In summary, the engineering decisions and an incomplete understanding of the
natural system contributed considerably to the current problems in Wells. Whether or not
this would have been different knowing what we know today about the area is open to
debate. Recent actions do not necessarily support this assumption, and the presence of
common patterns from other projects speaks to the contrary.

Wells Harbor - The Economic Justification
The following section chronicles the history of economic decisions and
predictions made by the Army Corps of Engineers during the course of the Wells Harbor
project. The section begins with an explanation of federal economic guidelines that the
Army Corps must adhere to when determining whether a project will receive federal
assistance. This is followed by the history of economic analyses for Wells Harbor,
synthesized from a number of Army Corps project reports. The emphasis is on the
evolution of predicted benefits and costs from start to present. All dollar figures are
listed in that report year's dollars unless otherwise noted.

An Overview of Federal Navigation Proiect Economics
The Army Corps must operate within federal economic guidelines when involved
in a public project. This is to ensure that public money being invested in projects will
benefit the nation and not just private interests. These guidelines also maintain that a
project will not be undertaken if the economic benefits to the nation are outweighed by its
economic costs. The Army Corps uses the criterion that the benefit to cost ratio of a
project must be greater than or equal to 1. When planning a project, the Army Corps will
look at several options to achieve their goals. Often, more than one option will satisfy the
benefit to cost criterion. The Army Corps will then choose the options that maximizes
net benefits overall (USACE, 1991a). l 3
Economically, benefits are defined by the combined consumer and producer
surplus in the market. For policy purposes they are defined subjectively as benefits that
increase the welfare of the nation or National Economic Development (NED). This is
distinguished from benefits received by a town or region, otherwise known as Regional
Economic Development (RED) (USACE, 1983a; USACE 1991a; USACE, 2000). RED
benefits might include nourishment of a private beach or transfer of a company from one
region to the project area. The definition of benefits reflects the opinions and priorities of
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A benefit to cost ratio greater than 1 does not necessarily mean that a project improves social well-being.
The benefit cost analysis the Army Corps employs ignores the distribution of benefits and costs. They
operate under the general assumption that "winners" theoretically could pay back the "losers". In other
words, the beneficiaries could potentially payback the public's tax dollars with the gains they make. Many
times the beneficiaries are a small group and the majority of the public rarely reaps any of the benefits of
the project they funded. This topic is covered in more detail in Chapter 8, Policy Recommendations.

the policy-makers who define them and are more concerned with equity rather than
efficiency. Equity is concerned with the perceived fairness of the action whereas
eficiency in this context is the action that produces the best overall, utility-maximizing
result. The two do not have to be mutually exclusive, but in this setting one does not
necessarily imply the other.
Costs are defined as the opportunity cost of not using the resources for the next
best alternative. Labor and materials spent on beach nourishment might have been spent
on another public works project needed by a region. From the perspective of policymakers, price adequately reflects this opportunity cost (USACE, 199 la). The majority of
a project's cost goes toward the construction phase of the project. Construction is a
combination of labor and materials. Beyond this, other costs will include yearly
maintenance and follow-up studies.
Not all costs are considered in the calculations. The Army Corps is interested
only in the costs that directly affect the ability of the project to provide the predicted
benefits. Incidental costs that may occur as a result of the project, but that do not affect
the project's ability to produce the predicted benefits, are not considered in the economic
analysis (USACE, 1983a; USACE, 1991a). Unfortunately, not all incidental costs are
"incidental". Massive erosion caused by the presence of federal coastal projects
generates substantial costs to a region and the nation. This became an issue at a national
level and changes were made in the River and Harbor Act of 1968, as amended by
Section 111. This allows for mitigation up to $5 million if shoreline damage is caused by
a federal navigation project (USACE, 2000).

Additionally, a distinction is made between projected costs and sunk costs. In the
event of a problem during a project, it is necessary to reevaluate the costs and benefits
prior to changing the project design. No prior costs, or sunk costs, that do not directly
affect the future flow of benefits are considered in calculating the new benefit to cost
ratio (USACE, 1991a). An example is a dredge design that did not work because the area
filled with sediment soon after completion. A new dredge design that eliminates this
problem will not consider expended dredging costs because the old design does not
provide any benefits to the new project.
Because most costs are tied to the construction phase of a project, they are
expended quickly and early. Benefits on the other hand, are not hlly realized at the
beginning of a project and accrue over time. This makes it necessary to average total
costs and total benefits evenly over the length of the project, on an annual basis, in order
to compare the two. Most projects' life spans are 50 years and no more than 100 years
(USACE, 1991a). Average annual benefits and costs are converted to a stream of present
values using an appropriate discount rate (USACE, 1983a; USACE, 1991a). The annual
benefits and charges are then used to compute the benefit to cost ratio which will
determine whether or not the government will fund the project (USACE, 1991a).
Once a project is accepted, the Army Corps determines the cost share of the
federal government. The remaining cost is the responsibility of the project sponsor,
usually the state or municipality receiving the project. This share is calculated based on
the percentage of benefits deemed NED and private. This is applied to the construction
phase of the project and sometimes to a portion of the annual maintenance costs.

The economic guidelines governing Army Corps navigation projects are found in
the Planning Guidance Notebook (USACE, 2000), the National Economic Development
Procedures Manual - Overview Manual for Conducting National Economic Development
Analysis (USACE, 1991a), and the Economic and Environmental Principles and
Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies (USACE,
1983a). These guidelines are extensive. Their design reflects a desire to streamline the
planning process while establishing practices that treat the public's money in an equitable
and responsible manner.

The Original Proiect - 1959 Feasibility Study
The following summary comes from data and information found in the original
1959 Army Corps feasibility study for Wells Harbor (USACE, 1959). The original
project proposal presented several harbor plans and designs. They were limited to the
smaller harbor design due to a $250,000 local contribution cap, imposed by the Town of
Wells. This plan called for a 2.4 m deep at mean low water (MLW) channel entrance
with a 1.8 m deep (MLW) anchorage. The channel would terminate behind the north end
of Wells Beach where a 7.4-acre anchorage would accommodate 150 vessels. The Corps
and town interviewed people, conducted written surveys, and reviewed activity at other
Maine harbors. They determined that the harbor would attract 150 vessels. The benefits
and costs for the project are listed in Table 4.3 and 4.4.

Benefit Classifications
Recreational (boating)
Commercial Fishing (lobster)
Shore Protection (Wells Beach and Drakes Island)
l ~ a n dEnhancement (public landing and parking)
Table 4.3 Benefit classifications for the original Wells I [arbor Project 1959 (USACE, 1959).

Cost Classifications
Material and Labor -jetty construction
Dredging
Engineering and Design
Administrative
Navigation Aids - buoys
Authorization Study
Infrastructure Changes - move waterline
Table 4.4 Cost classifications for the original Wells Ha 3or Project - 1959
(USACE, 1959).
Recreational benefits for boating were a combination of new boat purchases,
transferred boats from other harbors, and transient use from day visitors. Commercial
benefits were defined as increased catch due to a larger lobster fleet and lower
operational costs for transferred boats due to the closer proximity of the harbor. Lobster
boats were firther divided into filltime or part time operations.
Shore protection benefits were predicted for Wells Beach and Drakes Island based
on the impounding of sediment from a northerly and southerly longshore currents. It was
assumed that Wells Beach would widen by 396 m and Drakes Island would widen by
approximately 305 m. The protection was calculated as a percentage of home values
based on a lower probability of storm damage due to a larger beach buffer. It was
projected that land enhancement would result directly from the construction of a public

landing and parking lot formed from the disposed dredge spoils. (See Appendix A for a
full explanation of the formulas used to calculate benefits from 1959.)
Costs were a combination of the materials and labor needed to complete the
project to specification and the studies and administrative work necessary to design and
implement the project. Additional costs included navigation aids and follow-up studies.

Calculating Benefits
Town officials mailed 2,000 questionnaires to townspeople in Wells. One
hundred and forty seven people responded, a low response rate at just over 7%. One
hundred and twenty-three were in favor of development and 23 were in opposition. Of
the 123,77 reported that they would buy a new boat and 45 who owned boats in
neighboring harbors would move to Wells Harbor. By word of mouth, town officials
determined that there would be heavy transient usage from boat owners in neighboring
ports. The Army Corps used the history of high volume activity in neighboring ports as a
predictor for the level of activity in Wells (USACE, 1959) (Table 4.5). Using these, the
Army Corps calculated the monetary benefits of the fleet and combined this with the
Shore Protection and Land Enhancement benefits to compute total annual benefits (Table
4.6).

I

Vessel Type

New Recreational Vessels
Transferred Recreational Vessels
Transient Recreational Vessels
New Commercial Vessels
Transferred Commercial Vessels

Total Vessels

I

Vessel Numbers
103
27
6
11
3
150

Table 4.5 Projected fleet size for Wells Harbor from the 1959 study (USACE,

Benefit Classification
Recreational Vessels
Commercial Vessels
Shore Protection
Land Enhancement

Total Annual Benefits

Annual Benefit
$17,070
$8,260
$1,000
$1,250
$27,580

Table 4.6 Projected annual benefits for Wells Harbor by category from
the 1959 study (USACE, 1959).

Calculating Cost
Total construction costs were calculated using the prices of materials and labor
needed to complete the project. Jetty construction cost $7.50 per ton of stone. Dredging
of the entire project cost approximately $1.65 per m3. A 15% contingency fee was added
to these construction costs. Engineering, design, and administrative costs were also
figured into the total (Table 4.7).

1

Activity
Jetty Construction - 17,500 tons
Dredging - 178,906 m3
Engineering and Design
Administrative
Total Construction Cost

I

Cost
$151,000
$337,000
$14,000
$38,000

1

$540,000

Table 4.7 Projected total construction costs for Wells Harbor from the
1959 study (USACE, 1959).

Federal guidelines required that the project construction costs be divided into a
federal and local share based on the percentage of benefits that go toward RED and NED
(USACE, 1983a). It was determined that federal funds would cover 63% of the
construction and the town of Wells would cover the remaining 27%. This kept their
share at $205,000, less than the $250,000 limit they required. The Army Corps
committed to covering subsequent dredging, jetty maintenance, and aids to navigation.
These costs were converted to annual charges for a project with a 50-year lifespan
using a discount rate of 2.5% and an amortization rate of 1.03%. Annual maintenance
charges and navigation aids were added on to calculate the total average annual cost.
They assumed an infill rate of 3,058 m3 per year at a cost of approximately $1.96 per m3
dredged and jetty repairs for 175 tons of stone each year at $10 per ton. Table 4.8 shows
the annual costs by category.
The calculated annual benefits and costs gave the Army Corps a cost-to-benefit
ratio of 1.0 for the proposed project. Although this was marginal, it allowed them to
begin the project and commit federal funds.

Activity
Jetty Construction (Jetties and Project Dredge)
Dredging Maintenance
Jetty Maintenance
Navigation Aids
Total Annual Cost

Annual Cost
$19,500
$6,000
$1,800
$100
$27,400

Table 4.8 Projected annual costs for Wells Harbor from the original 1959
study (USACE, 1959).

The Original Proiect - 1961 Design Memorandum
After acceptance of the feasibility study, the Army Corps produced a design
memorandum outlining technical features in finer detail. Project design remained the
same, but costs and benefits estimates changed. These changes resulted from changes in
prices of labor and material, and new benefits resulted from updated information
regarding recreational and commercial use of the harbor (USACE, 1962). The new total
cost of construction came to $580,000, translating to $28,400 in annual costs over 50
years.
Table 4.9 outlines the changes in the annual benefit. Land Enhancement benefits
were removed,14 and there was an increase in Shore Protection. With the new
calculations, the new benefit to cost ratio became 1.2, an increase from the original ratio
of 1.O. This reinforced the decision to undertake the project.

14

They were removed because the cost of construction would eliminate the economic benefits in the end
(USACE, 1959)

Annual Benefit

Benefit Classification
Recreational Vessels
Commercial Vessels
Shore Protection
Land Enhancement

I

Total Annual Benefits

I

$34,080

1

Table 4.9 Projected annual benefits for Wells Harbor from the 1961
design memorandum (USACE, 1962).

New Proiect Design - 1962 Supplement to D e s i ~ nMemorandum
At this time, engineers noticed a design flaw in the project. Shoaling was
blocking the channel, and erosion of the northern tip of Wells Beach required immediate
mitigation. The design issue was addressed with a 60-meter extension of the north jetty
(USACE, 1962). The Army Corps felt that this would solve the problems they were
facing. These changes amounted to a change in the original project design. The Army
Corps was required to conduct a new economic evaluation if the original design changed
to determine if the benefit to cost ratio remained at least 1.O. The annual benefits
remained the same at $34,080 because the overall objective of producing an inlet and
anchorage for 150 vessels had not changed. Changes in cost resulted from the extension
of the north jetty (Table 4.10).
The original cost estimate from 1959 was $548,000 and the working estimate as
of 1962 was $443,000. The Army Corps had come in under the projected budget
presented in the original design of 1959 (USACE, 1959). The additional $100,000 did
not change the projected total cost, and therefore the benefit to cost ratio did not decrease.
Additional stone required additional yearly maintenance, but the increase was minor and

did not affect early economic predictions. Based on this, the Army Corps proceeded with
the changes.

Costs

Activity
Construction
Engineering and Design
Administration

I

Total Additional Costs

I

$79,000
$3,000
$12,000

$100,000

Table 4.10 Projected total additional costs for north jetty extension from
the 1962 supplement to the design memorandum (USACE, 1962).

New Proiect Design - 1965 Supplement to D e s i ~ nMemorandum
Shoaling problems continued within the inlet and anchorage areas. High wave
energy within the inlet made travel hazardous and damaged dredging equipment
(USACE, 1965a). Engineers believed that a 396-meter and 373-meter extension to the
south and north jetties, respectively, would stop sediment from entering the inlet from the
sides. A retention basin was also designed to trap sediment moving into the anchorage
from within the estuary (USACE, 1965a). The extensions were oriented slightly to the
south to block incoming waves from the east and to decrease wave energy within the inlet
and to decrease the amount of sediment transported into the entrance. Again, this
amounted to a change in the accepted design of the project requiring another reevaluation
of the benefits and costs.
Construction to that point cost $576,000. The new proposed construction would
cost an additional $878,000 bringing the total construction costs to $1,454,000. From
this total, the Army Corps deducted $370,000 for prior dredging and mitigation to the

northern tip of Wells Beach. These expenses represented "sunk costs" and did not affect
the future flow of benefits (USACE, 1965a). The final cost projection was $1,084,000.
Using an interest rate of 3.125% and an amortization rate of 0.854%, the annual
costs were calculated. The annual maintenance costs were recalculated assuming a
sedimentation rate of 10,704 m3per year at approximately $2.10 per m3 (Table 4.11).
Jetty maintenance increased to 1,000 tons of stone a year at $6 per ton (USACE, 1965a).

Activity

Cost

Construction
Jetty Maintenance
Dredging Maintenance

$43,200
$6,000
$22,400

Total Annual Cost

$71,600

Table 4.11 Projected annual costs for project modification from the 1965
supplement to the design memorandum (USACE, 1965a).

The realized annual benefit for 1965 was $40,920. The benefit to cost ratio was
well under 1 over the remaining life of the project. By federal guidelines, the Army
Corps was unable to proceed with the additions unless benefits increased (USACE,
199 1a). Other than the increased construction costs for the jetties, a majority of the cost
change comes from the maintenance dredging. Maintenance dredging started at $6,000
per year in the original design (USACE, 1959). By 1965 maintenance dredging increased
to $22,400 a year. Jetty maintenance jumped from $1,800 a year in the original design
(USACE, 1959) to $6,000 a year in the second supplement. Maintenance accounted for

28% of the annual cost in 1959. By 1965, maintenance accounted for 40% of the annual
cost.
This prompted a revue of projected annual benefits. Based on projected growth in
national population, GNP, and dispensable income through the year 2020, the Army
Corps reasoned that the original design for a 150-vessel harbor would not accommodate
growth patterns to be experienced in the U.S. Increased disposable income was used as
an indicator for greater demand for recreation. Based on these projections, it was
determined that the demand for space at Wells Harbor would increase by 10 times during
the 50-year project life. This growth necessitated expansion of the harbor in 5 increments
approximately every 10 years to eventually accommodate 1500 vessels. This represented
an increase in both recreational and commercial fishing fleet (USACE, 1965a).
By the 50th year of the project it was projected that there would be a fleet of
1,215 recreational boats and 135 commercial boats. These would produce a total of
$413,100 in benefits. Assuming a straight-line economic growth of 38.6625%, the
annual benefits came to $159,715 for the remainder of the project.
Costs were recalculated to account for the expansions. Total construction cost
was projected at $3 16,200. Using the same straight-line growth assumption, the annual
costs came to $122,250 for the remainder of the project. These were combined with the
annual benefits and costs already realized by 1965 (Table 4.12 and 4.13).

II

Benefit Classification

1

Annual Benefit

I

Realized Annual Benefit
Annual Benefits for Remainder of
Project

$40,920
$159,715
$200,635

Total Annual Benefits

Table 4.12 Adjusted annual benefit projections for project modifications
from the 1965 supplement to the design memorandum (USACE, 1965a).

Activity

Annual Cost

Realized Annual Cost
Annual Cost for Remainder of Project

$73,200
$122,250

I

Total Annual Cost

I

$195,450

Table 4.13 Adjusted annual cost projections for project modifications from
the 1965 supplement to the design memorandum (USACE, 1965a).

This produced a benefit to cost ratio of 1.03. Based on this ratio, the Army Corps was
able to go forward with the changes in the project.

Economic Analvsis - Post 1965

Little happened on the project after the modifications made in 1965. The jetty
extensions and dredging were completed in 1967. Subsequent dredges occurred in 1970,
1971, and 1974 to clear the channel entrance and anchorage (USACE, 1980a). Dredging
and activity on the channel ceased after 1974 due to beach property owners' concerns
over the accelerated erosion of their beaches. In the interim the Army Corps conducted a
new economic analysis of the project (USACE, 1980a). The report reviewed the
economic feasibility of continued maintenance dredging of Wells Harbor and the inlet.

The Army Corps decided to approach the project as a new venture. They
acknowledged that previous construction and design were unable to meet project
specifications. All prior costs were treated as sunk costs. The project was viewed as
purely a redevelopment project with existing navigation jetties. Three options were
presented for benefit to cost comparison. Two options investigated dredging the project
on a 3-year cycle. The first looked at the remaining 3 1 years of the project life while the
second treated the project as a new endeavor and projected over 50 years. The third
alternative was a "do-nothing" option that allowed the current shoaling to continue
without any future dredge.
The study assumed that shoaling would continue at approximately 16,820 m3 per
year, an increase from the 10,704 m3 used in the 1965 analysis. Dredging plans would
clear approximately 49,696 m3 of sand every three years. Additionally, an initial 64,987
m3 would need to be removed to return the project to its original depth and dimensions.
The dredging plan was the same for both the 3 1-year and 50-year projections. The
appropriate discount and amortization rates were applied along with a 10% contingency
fee. The 3 1-year plan had an annual cost of $137,950 and the 50-year plan had an annual
cost of $136,826.
Benefits were calculated based on peak operation capacity experienced from
1973-1974 (Table 4.14).

Number of Vessels

Vessel Type
Permanent Recreational Fleet
Overnight Transient
Short-term Transient
Commercial

1

Total Vessels

I

165

Table 4.14 Wells Harbor peak boat activity from 1973-1974 (USACE, 1980a)

The Army Corps assumed those levels would return after a full dredge. The same
benefits apply to both dredging plans (Table 4.15).

1

Benefit Classification

Benefit
$177,790
$43,550

Recreational Fleet
Commercial Fleet

/

Total Annual Benefits

1

$221,340

1

Table 4.15 Projected total annual benefits for Wells Harbor from the 1980
maintenance report (USACE, 1980a).

With these benefits, both plans generated a benefit to cost ratio of 1.6. This justified the
Army Corps continuing with the maintenance of the project.
The final "do-nothing" alternative was also considered. In this scenario the
assumption was that there would be no cost because there would be no further
maintenance activity. The Army Corps assumed that the shoaling rates would reduce the
total recreational fleet to 16 permanent boats and daily activity to 3 boats using the public
ramp. The commercial fleet would be reduced to 3 lobster boats. The total annual

benefits would be approximately $20,350. This was still a benefit to cost ratio greater
than one, but it was not chosen because it was not the benefit maximizing option. The
dredging plans supported greater economic activity; therefore, based on federal economic
regulations, they were chosen over the "do-nothing" option.
Small dredges occurred in 1990 and 1991. A modified larger dredge occurred in
2000 with another emergency dredge for the entrance in 2002. Originally, the 2000
dredge was economically justified by the prediction that the harbor fleet would be
between 200 and 250 vessels. The original 150-vessel fleet no longer justified federal
involvement (USACE, 1997a). This calculation also did not factor the original jetty
construction into the costs.
The long-term dredge program outlined in the 1980 report has not occurred.
Changing costs and benefits over the 23 years from the 1980 report might warrant
another economic analysis; however, both the Town of Wells and the Army Corps are
currently pursuing approval of an extended dredging program.

Economic Summarv
The following are summary charts documenting the progression of costs and
benefits predictions throughout the life of the Wells Harbor project. All calculations are
in year 2003 dollars unless otherwise noted.15
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Historic costs were put into current 2003 dollars using the Gross Domestic Product Deflator inflation
index with a base year of 1996.

Original Estimate
(1959)

Design Memo
Estimate (1961)

Supplement #I
Estimate (1962)

Supplement #2 Estimate
(1965)

Table 4.16 Total projected construction cost estimates for Wells Harbor 1959-1965
(2003 dollars)

*

This does not include the $370,000 (1965 dollars) of mitigation performed on
Wells Beach and the inlet.

Table 4.17 Total historic federal and local expended costs for Wells Harbor 1965 to
1980, reported in the specific project year's dollars. They have not been converted to
current dollars because each figure was compiled from several different years and include
the previous years' figures. They were never normalized. They are useful as an indicator
of what was actually spent during the major construction years of the project (USACE,
1980a).

Original
Estimate
(1959)

Design Memo
Estimate
(196 1)

Supplement #1
Estimate
(1962)

Supplement #2
Estimate
(1965)

Reconnaissance
Report Estimate
(1980)

$143,195

$172,564

$170,233

$958,654*

$440,765 **

Table 4.18 History of projected annual benefit estimates for Wells Harbor from 19591980 (2003 dollars)

* Includes the physical expansion of the harbor into the year 2016
** Does not include the cost of prior jetty construction, just dredging and maintenance.

Original
Estimate
(1 959)

Design Memo
Estimate
(1961)

Supplement #1
Estimate
(1962)

Supplement #2
Estimate
(1965)

Reconnaissance
Report Estimate
(1980)

Table 4.19 History of projected annual cost estimates from 1959- 1980 (2003 dollars)

*
**
***

Includes the expansions of harbor into the year 2016
3 1-year plan (does not consider original construction costs of jetties and harbor)
50-year plan (does not consider original construction costs of jetties and harbor)

Original
Estimate
(1959)

1.OO

Design Memo Supplement # l Supplement
Estimate
Estimate
#2 Estimate
(196 1)
(1962)
(1965)

1.20

1.20

1.03

Reconnaissance
Report Estimate
(1980)

1.60*

Table 4.20 History of estimated benefit-cost ratios for Wells Harbor from 1959-1980
(2003 dollars)

*Does not include the cost of prior jetty construction, just dredging and maintenance.

Wells Harbor Economic Analvsis

This project was marginally justified with a benefit-cost ratio of almost exactly
one. It was justified on its predicted ability to generate recreational boating benefits and
commercial fishing benefits. The basis of their benefit figures comes from a survey and
"word of mouth". The original survey16,mentioned in this section was sent to 2000

16

No copy of the original survey was available for inspection.

86

people in wells.17 Of the 2000 people, 147 responded, giving a response rate ofjust 7%.
Of the 147 responses, 123 were in favor of the harbor for both recreational and
commercial purposes. This represented 84% of the total respondents. The Army Corps
read these biased results as a favorable endorsement of the harbor.
Statistically, this is not a good indicator of a community's interest in the project.
It is, however, a rough measure for boat usage if one were to assume that all positive
respondents followed through and put a boat in the harbor. The Army Corps, via "word
of mouth", determined that in addition to the 123 potential boaters in the town, at least 27
more would come from the surrounding areas and round off a fleet of 150 vessels. These
questionable calculation methods are of concern considering that a slight change in
benefits could have produced a benefit-cost ratio of < 1, and the project theoretically
would never have materialized.

Familiar Cost Patterns
Over the history of the project some familiar cost patterns emerged. In particular,
it is clear that costs were underestimated from the start. Cost projections increased after
authorization and the start of construction. In 2003 dollars, the initial costs estimate for
the 50-year project was $2.85 million in 1959. By 1965 this jumped to $5.18 million.
Annually, this was a jump from $142,261 to $342,112. This figure did not include the
proposed expansions of the harbor to accommodate the growing fleet. In that case, the
annual costs jumped to $933,880, an increase in over $700,000 a year from the original
estimate. By 1980 the annual costs were back down to $272,475 covering dredging and

17

No explanation was offered for how the 2000 were selected.
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maintenance for 50 years, but none of the initial construction costs. Even this figure was
higher than the original combined price of construction and maintenance.
Much of these economic gyrations were driven by an underestimation of the
sedimentation rate and growing maintenance costs resulting from a physically expanding
project. The yearly maintenance costs went from 28% of the total projected costs in
1959, to 40% of the total projected costs in 1965, to approximately 100% of the total
projected costs by 1980. Through this time period, Army Corps predictions for
sedimentation rates rose from 3,058 m31yearto 16,820 m31yearwithin in the inlet and
anchorage, five times the original figure (USACE, 1980a).
There are also "incidental" costs not considered in the accounting of the project.
These costs are not considered because they have no direct bearing on the performance of
the navigation project even though they are a result of the project's presence. These
include deterioration of recreational beach, damage to existing protective structures,
higher probability of damage to development, and loss of habitat both along the beaches
and in the salt marshes of the estuary. These have never been calculated but are likely
substantial. The value of the Benefit Cost Analysis decreases because it does not
consider the economic effects in these areas and therefore is incomplete.

Familiar Benefit Patterns
Just as costs rose, so did benefits. For the most part they kept pace with the
increases in costs. The benefit-cost ratio ranges from 1.0 to 1.2 and back to 1.0 from
1959 to 1965. In 2003 dollars the annual benefits in 1959 were $143,195. By 1962 they
had increased to $170,233 keeping pace with the minor additions made to the project

design. Major changes in the design called for in 1965 (doubling the lengths of both
jetties) drove costs up considerably. To justi@ such an addition to the project there
needed to be a considerable increase in benefits. Army Corps planners broke from the
established methods of benefit calculation and now based benefits on projected national
population growth over 50 years. They thus determined that Wells Harbor would expand
to accommodate 1500 vessels, ten times the original figure. In hindsight (and maybe at
the time) a tenfold expansion in use seems ridiculous. By doing this, however, planners
were able to once again just@ embarking on an economically marginal project with a
benefit-cost ratio, again, of 1 . 0 . ' ~
It becomes clear in review that, along with undervalued costs, there was a
considerable overvaluation of benefits. By 1980 the Army Corps had acknowledged
(although not specifically) that previous economic forecasts were not viable. All prior
costs, $4,070,555 in 1980 dollars, were considered sunk, and hture benefits were based
on experienced levels of activity.

How Accurate Were the Orieinal Proiections?
With the exception of the 1965 projections, projected mooring space ranged from
150 to 200 boats. Despite the haphazard method of surveying used to generate the
original boat numbers, records show that this number is reasonable. In 1973 they were
able to bring in approximately 150 boats (USACE, 1980a), and in 2002 there were 142
paid spots in the harbor (Wells Harbor, 2002). This does not even account for transient
use and day-use of the public boat ramp. Based on the records, it is difficult to know
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NOphysical plans were presented for how these vessels would be accommodated.

whether they were able to achieve the mix of recreational boats projected to use the
harbor.
Commercially, the number of lobster and fishing boats did increase. The original
report in 1959 predicted that 14 additional lobster boats would use the harbor (USACE,
1959). Mooring records for 2002 list 24 commercial boats using the harbor and of those,
11 are reported as lobster boats. This is in line with the original projections. The number
of boats, however, is not what generates the benefits. The benefits are based on landings
for new boats and closer proximity for existing boats. Records do not support a vibrant
lobster industry for York County and show a marked decrease in the ground fishing
industry for Maine since the beginning of the project (Figures 4.1 1, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15,
and 4.16).
The Maine Department of Marine Resources does not consider York County or
Wells Harbor to be a particularly productive harvesting area. They feel that most
lobstermen and fishermen were going either north or south out of the harbor to better
grounds (Wilson, 2003). This would negate the benefit of proximity to the lobster
grounds, and harbor planners felt that commercial operations out of Wells Harbor would
have. It is not clear whether the commercial benefits were achieved, but the data
definitely supports a meager contribution from York County and a dying ground fishing
industry for the entire state. In fact, the Army Corps no longer is able to use increased
landings as a benefit in project justification unless expressly supported by the National
Marine Fisheries Service (Habel, 2003).
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Figure 4.11 Lobster landings in pounds for the State of Maine and York County
1964 - 2001. York County has not experienced the boom the rest of the state has
experienced since 1990 (Maine DMR website, 2003; Wilson 2003).
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Figure 4.12 Value of lobster landings in 2001 dollars for the State of Maine and
York County 1964 2001 (Maine DMR website, 2003; Wilson 2003).
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Figure 4.13 Halibut landings in pounds for the State of Maine 1964 - 2001. The
graph shows a substantial decline in recent years (Maine DMR website, 2003)
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Figure 4.14 Value of halibut landings for the State of Maine in 2001 dollars 1964
2001 (Maine DMR website, 2003)

-

Cod Landings Maine 1964-2001

I --t Millions of Pounds I

I

YEAR

Figure 4.15 Cod landings in pounds for the State of Maine 1964 - 2001. Like
halibut, there has been a substantial decline in recent years (Maine DMR website,
2003).
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Figure 4.16 Value of cod landings for the State of Maine in 2001 dollars 1964 200 1 (Maine DMR website, 2003)

In regard to storm protection, it is easy enough to see that the original projections
of accretion along the lengths of Wells Beach and Drakes Island were wrong. Accretion
along the jetties does protect the few properties in that area, but far more properties now
have less beach then they would have without the jetties.

What Do these Results Reveal?
It is important to appreciate the role played by the economic analysis in these
projects. The benefit-cost ratio test is the final hurdle for project approval. Once it is
satisfied, Army Corps projects start and are difficult to stop. It takes an act of Congress
and a lengthy review period, not to mention money, to decommission a federal navigation
project, and this does not necessarily remove the structures (Habel, 2003; Michaud 2003).
For this reason, it is important to approach marginal economic projects with caution. As
is seen in this case, if the benefits or costs had been more closely reviewed, any slight
shift would have made this project unfeasible. Theoretically, the project and its problems
would not have materialized if this were a simply a case of adhering to economic
guidelines.
The computation of benefits needs to account for uncertainty in the setting and
must consider the irreversible nature of the project. Probabilities should be used to
generate expected values that incorporate more than one scenario. Beyond the cost of
construction and maintenance, the potential loss of environmental amenities needs to be
considered in the overall cost projections. Again, probabilities should be used to generate
expected values from a range of scenarios. This may not have been possible at the start
of the project, but it is possible now and for future projects.

Wells Harbor - The Politics
Interviews

Open-ended interviews were conducted with 7 people representing 7 different
interests involved in the Wells Harbor Project. These interests include: Maine Geological
Survey, Maine Audubon, the New England Division of the Army Corps, the Town of
Wells, the Maine Coastal Program, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Maine Sea Grant
Extension, and Save our Shores (SOS) Wells.
Interviews were designed in order to identi@ the groups' perception of the
problem, the relationship with other groups, and their perception of success. The
following is a summary of the results.

I

Perceived Problem

Project Design
Harbor and Inlet Shoaling Creates Hazardous Setting
Beach Erosion Threatening Natural Setting
Beach Erosion Threatening Development
Dredging Threatens Estuary and Salt Marsh
State and Town Relationship
State Regulations Unreasonable
Town and USF&WS Relationship
Public Funding Private Interests
Divisions Within Community
State Regulations Not Understood By Stakeholders
Town and Maine Audubon Relationship
Balancing Working Harbor with Healthy Beach
Lack of Long Term Planning for SLR
Lack of Funding
Unwillingness to Consider Other Options

Frequency (n=7)
6
6
5
5
5
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 4.21 Problem areas with the Wells Harbor Project identified during interviews
with the 7 groups listed above. The frequency column shows how many groups out of
the 7 felt that this particular area was a problem.

Relationship Rating

IKEY:

Number of Responses

0 - poor, 1 - neutral, 2 - positive

Table 4.22 Relationship ratings for the Wells Harbor Project. Each of the 7 people was
asked to rate their relationship with the other 6 groups. Poor was a 0, neutral was a 1, and
positive was a 2. There were a total of 42 possible responses from the 7 groups.

Perceived Success
Working Beach and Working Harbor Per Design
Working Beaches
Change State Regulations to Address Local Problems
Small Working Harbor with Minimal to No Dredge
Remove Jetties - Allow Harbor and Beach to Return to Natural States
Partnership of State and Stakeholders Toward Common Goal
Acceptance of Current Equilibrium in System
Working Harbor
Establish Routine Dredging Schedule
Remove Public Funding for Such Projects
[preserve Habitat on Beaches and within Estuary

Frequency (n=7)

1

Table 4.23 Perceptions of success for the Wells Harbor Project as identified by the 7
groups. The frequency column shows how many of the groups out of the 7 felt that
particular solution was viable.

The Health of the Current Political Environment

Health in the context of the political environment is a subjective term. Here, a
healthy environment is defined by consensus and open communication. The interviews
reveal a political environment in poor health. Perceptions of the problem are varying.
Some are compatible, some are not, but the wide range indicates a lack of consensus and

focus. This translates negatively when attempting to address the problems in a manner
that suits all or even a majority of stakeholders.
This view is supported when looking at the responses regarding the health of the
relationships between participating parties. There are a possible 42 different responses
with 7 groups commenting on each other. One third of the responses identified poor
relationships with only one half identifying positive relationships. Within this, 6 of the 7
groups are not aware of the perception of at least one of the other groups. Group A may
believe they have a mutually positive relationship with Group B when in fact Group B
views the relationship negatively. This is indicative of poor communication and paints a
picture of a negative negotiating environment.
The perceptions of success are wide ranging. No more than 2 groups share any
single view of success. This again is indicative of a lack of consensus. Additionally,
some views are incompatible. It would be impossible to develop a harbor and at the same
time dismantle the jetties to allow the harbor and beaches to return to their natural states.
Based on the responses, the political environment is unhealthy. In its current
state, it is doubthl whether any consensus toward a plan can be reached. Something in
the current political environment needs to change before any progress is made on these
issues.

Political History and Environment of Wells
The Wells Harbor Project has been politically charged from its inception. The
Army Corps did not want to construct a harbor due to marginal economic returns and an
unstable environment (Habel, 2003). State and federal officials also voiced their doubts

during the initial site visit. They did not believe that an anchorage placed over a tidal
delta could be maintained (Dickson, 2002; Kelley, 2003; Lang, 2003). Local business
interests lobbied for the project and were able to convince Senator Margaret Chase Smith
to push the Army Corps forward on the project (Habel, 2003; Lang, 2003).
Problems plagued the project through the 1960s and 1970s. The harbor continued
to shoal. Wells Beach and Drakes Island were experiencing accelerated rates of erosion,
and residents watched as sand became impounded alongside the jetties. Beach property
owners blocked hture dredging after the 1974 dredge. They suspected erosion was due
to the presence of the jetties and blamed the Army Corps. The harbor filled with sand
and went from 186 moorings in 1974 to 40 in 1980 (USACE, 1980a).
Factions formed within the community. The non-beach property owners and
harbor enthusiasts wanted the harbor for economic development while the beachfront
property owners felt that hture dredging would harm their investments. Beach property
owners were able to block attempts to dredge by denying access to their property for
disposal equipment (Carter, 2002; Humm, 1984). The residents of Drakes Island offered
the town access to their beach properties for the sum of $1.3 million so that the residents
could reap the benefits of the federally paid sand (Carter, 2002). This hrther deteriorated
relationships within the community. An outside mediator was brought in to help solve
issues between the town and beach owners. They were successhl in opening a dialog but
were not successhl in implementing any plan (Humm, 1984).
During this same time issues over habitat arose. Maine Audubon, concerned over
shorebird habitat on both beaches, was able to reach a cooperative management
agreement with the property owners along Wells Beach and Drakes Island. The

agreement ensured the safety of nesting areas while allowing property owners to maintain
their autonomy. The program has been a success and established Maine Audubon as a
participating party in the present debate (Carter, 2002; Jones, 2003).
Another habitat issue was the Rachel Carson Wildlife Refuge located in the salt
marsh surrounding the anchorage. The Refuge was established in 1966 in Wells during
the time ofjetty construction. It is under the management of the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service. The initial area encompassed 5,000 acres and was planned to grow to
7,600 acres, stretching from Kittery to Cape Elizabeth (USF&WS, 2003). The original
spoils disposal area is located within the Refuge. Because the Army Corps could no
longer use the Refuge for dredge disposal, they needed access to the beaches. The
presence of the Rehge established the USF&WS as another participating party in the
debate.
By the late 1980s, the town regrouped with property owners. Those who once
blocked a dredge now supported a dredge. Their change of heart resulted from increased
erosion in front of their homes and from the realization that the only nourishment they
would receive would come from dredge spoils (Figure 4.17). This was hrther bolstered
by the state's newly initiated policy of retreat from the coast. The Sand Dune Rules and
Shoreland Zoning Act eliminated hture construction of hard protective structures like
seawalls and greatly limited development and construction within the coastal zone.
This began to unite the two factions within the town (Carter, 2002). A highly
publicized grounding of then Vice-president Bush's boat on a harbor shoal hrther
strengthened their resolve (Kreis, 1988). Plans for a new dredge were formulated in
1990. Key opposition came from the Rachel Carson Wildlife Rehge and state agencies

that felt the proposed dredge was too destructive to the intertidal flats and salt marsh
environments surrounding the anchorage (Cohen, 1990; Macey, 1988). The town had to
settle for a small emergency dredge to clear the inlet. Bad feelings between the
community of Wells and both the USF&WS and the State of Maine began to grow.
Community members approached Senator Cohen to get Vernon Lang, the USF&WS field
representative, removed from the project (Lang, 2003). A similar thing had happened to
Andy French, the Refuge manager and local Wells resident, in 1988 (Kreis, 1988).

Figure 4.17 Photograph of eroded Wells Beach from 1983. There is very little
dry beach and the waves are breaking on the seawalls (Photo courtesy of J.T.
Kelley).

By the early 1990s the erosion problems along the beaches became more serious.
The state and the town proposed a plan to move sand impounded along the jetties back to
eroded areas of the beach (Kimberall Chase, 1994). Governor McKernan enlisted the aid

of the Maine National Guard to complete the construction. State and local h n d s heled
the project, and the Army Corps agreed to act as consultant. This represented a
cooperative effort by local, state, and federal interests.
The project faced several problems. The sand targeted for removal was a part of
peoples' properties. It required their permission for removal and the permission of all
residents to operate machinery over their properties. Wells was not able to get all
residents to agree (Dynan, 1994). The town urged the state to take the sand by imminent
domain, and Governor McKernan was ready to send in the machinery. Maine Geological
Survey (MGS) and the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) both
blocked the project citing legal problems. Resource regulations prohibited the disruption
of sand with dune grass, and there were private property takings issues. The project was
cancelled, enraging the community. SOS Wells publicly blamed MGS (Kelley, 2003).
The relationship between the state and Wells was in shambles. The community
accused state agencies of arrogance and of obstructionist tactics, some vowing to never
cooperate with the state in the hture (Dynan, 1994). Some residents refer to this as the
time when the state "washed their hands" of Wells and their problems (Foley, 2002).
This hrther solidified the community's resolve. SOS Wells has been at the forefront of
dredging efforts for the harbor and shore protection ever since. They advocate on behalf
of beach property owners on Wells Beach and Drakes Island.
The town and the Army Corps proposed another dredge plan in 1996. It received
strong criticism from MGS, Maine Audubon, and the USF&WS (Ahearn, 1996; Bartlett,
1996; Marvinney, 1996). Negotiations went on for two more years and agreement was
reached on a compromise dredge. The town agreed to rearrange the existing anchorage,

moving the moorings to the natural channel within the estuary. This greatly reduced the
amount of dredging. Additionally, the flood tidal delta within the estuary was placed into
a conservation easement, removing it from future dredging operations. The town also
agreed to institute an extensive monitoring program of the salt marsh at their own
expense (Carter, 2002). The objective was to determine what effects the dredge had on
the surrounding marsh. The monitoring program was instituted for 5 years, at which
point the data will be analyzed by a board of scientists to determine whether dredging
will continue in the future.
The dredge was to occur in 1998, but USF&WS held up the process to ensure that
the town would pay for any damage to the Rachel Carson Wildlife Refuge (Cohen, 2000).
Once this agreement was made the dredge proceeded in 2000. The spoils were placed
upon Wells Beach and Drakes Island. The immediate impact of the replenishment was
short-lived, and the beaches are returning to their pre-nourishment states with sand
impounding along the jetties and settling in the entrance of the inlet. The inlet entrance
already needed another emergency dredge in 2002 to maintain navigability. The town
and the Army Corps have already begun the application process for the next dredge in
anticipation of the end of the monitoring program in 2005.
The town maintains its isolation from the state and has hired its own geologists
and economists to plead its case (Carter, 2002). Relationships between the parties have
not improved. During the summer of 2002, an estimated 500 property owners organized
by SOS Wells attended a meeting at Wells High School to protest changes to the existing
Sand Dune Rules. The meeting became a shouting match, and speakers were met with
boos and jeers (Cohen, 2002). The DEP, MGS, and Maine Audubon all supported the

changes that included clearer and more detailed definitions of acceptable development
activity in frontal dune areas and methods for computing the value of homes when
determining the extent of storm damage. Properties owners felt that the state was
denying them the ability to protect their properties. This has stressed the already poor
relationship with the town. All parties are anxiously awaiting the results of the
monitoring program in 2005.

Wells Harbor - Political Analysis
There are three important stages in the course of the political history of the Wells
Harbor project. The first is the project authorization stage. The second occurred during
the years immediately following jetty construction and the emergence of erosion
problems. The third stage began in the late 1980s early 1990s and is representative of the
current political environment.

Stape 1: Proiect Authorization
During the authorization period, heavy influence was exercised by special
interests, mainly by Vander Forbes, a local restaurateur and property owner in Wells
(Kelley, 2003). Both state and federal agencies felt that the site would not accommodate
the type of project being requested, physically or economically. Business interests in
Wells pressured Senator Margaret Chase Smith to see that a harbor project was
authorized, and that it would receive federal funding (Habel, 2003). The Senator
requested that the Army Corps accept the project and appropriated the necessary funds.
Regardless of whether the Army Corps wants to take on the project or not, they must do

as they are told by Congress. Without the support of senators and congressmen, the
Army Corps would lose its fbnding.

Stage 2: Communitv Divided
Shortly after completion of the jetties, the beaches adjusted to establish a new
equilibrium. This meant loss of beach for many of the property owners away from the
jetties. They immediately drew a connection between the beach erosion and the
navigation project. They are the ones who brought dredging to a halt for the remainder of
the 1970s and all of the 1980s.
The majority of these stakeholders were out-of-state, seasonal residents with
second homes (Carter, 2002). They viewed the harbor as a problem and did not trust the
Army Corps to make the decision in their best interests. This created a rift in the
community. A segment of the community wanted to see a working harbor, which meant
resuming dredging. They were for the most part year-round residents and were interested
in the economic development the harbor would bring. The community effectively was
split into a beach faction and a harbor faction. This was at the root of delays of
mitigation for the beaches and harbor.

Stage 3: Communitv Versus the State of Maine
As the 1980s came to an end, loss of dry beach continued to be a critical issue,
and the navigation project was not operating at fbll capacity. It was during this time that
the factions within the community found some common ground. The only economic
sources of sand for beach nourishment was in the harbor, and the least expensive place to

dump dredging spoils were the beaches. Dredging the navigation project became the
means to the ends sought by all. The Army Corps was the agency that could make this
all happen and was embraced by the community.
The State of Maine became the new obstacle. Regulatory and ideological changes
in coastal management occurred in 1983 with creation of the Sand Dune Rules later
incorporated into the Natural Resource Protection Act of 1988 (DEP, 1988). The rules
themselves did not necessarily prohibit dredging and nourishment, but they embodied a
movement toward future-thinking coastal planning that accounted for SLR, limited
resources and a desire to maintain the integrity of Maine's natural coastal environment.
This did not and does not mesh with the pro-development stance of Wells or the Army
Corps. The New England ofice of the Army Corps summarized it by describing Maine
as the "last frontier" for coastal development in the 1900s with the potential for many
Army Corps projects. The state's approach to coastal management since 1983 has
frustrated the Army Corps' plans for the Maine coast (Habel, 2003).
The state was and still is reluctant to grant the permission for a dredge of the
harbor until the fbll effects on the surrounding environment are better understood. This
has solidified the factions in the community and their relationship with the Army Corps
against the common obstacle: the State of Maine.

Re~ulatowVersus Development Interests
The conflict has become an issue of regulatory versus development interests.
Development and land-use issues are decided on the local level in Maine. It is a "home
rule" state. The State plays the role of regulator, monitoring activity to ensure that it

meets minimum standards set forth in the state legislation. The issue has become
polarized with the community (and Army Corps) on one side and the State of Maine on
the other. Additionally, there is also the USF&WS, which also takes a regulatory stance
and is seen as another roadblock to fiture dredging in the estuary and nourishment of the
beaches. Maine Audubon also influences such decisions. They monitor bird habitat in
the state and, with a fill-time lobbyist in the state legislature, try to discourage any
activity that threatens birds or their environment (Jones, 2003; Kelley, 2003).

Holistic Analysis
Each component of the case study impacts the project in a particular way. In
order to better understand how the project progressed and why problems are not being
resolved it is necessary to understand the interaction of the different components. In
answering these questions, the project is divided into three phases.

Phase 1: Proiect Authorization
Initially the project was rejected by state and federal agencies.19 Political pressure
was applied to the Congress and Congress, in turn, applied pressure on the Army Corps.
This resulted in a reevaluation of the project. Incomplete coastal data led to
unanticipated economic costs, and poor economic forecasting generated overvalued
benefits. This produced a marginal benefit-to-cost ratio that barely authorized the
project. The question remains whether the political pressure influenced the flawed
economic data and incomplete coastal process data or whether they truly were mistakes.

19

The original technical reasons for the rejection still exist.

It is reasonable to believe that a combination of both occurred. The relationship between
the Army Corps and Congress creates a complete dependency of the agency on Congress
for fbnding and employment. Political pressure by a member of Congress might prompt
the Army Corps to make the adjustments necessary for a project work. It is also
conceivable that better quality data were not available at the time (Figure 4.18).

Phase 2: Proiect Construction

Once authorized, construction of the project began. An initial project design was
created based on the coastal process and economic data (Figure 4.19). The construction
phase started and problems arose. This brought about a review in the project design,
recycling the original flawed economic and coastal process data. Design modifications
were made and construction continued. This cycle repeated itself twice before
stakeholders stopped the dredging operations. During this phase, there was an interaction
between the economics and engineering aspects of the project. On one hand, unqualified
opinions of the coastal processes generated false cost figures. On the other hand,
economic constraints helped determine the engineering and design specifications. Old,
often incorrect, data was recycled through the process and problems escalated.

I PROJECT AUTBORIZATION I

Figure 4.18 Project Authorization Phase for the Wells Harbor Project.

PROJECT CONSTRUCTION

Figure 4.19 Construction Phase for the Wells Harbor Project

Phase 3: Mitigation
Construction of the project was completed, and problems persisted, both in the
anchorage and along the adjacent beaches and salt marsh. Attempts were made to
address the problems. Actions were taken, but the participants have not been able to
embark on any decisive, concerted plan. All three components are responsible for this
inability to move forward (Figure 4.20). The coastal processes of the natural setting limit
the engineering options available to address the problems. Economically, they have
limited response options due to the federal criteria. The community is not able to
circumvent this by investing their own money because of their limited resources.
Politically, there is no consensus; there is distrust and there is an atmosphere of "nocompromise". Ideological differences in coastal management exist between all parties.
This does not allow for any movement and hrther complicates existing engineering and
economic problems by stifling negotiation efforts and creating the situation experienced
currently.

MITIGATION

Figure 4.20 Mitigation Phase for the Wells Harbor Project

CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY 2: SAC0 R I W R NAVIGATION PROJECT

Developing the Saco River
In 1824 the Army Corps embarked on a navigation project to improve the inlet
and channel on the Saco River along Maine's southern coast (Figure 5.1). The end result
consisted of two stone jetties over 3.2 krn in combined length and a maintained channel
stretching from the inlet to the head of navigation at the cities of Saco and Biddeford.
Since the project's beginning, the area has experienced a shift from lumber and
manufacturing to commercial fishing and recreational use. The inlet has also experienced
continuous shoaling in the channel and high rates of erosion on both Hills Beach and
Camp Ellis Beach. Many homes have been lost and the community of Camp Ellis is on
constant vigilance as each passing storm sends waves and debris into the homes and
streets of the community.
The community and state have struggled for years to get the Army Corps to take
responsibility for the problems. Over that time, relations have deteriorated within the
community, with the state, and with the Army Corps. Within the last 10 years, efforts to
restore relationships have made some progress, and the state and community succeeded
in getting the Army Corps to accept responsibility and to provide funding for mitigation.
Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter of spending some money. It is a
complicated problem with many contributing factors and no clear solution.
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Figure 5.1 Map of Maine's southern coast and location of the Saco River Project
(Kelley et al., 1989b).

Saco River Navigation Proiect Construction Historv - 1800s
The navigation project officially began in 1824. Federal money was used to build
piers, place aids to navigation, and remove obstructions along the Saco River (USACE,
1910). In 1866, construction began on a jetty on the northern shore of the inlet. Its
purpose was to stabilize the inlet and to block shoaling sand from entering the inlet from
the north. Additionally, the river channel and the 10 piers along its course were
improved. Between 1869 and 1871, a dogleg extension was added to the end of the north
jetty. By 1873, the north jetty was 13 15 m long at a height of 3 m above mean low water
(MLW) (USACE, 1886; USACE, 1910).
Shoaling continued in the inlet and in 1886 other sorts of improvements were
made to the north jetty. Engineers began heightening the jetty in an attempt to stop the
wash over of sediment. By 1897, the entire north jetty had been heightened from 3 m to
4.6 m above MLW along its entire length (USACE 1955; USACE, 1992). Local business
interests requested an improved 1.8 m channel from the inlet to the head of navigation at
the cities of Saco and Biddeford to better accommodate coal-carrying vessels (Pilkey and
Dixon, 1996; USACE, 1886). This was approved and carried out by the Army Corps.
Increasing the height and length of the north jetty did not stop shoaling, and
construction of a southern jetty was authorized in 1891 to address the problem. When
completed, the south jetty was 1372 m long at a height of 1.7 m above MLW. It is
considered a "half-tide" jetty, allowing the flow of water and sediment over its top during
higher tides (USACE, 1934). During that same period, several smaller submerged riprap
jetties were constructed along the river channel between the inlet and the cities of Saco

and Biddeford to help maintain the channel's course and to encourage self-scouring of
sediment (USACE, 1992).

Saco River Navivation Proiect Construction History - 1900s
Shoaling problems continued into the 1900s and engineers were now faced with
the additional problem of erosion along Hills Beach to the south and Camp Ellis Beach to
the north of the inlet. Between 1900 and 1912, the southern jetty was lengthened both
shoreward and seaward. It was reattached to a landward migrating Hills Beach, and its
overall length increased to 1463 m (USACE, 1955). Erosion problems persisted at Camp
Ellis, and in 1912 a 22 m spur jetty was built off the north jetty, parallel to the shore to
slow the rate of erosion along the beach.
Despite problems with shoaling and erosion, channel development continued. In
1912 the Army Corps deepened the channel from 1.8 m to 2.1 m to encourage more
commercial vessel traffic (USACE, 1992). Between 1925 and 1930, the channel from the
inlet to the head of navigation was deepened again to 2.4 m. Shoaling was still an issue
and was addressed with another lengthening of the north jetty. A 1.7 m above MLW the
extension brought the total length of the north jetty to 1768 m (USACE, 1930). Between
1935 and 1938, local officials again approached the Army Corps to increase the channel
depth, this time to 4.6 m. The Army Corps denied this request but lengthened the north
jetty again to stop sediment shoaling at the mouth of the river. The extension was 253 m
long at a height of 1.7 m above MLW (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). The north jetty was
2012 m long.

Erosion problems continued along the shore. In 1953, a 213 m stone revetment
was built by the city of Saco to protect roads in Camp Ellis from being undermined by
the eroding beach (USACE, 1955). In 1958 the north jetty was heightened along the first
213 m from land. This was to prevent sand from crossing the beach to the river (USACE,
1968; USACE, 1992).
These actions did not solve the problems of beach erosion or channel shoaling.
The jetties continued to be outflanked by erosion along the shore. Between 1968 and
1969 both the north and south jetties were extended shoreward. This time they were
secured to stone revetments on each beach. Cracks were filled and tightened, ensuring
that no sand could pass from the river to the beaches at the junctions with the jetties. The
shoreward 259 m of each jetty were raised again. The north jetty was raised to 5.2 m
above MLW, and the south jetty was raised to 3.4 m above MLW (USACE, 1992). A
history of jetty extensions is summarized in Table 5.1, and a history of heightening is
summarized in Table 5.2. See Figure 5.2 for a photograph of the current project.

North Jetty (meters)
1315

Year
1866- 187 1

I

TOTAL

1

2042

South Jetty (meters)
0

I

1463

I

Table 5.1 History ofjetty construction on the Saco River Inlet from 1867 to 1937
(USACE, 1930; 1934; 1955)

Year
Heightening Activity
1866 North jetty constructed at 3m above MLW
1886 North jetty raised to 4.6m above MLW
1891 Southj etty constructed at 1.7m above MLW
1927 North jetty extensions built at 1.7m above MLW
uried shore segment of north jetty raised from 3m to 4.6m above

1

59 m shore section of north jetty raised from 4.6m to 5.2m above
1968 R L W
59 m shore section of south jetty raised from 1.7m to 3.4m above
Table 5.2 History of jetty heightening on the Saco River Inlet from 1866-1968
(USACE, 1886; 1910; 1930; 1934; 1955; 1968; 1992).

Figure 5.2 Aerial photo of the Saco River Inlet 1993. Camp Ellis Beach lies to the
north and Hills Beach lies to the south (Photo courtesy of J.T. Kelley).

Development continued during this time period. In 1968, a proposal to dredge
two anchorages, 10.5 acres in total acreage, and a 10-acre turning basin at the head of
navigation, was accepted (USACE, 1968). Erosion problems continued along the
adjacent beaches. In 1971 a 198 m stone revetment was built along Hills Beach to
protect property from erosion (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). Navigation improvements
continued in 1982 with the construction of another 3-acre anchorage and installation of
13 icebreakers2' in the river. This was to maintain the channel year-round and to protect
anchorages and piers heavy winter ice flows (USACE, 1982). Table 5.3 summarizes the
history of navigation development projects on the Saco River.

Development Activity

Year

1827 Piers improved, navigation aids, obstructions cleared from entrance

1
1

b

Channel deepened to 1.8m from the mouth to the head of
aviaation
hannel deepened to 2. lm from the mouth to the head of
1910
avigation
Channel deepened to 2.4m from the mouth to the head of
1 1 9 2 5 avigation

1

1886

b

onstruction of 2 anchorages 10.5 acres in total area and a 10 acre
urning basin at the head of navigation
Construction of a 3-acre anchorage and installation of 13 ice
1982
breakers
1967

Table 5.3 The history of channel improvement and navigation development on
the Saco River from 1827 to 1982 (USACE, 1886; 1910; 1930; 1934; 1968; 1982)

Beach erosion at Camp Ellis has been an issue since the early 1900s and now is
the main concern of stakeholders and government agencies. Over 30 homes were lost,
and damage regularly occurs to roads and infrastructure. The Army Corps conducted

20

Stationary structures placed upriver of the anchorage to intercept and break ice flows.
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numerous studies from the early 1900s to present. None of the early studies
acknowledged a connection between the jetties and the erosion on adjacent beaches. In
1992 a Section 111 Study finally did acknowledge a connection, and several mitigation
options were presented but none satisfied the federal benefit-cost ratio criterion (USACE,
1992).

"That report, together with a subsequent report by the Waterways Experiment
Station concluded that (1) most if not all of the erosion problems on Camp Ellis
Beach within the first 1300 feet north from the jetty were attributable to the jetty's
effect on waves, (2) erosion for an additional 1,200 feet hrther north along the
beach and (3) that the potential benefits of several alternative solutions did not
offset estimated costs of those solutions." (USACE, 200 1, p 1)

The Army Corps continued to study the problem. They built a physical wave
model in 1995 to better understand the coastal processes around Camp Ellis. The Army
Corps then proposed another breakwater structure that was ultimately rejected as too
expensive and in violation of Maine coastal regulations (Kelley and Anderson., 2000).
The Army Corps did not pursue the project, and the city of Saco was left to address the
problem on its own. Nourishment of Camp Ellis had been attempted over the years, but
only in conjunction with dredging maintenance of the river and with very limited success
(Table 5.4). Sand is removed from the system quickly.

I

Year

I Volume (m3) /

I

Total

1

1

362,184

Cost (that year's dollars)

1

$3,056,072

I

Table 5.4 Recent nourishment history for Hills Beach and Camp Ellis Beach.
Reporting volume and cost in the project year's dollars (Duke University, 2002;
USACE, 2001).
The problems were addressed anew in 200 1 with a revised Section 111 Study.
Economic conditions were more favorable, and finding was secured for studies and
work. Currently, local stakeholders, the state, and the Army Corps are working together
to formulate a mitigation plan. Again, a review of the different components of the case
history sheds light on how this project became so problematic and why participants
weren't able to reach consensus on a solution. The Saco River Project history offers
some insight into the current situation at Wells Harbor, due to its longer history.

Saco River - The Natural Setting
The study area lies within Saco Bay. Saco Bay is approximately 11 km from
southwest to northeast (USACE, 1955). The bay is the northern boundary of Maine's
southwest arcuate embayment compartment. It is bound by two rocky headlands, Prouts
Neck to the north and Fletchers Neck to the south (MCP, 1979; USACE, 1955; USACE,
1991; USACE, 1992). Within the bay, there are numerous islands and rocky outcrops
(USACE, 1955) (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3 Map of Saco Bay and Saco River Project area (Heinze, 2001).

The study area is located at the south end of the bay, just north of Fletchers Neck,
approximately 24 km south of Portland and 149 km north of Boston. The area includes
the Saco River inlet and the adjacent beaches. Hills Beach lies directly to the south of the
inlet while Camp Ellis Beach, Ferry Beach, and Kinney Shores lie to the north. Kinney
Shores is bordered to the north by Goosefare Brook (Nelson, 1979; USACE, 1955).
The navigation project starts at the mouth of the Saco River and extends upriver
approximately 8 km to the head of navigation at the cities of Biddeford and Saco
(USACE, 1924). The project was originally designed for commercial vessels servicing
the manufacturing and textile factories along the Saco River. Today, recreational vessels
and a small fleet of commercial fishermen are the primary users.
The beaches of Saco Bay are popular tourist destinations. Hills Beach, Camp
Ellis Beach, and Ferry Beach are all recreational beaches located just to the south of Old
Orchard Beach, one of Maine's largest beach resorts. These beach areas are heavily
developed. Homes and roads are found in the front and back dunes from Hills Beach
through Camp Ellis Beach (USACE, 1955). The frontal dunes are not as developed near
Ferry Beach, where there is a larger, healthier dune system with mature maritime forests
established in the back dune (Kelley and Anderson, 2000).

Coastal Processes of Saco Bay

The winds in Saco Bay generally follow the same patterns as Wells Bay (see
chapter 4). Humcanes are the most destructive storm activity but are rare. The most
common storm activity comes in the form of extratropical storms.

Wave activity differs from north to south in Saco Bay. The north end of the bay
is sheltered from north and northeast waves by Prouts Neck and Nova Scotia. Northern
areas are exposed to south and southwest waves during the summer. The southern end of
the bay is the opposite. That area is exposed to waves from the northeast but is sheltered
from south and southwest summer swells by Fletchers Neck (Barringer and Ten Broeck,
1978; MCP, 1979; Nelson., 1979; USACE, 1991; USACE, 1992). The study area is
exposed to forces of erosion from northeast waves and is blocked from nourishment
delivered by southwest swells. Hindcast wave data reports mean monthly wave heights
ranging from 0.3 - 0.6 m and maximum monthly wave heights from 3.9 - 4.4 m between
1956 and 1975 for the project area, north to Portland (Jensen, 1983).
Tides are semidiurnal and range between 2.4 m and 2.7 m (MCP, 1979; USACE,
1910; US ACE, 1955). There is a turbulent tidal environment within the estuary of the
Saco River. Ebb and flood current velocity increases down river with ebb currents
relatively faster on average. A June 1992 measurement recorded a 3.76-million m3 tidal
prism during ebb tide and a 1.94-million m3 tidal prism during flood tide. That same day
maximum ebb and flood velocities of 1.15 m per second and 1.26 m per second
respectively were observed. These conditions support sediment suspension in the water
column and are indicative of down river sediment movement (Manthorp, 1995).
Researchers agree that longshore currents play an important role in sediment
transport within the bay; however, they have not been able to agree on the direction of
these currents around the study area. The Army Corps maintained that the net longshore
flow is to the south in the vicinity of the Saco River (USACE, 1886; USACE, 1910;
USACE, 1924; USACE, 1930; USACE, 1955; USACE, 1991; USACE, 1992). They

believed that a nodal point existed at Old Orchard Beach where the longshore current
splits to the north and south. They pointed to the north growing spit near Pine Point and
the south growing spit near Camp Ellis as their evidence (USACE, 1991; USACE, 1992).
Others felt that the net longshore current was to the north, not the south (Farrell,
1970; 1972; MCP, 1979; Nelson, 1979; Nelson and Fink, 1980). Their evidence also
included the northward extending Pine Point, the closing of Goosefare Brook, and
anecdotal information from residents who reported watching waves carry sand from their
beaches to beaches north of them (Kelley et al., 1995b; Kelley and Anderson, 2000).
Both factions did agree that longshore current can shiR to the south during storms
(Farrell, 1970; USACE, 1992). Currently it is generally accepted that net movement is to
the north, and southern longshore currents are possible under storm conditions.

The River's Contribution

Starting in Crawford Notch, New Hampshire, the Saco River is approximately
200 km long, dropping over 580 m in elevation before emptying into the Gulf of Maine
along the southern coast of Maine. There are three major tributaries, the Ossipee River,
the Little Ossipee, and the Old Course. In total, it drains over 4,400 km2 of land (Figure
5.4) (MCP, 1979; USACE, 1930).
The river passes from higher mountains through glacial lakes, outwash plains,
bogs, forests, and agricultural lands. The majority of these areas have abundant supplies
of sand and silt (MCP, 1979; Thompson and Borns, 1985).
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Figure 5.4 The Saco River corridor and its tributaries from the New Hampshire
border to the Gulf of Maine (USACE, 1995).
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The river has a mean discharge of approximately 9 1 m3 per second with a maximumrecorded spring discharge of 1303 m3 per second (MCP, 1979). As of 1979, there were 8
dams on the Saco and 27 on its tributaries. This has not interrupted the flow of sediment
dramatically. Most of the dams are for power and have minimal storage capacity. Water
is drained through the bottom of the dams allowing sediment to pass on down the river
(MCP, 1979).

Sand Sources for the Beaches

There is some disagreement as to how much sand is supplied to the beaches of
Saco Bay by the Saco River. The Army Corps takes the position that no appreciable
amount makes it to the river's mouth due to the number of dams upriver (USACE, 1955;
USACE, 1991). Their original analyses identified considerable amounts of sand, gravel,
and timber being washed down the river and deposited around the islands near the river's
inlet (USACE, 1886). The Army Corps considered the immediate project area sand
starved (USACE 1955; USACE, 1992).
Others feel that the river adds considerable sediment to the system. They point to
the sand bodies and bars found throughout the lower reaches of the Saco River as
evidence that sand is still being camed downriver (Farrell, 1970; Kelley and Anderson,
2000; MCP, 1979; Nelson and Fink, 1980). Current meters show ample speed to
transport sediment downriver (Manthorp, 1995). Only considering the volume of
suspended sediment, a minimum sediment discharge of 6,100 m3 per year was calculated.
When also considering the infilling rate of the Saco River anchorage, sediment passing
through the jetties represented by the infilling of Biddeford Pool, and the infilling rate of

the Scarborough River anchorage, a range from 10,000 m3 per year to 16,000 m3 per year
was calculated (Kelley et al., 1995b; Kelley and Anderson, 2000).
Other than the river's contribution, sand circulating within the system originates
from the existing shoreface deposits. Sand is not able to bypass the rocky headlands
bordering the bay and is not able to enter the beach systems from the outside. There are
drowned glacial deposits off the coast, but the speed with which they were covered did
not allow for significant erosion. Their sand is effectively isolated from the system
(Kelley et al., 2002).

Pre-Jettv Conditions
Prior to jetty construction there were both ebb and tidal delta bodies in the Saco
River (Farrell, 1970; USACE, 1991). The channel was "bifurcated", separated by ebb
bodies at the mouth of the river (USACE, 1991; USACE, 1992). There was an exchange
of sand along shorefaces and the delta bodies (Farrell, 1970; USACE, 1992). It is
speculated that all the inlets, delta bodies, and crescent-shaped beaches of Saco Bay
maintained equilibrium through exchange of sand from one area to another, prior to
engineering alterations (USACE, 1992).

Post-Jettv Conditions
The ebb tidal bodies were eliminated with the construction of the north jetty. The
bifurcated channel became a single channel (USACE, 1991b). The exchange of sand
from inlet to shoreface was interrupted by the current jetty configuration (Nelson et al.,
1979). Sand that does come down the river is carried over 1.5 km beyond the beaches

and presumably lost from the system or is deposited in either the inlet mouth to form a
northward pointing shoal at the end of the jetties (USACE, 1992), Biddeford Pool (Kelley
et al., 1995b), or the Hills Beach area.21
Substantial accretion occurred along both Hills Beach and Camp Ellis Beach after
the initial construction of the north and south jetties. This was a result of the remaining
ebb bodies migrating toward the inlet and impounding along the outside of the jetties
(USACE, 1991b; US ACE, 1992). By 1896, accretion had stopped, coinciding with the
heightening of the north jetty to 4.6 m (USACE, 1991b). This marked the beginning of a
period of erosion for both beaches. Hills Beach eroded at first then accreted. It appears
as if the compartment has now achieved equilibrium and reformed into its own crescentshaped beach (USACE, 1992). Camp Ellis Beach, with the exception of a period in the
early 1900s, has eroded constantly to the present.22 By 1934 the shoreline had eroded to
the pre-project position (USACE, 1991b).
Northeast waves strike the north jetty and are reflected inshore. As they travel
along the relatively smooth surface of the jetty, they are amplified both in their base and
height (USACE, 1992). These waves create longshore currents near the beach and scour
the sand from the area (Figure 5.5). This sand is transported northward away from Camp
Ellis and accretes at Pine Point blocking the Scarborough River inlet (Figure 5.6)
(Barber, 1995; Kelley et al., 1995b). So much sand was accreting in the Pine Point area
that the Scarborough River Inlet shrunk to one-third its normal width (Kelley and
Anderson, 2000) and required construction of a jetty in 1962 (Farrel, 1972). Northward
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The beach appears to have achieved equilibrium therefore sand may be coming from the river.
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is speculated that this short accretionary event was due to the disposal of dredge spoils and that
remnants of the ebb-tidal delta were impounded along the jetty.

sand movement is also supported by observations at Goosefare Brook after spoil
placement on Camp Ellis Beach. Nourishment at Camp Ellis is closely followed by sand
closing the entrance of Goosefare Brook to the north (Kelley et al., 1995b). Corps reports
estimate a loss of over 5.96 million m3 by 1955 (USACE, 1955). Southwest swells that
would normally carry nourishment material have even more of a difficult time reaching
Camp Ellis Beach with the jetties now blocking the approach.

Figure 5.5 Storm waves at Camp Ellis Beach (Photo courtesy of Stephen Dickson,
MGS)

As was mentioned, nourishment has been used at Camp Ellis Beach. This was in
conjunction with maintenance dredges of the inlet and channel. The benefits were
temporary, and sand was removed from the system and transported north. Over 30
homes have been lost to the sea, and the road bordering the beach in Camp Ellis is
constantly
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Figure 5.6 Longshore currents transport sand from Camp Ellis Beach
north to Pine Point and the Scarborough River Inlet (Kelley et al., 1995b).

being over washed by water and sand (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). In the current state,
erosion will continue, destroying development and infrastructure.

Saco River Natural Setting Analysis

Several factors are important when examining how the engineering decisions have
altered the natural setting of the inlet and adjacent beaches. First is that the Saco River
contributes sand to the system. The amount ranges from 10,000 to 16,000 m3 per year
(Kelley et al., 1995b). The river is the greatest supplier of new sediment. Sand is
introduced into the near shore system and exchanged along the beaches and delta bodies
of other inlets to the north.
This observation leads into the second factor. Net longshore transport is to the
north. Direction can change with storms, but transport is predominantly to the north.
Again, sand from the Saco River travels north, feeding the beaches in Old Orchard and
Scarborough. It has even closed smaller inlets in the past (Kelley and Anderson, 2000).
The final factor is the orientation of the inlet and beaches within Saco Bay. The
southern end of the bay is directly exposed to the force of extratropical storms. The
headland to the south blocks the replenishing southerly swells bringing sand during the
summer months. Even without the jetties, the area is at a disadvantage in that respect.
Without the benefits of natural nourishment, the immediate region around the Saco River
is dependant on the exchange of sand from the river to counter the effects of erosion.

Flawed D e s i ~ n
Problems with the design of the project are rooted in a misunderstanding of the
factors affecting the natural setting. First, the Army Corps believed (until very recently)
that the net longshore flow for the immediate area was to the south, not the north. This
resulted in construction of the first jetty on the north side of the inlet to stop shoaling
sand believed to originate from the north.23
This obviously did not have the desired effect, and shoaling continued. In the
same frame of mind the Army Corps believed that shoaling would stop if another jetty
was added and if both were lengthened incrementally over time. They believed sand was
coming from the north and either migrating around the end of the jetty and depositing in
the inlet or actually traveling over the jetty and through the spaces in the rock. The
lengthening of the jetties effectively moved the sand coming down the Saco River far out
of the beach system. Now, apparently none of the sand makes it to the beaches in
southern Saco Bay, although no one knows where it goes.
The belief that considerable amounts of sand were traveling over and through the
jetties is the basis for heightening and tightening the jetties. This created the
phenomenon seen today of waves being reflected and amplified onto the shores of Camp
Ellis. This is the source of considerable damage to structures, flooding of streets, and
scouring of the remaining sandy beach. Again, this engineering decision was based on a
flawed understanding of the coastal processes of the project area.
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Problems would have existed if the south jetty were constructed first due to the tidal nature of the inlet.
Both jetties were needed to create a deep enough channel, regardless of the direction of sand flow.

This is a common pattern seen in other Army Corps projects. Problems are
addressed with expanding engineering designs. These expansions are sometimes based
on the original flawed information, and the scale of problems increases with the size of
the physical project.

Availability of Information at the Time
This project began in 1824, and it is safe to say the knowledge of coastal
processes and marine geology was inferior to present understanding. The processes
affecting southern Saco Bay and Camp Ellis were not as well understood as they are
today; however, there was ample opportunity to learn much earlier then the Army Corps
was able to do.
Residents and researchers knew for years that the sand traveled north, not south.
They expressed this to the Army Corps to no avail (Dickson, 2002; Farrell, 1972; SOS
Camp Ellis, 2003; Michaud, 2003). The Army Corps' earliest reports acknowledged that
the river camed a good deal of sand to the coast. The evidence was debris piles and sand
bars deposited in the lower reaches of the river (USACE, 1886). After this initial report
the assumption was that the numerous dams located upriver and along the Saco's
tributaries eliminated this source of sand. This was a viable assumption if the dams were
backed by reservoirs. This was not the case. The dams were "run of the river" structures
used for flood control and hydropower. By design they did not impound sediment like
reservoirs. There is no indication that the Army Corps ever investigated this or made any
attempt to veri@ this assumption.

Would Things Have Gone Differently?
Again, one would like to think that given the current knowledge of the project
designers would adjust their plans accordingly if developing the area today. It is hard to
say whether this would have happened based on the history. The Army Corps
disregarded most anecdotal and written reports on the area. It is unrealistic to expect
them to change the design whenever someone presents their own theory, but over the
years, an overwhelming amount of information surfaced revealing that their original
assumptions were wrong. It hasn't been until the last few years that they changed their
stance. This might be due in part to the amount of public money spent without studying
the project and becoming any more enlightened. An example was an $850,000 physical
model of the project area built in Vicksburg, MS, during the early 1990s. It resulted in no
action and no better understanding of the area (Kelley, 2003).
A secondary problem was that most of the Army Corps' data on the coastal
processes came from sites outside the project area and were re-used, despite their
inaccuracy, for close to 100 years. Wave, tide, and wind data were gathered from other
areas along Maine's coast. Information on currents and sediment transport were
determined using a wave model in Vicksburg. Nothing was done by the Army Corps to
evaluate what was happening specifically at Camp Ellis. In 2003 they are finally making
plans to make their first observations on site. This pattern does not support the belief that
the Army Corps would be any more or less conscientious if the project were being
constructed today. Therefore, it is not clear whether things would have been different.

Saco River - The Economic Justification
1886 Army Corps Report
The economic purpose of the Saco River Navigation Project was to generate
commercial benefits. At the time, the cities of Saco and Biddeford were home to a
vibrant manufacturing sector, primarily textiles. These businesses required production
materials to manufacture their products and coal for energy. Transport occurred either by
railway or by boat up the Saco River from the Atlantic (Table 5.5).
Shoaling in the river mouth made boat travel hazardous and permitted only
smaller draft boats passage during the highest tides. The original navigation project from
1824 and the subsequent addition of a northern jetty in 1866 secured the migrating inlet.
It was hoped that the jetty would also block the flow of sediment into the river mouth.
By 1886, commercial interests requested further improvements of the channel through to
the head of navigation. They also had the breakwater heightened to block the continued
shoaling sediments (USACE, 1886).

River Borne Commerce - April 15 to December 1,1883
Commerce:
Coal, sand, cotton, iron, paving, pitch, paper, gravel, lime,
cement, plaster, ashes, timber, and ice

F

umber of Vessels:
0 - 50 schooners each year

Total Tonnage:
3 8,000 tons (33,800 of which were coal)

Table 5.5 Commercial activity on the Saco River in 1883 (USACE, 1886)

The 1886 Army Corps report noted that considerably more commerce arrived by
railway, particularly coal, the principal product originally coming from ships along the
river. All finished products left by railway, leaving most ships empty for their return trip
(USACE, 1886).
There were no specific benefit calculations presented in this report. Business
interests along the river supplied all relevant commerce data. Both the channel
improvement and the jetty heightening occurred. It appeared as if a strong enough case
was made, in the eyes of the Army Corps, that the region's productivity justified the
expenditure of public finds on the development project.

1910 Army Corm R e ~ o r t

By 1910, the south jetty was constructed and had already been lengthened. All
previously authorized improvements, with the exception of lengthening the north jetty,
were completed. Once again, commercial interests wanted to increase the capacity of the
channel by deepening it to 2.3 m MLW. Justification was based on a need to
accommodate larger vessels with greater drafts. Newer ships with larger drafts were
blocked by the sand bar at the mouth of the river and found the 1.8 m MLW depth of the
channel an impediment. They often had to wait for the highest tide conditions,
sometimes for a week. Ships were under loaded in order to pass over the bar and through
the channel. This raised rates, and some ships were reluctant to run the route (USACE,
1910).
In addition to channel expansion, engineers continued to struggle with shoaling
problems at the mouth of the river. The f i l l proposal in 1910 was a combination of

improvements to the channel and lengthening of the north jetty (USACE, 1910). The
projected cost was $218,000, over $3.5 million in 2003 dollars.24 To that date, $35 1,775
had been appropriated from the start ofthe project (USACE, 1910).
There was some dissent within the Corps regarding project benefits. Some felt
that benefits did not justifl costs. The Board of Engineers did not share this opinion.
They acknowledged that predicted benefits could not be achieved based on the existing
size of the project. This meant that it was necessary to expand the size of the project in
order to produce the benefits needed to justifl the costs to date.

"...under existing conditions resulting benefits are incommensurate with the cost.
Furthermore, it is not probable that a change for the better will occur unless some
increase in depth is obtained." (USACE, 1910, p.5)
They decided against jetty extensions and opted to invest only in the expansion of the
channel. Engineers felt that shoaling would continue down the length of the jetty, no
matter how long the extension. Short-term changes were expected to occur but in the
long run conditions reverted back. This reduced the project price to $55,000 with $3,000
annually for maintenance (USACE, 1910).
Again, benefits were based on commercial activity, both on the rails and river.
The volume of trade for 1909 was approximately $18 million for Saco and Biddeford
(USACE, 1910). A summary of commercial activity is listed in Table 5.6.
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Converted using a GDP deflator with a base year of 1996.
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River Borne and Rail Commerce - 1909
Commerce:
Coal (majority), textile production inputs, machinery production inputs
otal Rail Tonnage:
tons received (40,000 tons were coal), 13 1,714 tons shipped
Total River Tonnage:
50,746 tons received (mainly coal), nothing shipped
Table 5.6 Commercial activity on the Saco River in 1909 by rail and river
(US ACE, 19 10).
Again, specific benefit levels were not calculated. Justification was based on
improved freight rates for both water and rail. Past experience showed a drop in rail rates
by half from $0.70 per ton in 1890 to $0.35 per ton in 1900 between Portland and Saco.
The reduced rates coincided with the initial improvements on the river channel (USACE,
1910). Water freight charges improved due to increased load capacity. Deepening the
channel through the mouth also cut down on the time spent waiting for a high tide.
The exact effects were not known, but they assumed that a possible benefit of
between $12,100 and $15,350 a year might be realized. The Army Corps openly
admitted that this was speculation and that the actual results were unknown. They did not
know if more ships would even start coming to the Saco River. They did not know how
it would affect rail charges, nor did they know about future coal consumption overall.
There were other charges involved in water transport that would affect the
ultimate benefits. There was a $0.12 per ton charge to tug the ships up the river and a
$0.20 per ton offloading charge at the docks. The Army Corps proceeded with channel
improvements based on the justification that increased channel capacity would attract the

commercial traffic needed to generate the benefits that would validate project costs to
date (USACE, 1910).

1924 Armv Corm R e ~ o r t

By 1924 total project appropriations were $406,775. Commercial interests were
again pushing for a deeper channel to accommodate larger vessels and cut down on the
time needed to enter the channel. Shoaling at the river mouth continued. Another
request to extend the north jetty was proposed to address the problems. District and
division engineers rejected the project, reiterating previous comments that benefits would
not justifL costs and that even though lengthening the jetty might slow shoaling in the
short run, the process would resume in the fiture (USACE, 1924).
The Board of Engineers requested a review and it was determined that benefits,
amounting to $24,000 from increased size of coal shipments, justified both the jetty
extension and the deepening of the channel to 2.4 m (USACE, 1924). Average coal
shipment sizes had increased from the beginning of the project and projections led
planners to believe shipments would continue to increase. Project planners were not
allowed to consider the effects on rail freight charges this time. It is implied that these
effects were not as relevant as previously believed. Commercial activity is summarized
in Table 5.7. The cost was $122,000 with $3,000 each year in maintenance. The Army
Corps acknowledged that private interests were benefiting from the project and required
that the community provide 16%, or $20,000 of the cost.

River Borne Commerce - 1923
Commerce:
Coal (mainly), cotton, and timber
verage Annual Tonnage:

Anticipated Tonnage for 1923:
65,000 tons
Table 5.7 Commercial activity on the Saco River in 1923 (USACE, 1924)

1930 Army Corps Report
By 1930, $524,271.75 had been appropriated for the project, with $20,000 coming
from local sources. These were all improvement costs and did not include finds spent on
mitigation, such as jetty repairs along the shoreline or construction of the spur dike on the
north jetty25(USACE, 1934).
The 1930 study investigated the possibility of firther development for the Saco
River project. This was an unsolicited search for development opportunities by the Army
Corps. After review, it was determined that the costs of construction would far outweigh
the benefits received from any navigation, flood control, irrigation, or hydropower
project. The average annual water freight from 1920 to 1927 was approximately 50,000
tons at $502,000. This was very similar to the conditions prior to the 1924 report and
does not represent the increase they predicted from the previous channel deepening.

These costs &d not directly effect the performance of the navigation project and therefore were not
included in project accounting.
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1934 Armv Corps Report

The year 1934 marks the final extension of the jetties and an end of development
for the Saco River navigation project as an industrial corridor. The remaining 262 m of
the north jetty were added to extend it to Sharps Ledge and its present location (USACE,
1934). Savings in freight charges were no longer the intended benefits; the intended
benefits were considered the foregone expense of dredging the shoals at the entrance of
the inlet. Benefits were foregone maintenance charges. Setting up a dredging operation
for a relatively small area was cost prohibitive, and it was determined that the cost of
extending the jetty was less than the cost of continued dredging. This was the feeling
despite continued concerns that the shoaling would only stop for a short time before
reestablishing itself at the entrance (USACE, 1934). The cost for the extension was
$69,000 plus an additional $500 in annual maintenance to the existing $3,000 annual
maintenance costs.
Commercial interests requested an increase in the channel depth to 4.6 m, but this
was not justified by the projected river commerce. In the 5 years prior to this report,
commercial river traffic decreased by 25% (USACE, 1934). The water borne freight
continued to average approximately 50,000 tons per year and was almost entirely coal.
Considerable freight continued to be brought in by rail. The general feeling was that this
would not change to water as a result of improvements. The Board of Engineers finally
agreed. It was generally felt that the supply of coal was meeting demand and that, if
anything, the demand would decrease over time (USACE, 1934).

1968 Armv C o r ~ R
s e~ort

The final shipment of coal sailed up the Saco River in 1940. This was also the
last year the project was dredged prior to 1968. Repairs were made to the jetties but
nothing more. The Saco River had changed from a shipping route supporting commercial
interests to a primarily recreational boating location and a harbor for a small fishing fleet.
Subsequent development was focused on generating recreational benefits and decreasing
the cost of operation for fishermen based on the Saco River (USACE, 1968).
The 1968 report investigated the feasibility of creating anchorages within the river
and a turning basin at the head of navigation (Table 5.8). Existing conditions did not
meet mooring demands. Boats were forced to seek shelter at other harbors during storms
and continued shoaling forced most of the lobster boats to unload at Biddeford Pool to
avoid delays and damage due to overcrowding and hazardous navigation conditions
(USACE, 1968).

Navigation Development Project - 1968
Project Description:
2 anchorages, 10.5 acres in total area and a 10-acre turning
basin at the head of navigation
Benefit Classifications:
1. Reduction of tidal delays
2. Increased use of existing fleet
3 . New additions to fleet
4. Increased transient use
5. Reduction in damages
Table 5.8 Saco River Navigation project expansion plan and benefit
classifications in 1968 (US ACE, 1968)

Additionally, the entire project was dredged to its original 1.8 m depth to
accommodate the new traffic. Dredging was completed under a separate authority and
did not fall under the budget of the new development project (USACE, 1968). There
were secondary benefits mentioned in the report, in particular the benefits fiom placing
dredged spoils on the eroding beaches. The Army Corps acknowledged that serious
erosion problems existed on the adjacent beaches for years, although they did not accept
responsibility. Benefits fiom nourishment were not included in the project, but they were
considered an important component and established a connection between dredging and
the health of adjacent beaches that continues today.
The recreational benefits were calculated in a similar manner to Wells Harbor
benefits. Refer to Appendix B for complete formulas. Improvements were designed to
make room for the fleet listed in Table 5.9.

Vessel Type
Recreational Fleet Existing
Recreational Fleet New
Transient New and Old
Commercial Lobster Existing
Commercial Lobster New
Sardine Fleet

Number of Vessels
260
130
168
20
6
NA

Table 5.9 Projected size of the Saco River fleet using the expanded anchorages
from the 1968 development project (USACE, 1968).

The existing commercial lobster fleet landed 60,000 pounds of lobsters annually.
An increase of 10,000 pounds was expected for the existing fleet, of which they would
realize 80% of the revenue after expenses. The 6 new commercial lobster boats would

add 21,000 additional pounds of lobster annually, of which 40% of the revenue would be
realized after expenses (USACE, 1968).
The sardine (Atlantic Hemng) fleet returned to use the anchorage. Both the
sardine boats and the lobster boats benefited from foregone damage due to better
navigation conditions. Specifically it was predicted that 5 lobster boats and 12 sardine
boats would realize a decrease in damages (USACE, 1968).
Sixty boats that moored in the shallows near the head and mouth of the river were
the primary recipients of benefits from project improvements. The other 200 boats
already used one of the two marinas or yacht club (USACE, 1968). New recreational
boats occupied new spaces in the anchorages, and improved conditions attracted more
transient day use. Annual benefits are listed in Table 5.10.

Benefit Classification
Recreational Vessels
Commercial Vessels
Transient
Damage Reduction
Total Annual Benefits

Annual Benefit
$20,400
$9,840
$890
$3,400
$34,530

Table 5.10 Predicted annual benefits for the 1968 Saco River anchorage project
(USACE, 1968)

The total cost of construction came to $202,400. A combined interest and
amortization rate of 3.125% was used to discount construction costs (Table 5.11).
Maintenance dredging costs were calculated assuming a sedimentation rate of 2,294 m3
per year. The resulting benefit to cost ratio came to 2.7.26
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The Army Corps split the recreational benefits in half, claiming that half went to private interests.
Therefore it is assumed that not all benefits go toward the benefit to cost ratio, reducing it to 1.85, still well
withm the acceptable criteria.

Activitv
Construction
Maintenance Dredging
Maintenance Navigation Aids
Total Annual Cost

Cost
$8,000
$4,500
$350
$12,850

Table 5.11 Projected annual costs for the 1968 Saco River anchorage project
(USACE, 1968).

1982 Armv Corus Reuort

The last development project performed on the Saco River was in 1982. The
project's aim was to provide year-round opportunities for commercial fishermen by
building another anchorage near the City of Saco and providing sufficient protection from
flowing ice during the winter months. Four options were investigated. One was
discarded due to an inability to achieve the project goals. Of the other three, one entailed
installing icebreakers to protect existing anchorages, and the other two proposed
constructing a new 3-acre anchorage in addition to the installation of icebreakers. A new
anchorage project was chosen with 13 icebreakers. This was the biggest in physical
scope, chosen because it maximized net benefits (USACE, 1982).
The project catered to an estimated 16 vessels. Of the 16 vessels, 6 normally
moored at Camp Ellis during the winter, 5 pulled out of the water, and the other 5
normally moved to another port for the winter. The 5 that moved to other ports
represented a transfer of income from one port to another and therefore did not represent
the majority of the benefits. The majority of benefits went to the other 11 boats in the
form of additional fishing income. The transferred 5 boats received benefits in foregone
costs associated with higher priced ports (Table 5.12).

Benefit Classification
Additional Fish Landings
Foregone Boat Hauling Fees
Foregone Relocation Fees
Less Water and Road Travel
Avoided Ice Flow Damage
Total Annual Benefits

Annual Benefits
$1 12,800
$2,300
$3,500
$1,600
$1,500
$121,700

Table 5.12 Predicted annual benefits for the 1982 Saco River project (USACE,
1982).
Additional fishing days represented 60% of the value of the new and additional
catch, primarily finfish. The 11 boats not transferred from other winter harbors were the
recipients. Foregone boat hauling fees went to the 5 boats that pulled out of the water
during winter. The 5 transferred boats received the savings in relocation fees, and all
received the savings in reduced water and road travel times. When computing the
savings in damages due to ice flows, the Army Corps primarily considered the 6 boats
normally moored at Camp Ellis for the winter. In all, benefits were very localized and
focused on a small segment of the overall fleet.
Table 5.13 compares annual costs and benefits for the three plans. Plan 1 was the
non-dredging option and plans 2 and 3 were the variations on a new anchorage.

I
[Annual Benefits
Annual Costs
Benefit - Cost Ratio
Net Benefits

I
1

PLAN 1
$45.400
$12,200
3.7
$33,200

I
1

PLAN 2
$121.700
$29,000
4.2
$92,700

I
1

PLAN3
$121.700
$33,300
3.6
$88,400

Table 5.13 Predicted annual benefits, costs, benefit-cost ratios, and net benefits for the
three versions of the 1982 Saco River development project (USACE, 1982).

1
1

A combined interest and amortization rate of 7.625 % was used to calculate annual
figures. For all projects, benefits exceeded their costs. Any one would have satisfied the
benefit-cost ratio criterion. Plan 2 was chosen because it had the greatest net benefits. It
is clear within the report that planners would also lean toward plans 2 and 3 for because
of the secondary benefit of beach nourishment.

Beyond the S c o ~ of
e the Navi~ationProiect

Erosion of adjacent beaches became an issue in the early 1900s and presently
remains an issue. In 1920, the first erosion study was conducted to determine the effects
on Hills Beach. Since 1920, there has been at least 12 Army Corps studies investigating
the erosion problems at Camp Ellis (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). Since 1970, there have
been 23 scientific studies studying erosion and coastal processes in the project area
(SBIT, 2002). Proposed mitigation options were discarded because they either were not
cost effective or because they did not comply with State of Maine natural resource
regulations. It is estimated that approximately $6.5 million has been spent on studies
(SOS Camp Ellis, 2002).

Property Damage
Over 30 homes have been lost since the beginning of the project, and it is
predicted, based on current erosion rates, that 60 more could be lost over the next 50
years (USACE, 2 0 0 1 ) . ~The
~ total value of these properties is over $8 million. 28 This
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Other than the erosion environment created by the waves and the northern jetty, sea-level rise will also
play a part in the future loss of development. It is not clear whether the Army Corps accounted for this in
their calculations. The State of Maine calculated different sea-level rise scenarios for Camp Ellis to
determine the extent of the damage (MSPO, 1994).

figure does not include infrastructure damage. The loss of Surf Street would mean loss of
utilities to Camp Ellis (Michaud, 2003). The City of Saco regularly repairs damage along
Surf Street. The estimated average annual maintenance costs for the City of Saco are
$19,700, which includes beach restoration, infrastructure repair, clean up, evacuation, and
overtime for safety officials (USACE, 2001)~'. Some form of repair takes place after
every major storm.

Other "Incidental" Costs
There are other costs not included in economic reports. For the life of the project,
the Army Corps had not acknowledged a connection between the jetties and erosion
along the beach. Their position changed in the 1990s. The cost of seawalls, spur dikes,
riprap, and other repairs to the beach-jetty interface are tied to the presence of the project.
These used both local and federal funds.

Current Efforts and the Economic Rationale
Currently, $5 million in public hnds from the Section 111 Study was allotted to
address the erosion problems at Camp Ellis Beach (USACE, 2001). Almost $2 million
has been spent on studies, and more are currently underway. It appears that any viable
solution will be well in excess of the remaining $3 million (Dickson, 2002; Michaud,
2003). This takes the community over the $5 million spending limit imposed in the
Section 111 Study. Congressman Tom Allen was able to secure additional appropriations
--

28
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It is difficult to determine where the 60 homes are located. The actual number may very well be smaller.

As a note, t h ~ figure
s
is much smaller than the $67,000 a year estimate used in the Corps' 1987 report
proposing construction of a large seawall in Camp Ellis (USACE, 1987a).

of $1.22 million in federal h n d s for 2003, and it seems likely that he will need to secure
much more.
A recent, unpublished, analysis of economic benefits by the Army Corps shows a
potential of $48 million in property value benefits, as opposed to the $8 million in the
2001 Section 11 1 Study (Michaud, 2003). This was calculated looking at communities
just north of Camp Ellis near Old Orchard Beach. The rationale is that if there is
sufficient beach protection at Camp Ellis, the value of homes would be comparable to
communities up the coast and Camp Ellis would enjoy the same property values
experienced by their neighbors with healthy beaches. This is based on the assumption
that Camp Ellis would start generating the revenue generated at beaches like Old
~ r c h a r d . ~The
' Army Corps is comfortable with this line of reasoning, as is the City of
Saco for obvious reasons (Michaud, 2003).

Saco River Economic Analvsis
There are essentially two economic periods in this project's long life. The first
120 years can be considered an industrial period. This essentially lasted from 1824 to the
1940s. As industry left the Saco River, the second period began with project
development oriented toward accommodating commercial fishing and recreational
boating. It remains this way today. In total, the project has spanned over 3 economic
lifetimes (50 years per life as defined by the Army Corps).

30 Camp Ellis would have to go through some major redevelopment in order to resemble the beach resorts
to the north. It is doubtful that the community would be able to keep the type of beach necessary to keep
property values at the levels they need as long as the jetties are still there.

Period 1: Industrv

The original purpose of the navigation project was to develop the area and help
the existing manufacturing industry grow. The benefits received were production inputs
delivered at a lower cost, predominantly coal. The original intention was to also have
these ships leave with finished products for distribution. Early on in the project's life,
timber was shipped from the port, but records show that this was phased out and the
manufacturing industries took over (USACE, 1924). Manufacturers did not use the river
to ship finished products out to the market; trains were used for this.
Early in the project's history, the accounting records of benefits and costs were
not nearly as well defined as they are in projects today. Due to lack of information, it is
difficult to measure whether or not the predictions were accurate. Some familiar patterns
do emerge. There is a constant physical and conceptual expansion of the project. This
was to generate the benefits needed to justifjr the escalating costs. This was specifically
referred to in the previous sections. The majority of commerce data on which benefits
were calculated, came directly from the commercial parties asking for the project. There
is no evidence that the Army Corps checked any of the data. Finally, the project was
very focused and localized in nature. The idea that the "winners" could theoretically
compensate the "losers" in the development of the national economy seems unlikely in
this scenario. A good example is the fact that the river tug was owned by a few of the
businesses on the river. They constantly were pushing for a bigger and deeper channel.
This would allow bigger boats to enter and bring the cost of coal down, and it would also
open it up to more traffic that would have to pay the tug fees to travel the river.

Toward the end of the industrial phase of the project, additional development and
expansion were based on lowering the maintenance costs of the existing project. The
Army Corps was not trying to improve the industry along the Saco River; they were
looking for ways to address the growing maintenance costs of their expanding project.
This became a cycle where new projects were necessary to maintain the expanding
project, which, in turn, expanded the project even more. At the end of Period 1,
maintenance costs escalated without any noticeable improvement to the project for the
money spent.

The Accuracy of Period 1 Economic Predictions

Due to a lack of information, it is difficult to say how accurate the predictions
from Period 1 were. This phase of the project spanned over 100 years and 3 major wars.
It is possible that the project generated the benefits for which it was designed, but it is
unlikely that the records will reveal the answer. It is clear, however, in reviewing the
reports that some of the initial economic assumptions were wrong, in particular the effect
on railway commerce. Railways continued to carry finished products out of the area - not
the ships as was originally hoped. Additionally, rail rates did not drop as anticipated.
This is implied by their omission in benefit calculations of later projects.

Period 2: Recreation and Commercial Fishing

Industry started leaving the Saco River, and the final coal shipment by boat went
up the river in 1940 (USACE, 1968). The community still had the jetties and harbor.
The usage converted to recreational and commercial fishing vessels. Both groups used

the harbor prior to this but the Army Corps was now primarily interested in the
development of the latter.
Justification of government involvement followed a pattern similar to Wells,
which makes sense given that the projects are contemporaries. The Army Corps wanted
to increase the size of both the recreational and commercial fleet while improving the
conditions for the existing vessels. What actually materialized were several development
projects targeting a very small segment of the society.

The Accuracv of Period 2 Economic Predictions

Records are poor, and it is difficult to say whether the project achieved the
intended benefits. It is plausible that usage increased, and that demand met the
expanding facilities. Commercially, lobster in York County has not been a leading
contributor to the overall industry in Maine. This was shown in the Wells section.
Finfishing in Maine experienced a decline during that time to present. In contrast,
Atlantic Herring, or Sardine landings increased from the time of the projects to present
(Figures 5.7 and 5.8).

Incidental Costs

There were other costs that must be considered in reviewing the economics of this
project. First and foremost was the loss of 30 homes in Camp Ellis due to accelerated
erosion caused by the jetties (Michaud, 2003). As was previously stated, the Army Corps
believes another 60 homes will be lost if nothing is done to address the current problems.
They alone are valued at over $8 million (USACE, 2001).

Atlantic Herring Landings 1960-2000
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Figure 5.7 Atlantic Herring (sardine) landings by metric ton for the State of Maine
from 1960 to 2000 (Maine DMR website, 2003).
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Figure 5.8 Value of Atlantic Herring landings in the State of Maine in 2001dollars
from 1960 to 2000 (Maine DMR website, 2003).

There was the loss of the recreational beach fronting Camp Ellis. No one has
calculated a number for this as of yet. Rip rap and repairs to property added to the cost
figure. Annual maintenance performed by the City of Saco averaged $20,000, and it is
reasonable to expect this to climb as conditions deteriorate and sea level rises. There
have been millions of dollars in studies, with very little action. Another cost is for travel
and meetings by the Saco Bay Implementation Team as they address interested parties.
Currently $5 million has been allotted for mitigation, and it appears that this number will
triple in time (Michaud, 2003). Costs have far exceeded original estimates.

Analysis Summarv

The project increased in scope early on to generate the benefits needed to justifjl
the increasing costs of construction and maintenance. This expansion is the root of
erosion problems experienced along adjacent beach communities. This generated a need
for more protective structures, which, in turn, required more maintenance. Economically
the project turned from development to maintenance and mitigation. These costs have far
exceeded the original cost projections.
The delay in response resulted in a deterioration of the communities. This drove
down their value and decreased potential economic benefits produced by the area.
Meanwhile, costs escalate as damage continues. This produced a situation where it was
difficult to generate the benefits to justifjl mitigation costs. As each year passed, the gap
between benefits and costs increased. Unless some leeway is given in applying the
criteria for computing the benefits and costs, this cycle may repeat itself until the
community is gone. Fortunately, new efforts have found the means economically to

just@ action, and the community will hopefblly break out of this downward cycle
(Ouellette, 2002).

Saco River - The Politics
Interviews
Open-ended interviews were conducted with 9 people representing the Army
Corps, Saco Bay Implementation Team, Maine Geological Survey, City of Saco, SOS
Camp Ellis, Congressman Allen's office, and the Maine State Planning

Several

of these interviews (Army Corps, MGS, and Maine SPO) were with the same people
questioned on the Wells Harbor project.
Again, the objective of the interviews was to determine people's perception of the
problem, define the health and status of relationships among participating parties, and
determine their perception of success.

Perceived Problem
Jetties accelerate erosion that threatens development in Camp Ellis
Current regulations do not address unique case at Camp Ellis
Inaction (state and federal)
Unreasonable expectations from stakeholders

Frequency
(n=9)
9
6
3
1

Table 5.14 Problem areas identified for Saco River Project during interviews with the 9
people representing the groups listed above. The frequency column shows how many
people out of the 9 felt that this particular area was a problem.
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SOS Camp Ellis was represented by 3 people and Maine Geological Survey was represented by 2 people.
Their separate voices were presemed because there was not agreement among them. This is why there are
9 people and 6 groups.

Other issues were mentioned during interviews. These included relationship
issues between groups and criticism of others' actions. These were not included because
in the author's opinion. They were not the driving problems in peoples7minds.
QualifLing statements followed these criticisms acknowledging the overall progress
made. Those criticisms seemed more a sign of frustration over their plight.32
It is more difficult to quantifL the quality of the relationships in the Saco River
Project then it is with the Wells Harbor Project. This is mainly due to the ongoing nature
of negotiations and planning. People are working together, and most do not want to
jeopardize progress with negative comments about others.
Something that is clear is that it is a different working environment than that in
Wells. There are two main reasons for this. The first is the length of time the project has
been going on. The Army Corps and community of Camp Ellis have been involved in
studies of the erosion problem for over 100 years. The community has experienced the
loss of over 30 homes and must face the prospect of property loss daily. Although there
remains a level of distrust between groups, this is ovemdden by a sense of urgency. All
parties are working against a clock and understand the potential consequences might be
devastating. There is also a desire among agencies to end the ongoing debate associated
with this project.
The second reason is the level of involvement from Congressman Allen's office.
This is not to say that Senators Snowe and Collins have not supported the communities of
Southern Maine. Both have aided the communities and helped appropriate federal finds
when needed. This is appreciated by Saco and was noted during interviews. The

32~nterviews
with stakeholders in Camp Ellis took place prior to a large Northeaster hitting the Maine coast.
Anxiety was at a high level during the interviews.
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difference is the day-to-day hands-on assistance provided by a representative from the
Congressman's office. He fills the role of intermediary and facilitator that has been
missing for some time. He is successfully getting people to work through their
differences. He helped to define objectives and goals. To the community, this represents
a commitment by their congressman and means that their case is being heard in
Washington. To the Army Corps, this is a message that a member of Congress, the
source of their funding and directives, has invested a personal interest in the project and
its outcome.
This keeps the process moving forward and is taking the focus off relationships
and placing it on problem solving. Relationships between groups are improving. This
was indicated during the course of interviews. If the process continues to move forward
toward a solution, it is probable that relations will only continue to improve. This has
positive implications for future endeavors along Maine's coast, beyond Camp Ellis and
Saco.

Perceived Success
Slowing erosion to manageable rate where the town can afford to nourish
A working beach and working harbor
Flood-proof and relocate homes
Jetty removal and restoration of beach and harbor to natural state
Either a working beach or working harbor

Frequency
(n=9)
8
2
2
1
1

Table 5.15 Perceptions of success identified for Saco River Project during interviews
with the 9 people. The frequency column shows how many of the people out of the 9 felt
that particular solution was viable.

Health of the Current Political Environment

The political environment was unhealthy but is rapidly improving. This is evident
when reviewing the different responses regarding perceptions of problems and potential
solutions. There is not the wide range of responses found in Wells. In each category,
there is one overwhelming response that either has complete, or nearly complete,
consensus from the participants. All view the jetties as the problem behind the
accelerated erosion along Camp Ellis. All but one feel that the solution is finding a way
to slow the erosion to a point where the town can manage their own problems with the
resources they have. There are some incompatible perceptions, but they are few and held
by a minority.
Although interviewees declined to give any definitive statements regarding their
relationships with the other participants, it was clear that they are better then what is
experienced in Wells. Their hesitation to comment reflects a respect they have for the
current process. People are more focused on attaining the goal then on each other's
actions.

The Early Industrial Years: 1800s - 1930s

The Saco River Project has a long history, approaching 180 years and spanning a
number of Congresses and events in U.S. hist01-y.~~
Despite the project's longevity, the
record of early Army Corps reports reveals that not all believed the Saco River deserving
of a federally hnded project. Engineers and officers within the Army Corps voiced
doubt as to whether economic benefits justified the costs and whether project design
could prevent shoaling in the inlet at the river mouth.

In 1886, Colonel of the Engineers, C.E. Blunt, wrote the following concerning
development of the river channel.

"I accordingly do not recommend the appropriation or expenditure of any money
for next year for the improvements suggested in this report.. . a large proportion of
all goods needed there have come, and will continue to come, by railroad entirely,
irrespective of any river improvements." (USACE, 1886, p.4).

As was discussed in the previous section, the area already received the majority of its
goods via railroad, and all manufactured goods were shipped out via railroad. This
practice continued throughout the project (USACE, 1910). Local interests pushed for
improvements, and the then acting Chief of Engineers, John G. Parke, authorized the
project despite the objections of his officer (USACE, 1886).
In 1910, similar comments were made regarding another channel development
project. Colonel John G.D. Knight, the Division Engineer, did not feel that the cost of
increasing the channel capacity was justified by the benefits from water borne commerce.
Additionally, he did not feel that remaining components of previous projects were
economically worth finishing.
"I do not deem this locality worthy of improvement by the General Government,
and I am of the opinion that the completion of the existing project is not justified."
(USACE, 1910, p.4)
Concern over the effectiveness of extending jetties was also voiced in this report
Engineers acknowledged that conditions along the channel had improved but the mouth
of the river continued to experience shoaling problems. As previously stated, it was
-
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Abraham Lincoln was one of the earliest authorizers of efforts to develop the river Wchaud, 2003).
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believed that lengthening might stop shoaling for a brief period, but the fix would only be
temporary (USACE, 1910).
The Board of Engineers, after a meeting with local interests along the Saco River,
did not agree with the opinions of the Division Engineer and requested a more in-depth
study of the area. A new survey, of the same scope, was completed and endorsed by a
different Division Engineer, Colonel W.M. Black. The new development plans were
approved and initiated (USACE, 1910).
By 1924, further channel and project improvements were proposed. This time
Division Engineer, Colonel H.C. Newcomb, and District Engineer, Lieutenant Colonel
Wildurr Willing, both felt that the project was not worth expanding beyond its current
dimensions. Again, the Board of Engineers voiced opposition to this opinion after
consulting with local interests and authorized another survey. A different District
Engineer, Major S.C. Godfrey, conducted the survey and determined upon review, that
the improvements were warranted. The Division Engineer, Colonel Newcomb, still
disagreed, but the Army Corps went ahead with improvements despite his dissenting
view (USACE, 1924).
By the 1930s, it became clear to all that the project's productivity had peaked
earlier that century. Benefits did not justifjr additional development of the project for
industrial commerce (USACE, 1930; USACE, 1934). Dissenting views held by officers
and engineers, were now shared by the Board of Engineers and no further review for
development was requested.
Conflicts of interest emerged early in project development. Practically every
project report contains internal dissenting views. The pattern that ensued was one of

meetings between the Army Corps Board of Engineers and local commercial interests
followed by the commissioning of a second survey that produced favorable economic and
engineering results. To support hrther the idea of commercial interest exerting pressure
upon the process, it should be noted that all economic data was compiled by the industry
asking for the improvements and was accepted at face value by the Army Corps.
It should also be noted that the only tugboat operation on the river was owned and
operated by Saco River manufacturing operations (USACE, 1924). Although this makes
sense for businesses receiving coal via river transport to own the tugboat, it also raises the
question of who was receiving the benefits fiom this project. It is not only in the best
interests of business to get the freight cost of coal down, it is also in their best interest to
get larger coal shipments because they are paid a greater tug fee. This could drive the
political efforts to continually expand the size of the project.

Recent History and Erosion Problems

River borne commerce began to decline in the 1930s. The last year that coal was
shipped up the Saco River was 1940 (USACE, 1968). Project development ceased fiom
1940 to 1968, but erosion and shoreline repairs did not. Homes were damaged and lost.
A large winter storm in 1978 caused particular damage, requiring substantial repair to
area beach development (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). Residents of Camp Ellis and Hills
Beach were concerned, and both the City of Saco and State of Maine pushed the Army
Corps to develop a solution to address the erosion problem.
A change in Maine's coastal management policy in 1983 presented both the town
and Army Corps with new restrictions on mitigation options. New hard structures, such

as seawalls, groins, and breakwaters, were banned from use in Maine (Pilkey and Dixon,
1996). Despite these rules and the federal government's obligation to respect state
coastal regulations, the Army Corps often proposed solutions in direct violation with
Maine law. Smaller-scale projects that worked within the state's laws could not produce
the benefits needed to justifjr the costs. This was frustrating to the Army Corps who were
used to implementing engineered solutions. It was particularly frustrating to the towns
that watched more of their sand wash away as studies and negotiations continued.
Divisions grew between the state, the town, and the Army Corps that persisted through
the 1990s and to a lesser extent today.
There was no unified voice among the communities of southern Saco Bay. An
example of this was seen in 1988. The Army Corps planned to dredge the Saco River
channel and mouth and place spoils on Camp Ellis Beach. This angered the residents of
Hills Beach who believed the sand came from their beach and therefore should be
returned. Their legal efforts to get sand back from their neighbors were blocked by the
DEP and USF&WS on the grounds that dumping sand would harm clam-flats (Gold,
1988a). Efforts by the Town of Biddeford to dispose of dredged spoils from Biddeford
Pool on Hills Beach were also rejected on similar grounds and economic issues (Gold,
1988b).
Tensions were high among all parties. The communities did not trust the Army
Corps, and they felt that the state was more concerned with preserving the environment
then people, a view that still persists with the property owners (SOS Camp Ellis, 2003).
The Army Corps's relationship with the Maine Geological Survey and DEP soured as
disagreement over solutions and coastal data persisted (Dickson, 2002; Habel, 2003;

Kelley, 2003; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). This came to a head in 1992 when the Army
Corps completed a Section 111 Study for Camp Ellis and determined that the erosion was
indeed their fault, but there was no economically viable engineering solution. Under
project guidelines, the federal government would not provide financial assistance. This
was announced unexpectedly during a planning meeting with FEMA, the State of Maine,
and stakeholders. This prompted an angry letter from Governor McKernan to the Army
Corps, admonishing them for being uncooperative, obstructionist, and unprofessional
(Kelley and Anderson, 2000; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).
There was a total breakdown in communications between all parties and an
environment of distrust flourished. The Army Corps walked away from the project for
the rest of the 1990s. During that time, serious divisions formed within the community of
Saco. The City of Saco, frustrated over the ongoing problems at Camp Ellis and repeated
maintenance costs, was resolved to let Camp Ellis erode rather then expend more time
and resources (Michaud, 2003). Camp Ellis was left to fight the problem on their own,
and their future looked bleak.
Things changed for the better in 2000. A staff member from Congressman Tom
Allen's office brought everyone back to the negotiation table, including the Army Corps.
Allen's office moderated discussions between the state, stakeholders, and the Army
Corps. A new process began, and continues, where all parties are working toward a
common solution (Ouellette, 2002). A revised Section 111 Study produced economically
viable solutions. The federal government is providing public funding, and Congressman
Allen continues to secure additional funds.

Relationships within the community have changed over the last 4 years with the
election of a new mayor and a deputy mayor, himself a resident of Camp Ellis. They
have committed the City of Saco to finding a solution for the problems at Camp Ellis
(Michaud, 2003). Congressman Allen's office helped form the Saco Bay Implementation
Team consisting of stakeholders, local administrators, state agencies, and Congressman
Allen's office. They have been instrumental in getting the state and community to move
forward in a common direction and have managed to keep the Army Corps engaged in
the process actively seeking a solution.
Currently, relations are far better than they have been in recent history. People
are working together to reach a solution. It is taking longer than expected, due to the
need for additional studies, but it is moving forward nonetheless. There is still distrust
under the surface, mainly from stakeholders. Most of this is aimed at the state and their
regulatory stance on the coast. People are upset with the Sand Dune Rules, in particular
the inability of the community to construct any new hard structures to protect their homes
(Skinner, 2002). This has prompted local representatives to seek exceptions to the rule
for Camp Ellis in the state legislature. A new bill will be presented to the Maine
legislature in 2003 that would provide Camp Ellis with an exemption from state
regulations and allow the community to armor the stretch of beach along Surf Street
(Michaud, 2003). Local representatives are considering bills of their own seeking similar
exceptions (Skinner, 2002).
Stakeholders are still wary of the Army Corps. Recent delays in the project led
some residents to doubt whether the Army Corps will embark on any work (SOS Camp
Ellis, 2002). A plan was due in December 2002. The meeting was delayed and didn't

occur until the end of January 2003, where no plan other than to go forward with 6 more
months of studies was presented. Residents present at the meeting were upset and vented
their frustration (SBIT, 2003).
Despite these setbacks, officials remain positive about the process and their
progress. A City of Saco administrator acknowledged that it is understandable if
stakeholders are upset. Their homes and property are at risk. He emphasized that,
despite the grumblings and hurdles, solutions were being entertained rather than
discarded (Michaud, 2003). Congress Tom Allen's office voiced similar feelings
conceding that this is a difficult task, but the continued efforts of those involved, and
their dedication to reaching a solution keeps negotiations moving forward (Ouellette,
2002).

Saco River Political Analysis
There are several stages in the project's political history worth identifling. The
first is the authorization stage early in its life. The second stage is the intervening years
up until the year 2000 where erosion problems escalated, and the health of the political
environment deteriorated to all-time low levels. The third and final stage is very recent,
2000 to present, and is characterized by renewal of negotiations and mitigation efforts.

Stape 1: Proiect Authorization
This stage spans the early years of the project from approximately 1886 to 1924.
It is representative of a pattern common to other projects. The projects were not deemed
viable either economically or in design. There was an initial move to rehse the project.

An oversight body pressured by special commercial interests within the community
overturned this rehsal and a new survey was conducted with positive results granting
project approval. With the Saco River Project, this cycle repeated itself several times as
jetty expansion occurred over time.

S t a ~ 2:
e The Erosion Years
Soon aRer jetty construction, problems arose. Deteriorating conditions and
inaction led to divisions forming between the various participants. The state and
stakeholders held the Corps responsible, and distrust grew that still exists today (and
carried over into other Maine federal projects). A change in coastal management
ideology in the mid-80s was a leading cause for problems between the community and
the state and the Army Corps and the state. Much later in the process, a division formed
within the community between beach property owners and non-beach property owners.
One does not see the interaction of NGOs and the USF&WS because habitat was not an
issue; there is none of great concern. The result was disagreement and distrust all around.
Everyone, led by the Army Corps, walked away from the mitigation process.

Stape 3: Renewed Efforts
Beginning around 2000, Congressman Allen's office took a particular interest in
resolving the problems in Camp Ellis and dedicated the personnel and resources needed
to complete the job. There is also the implied support of Maine's two very influential
senators: Snowe and Collins (Michaud, 2003). The Congressman's office provides two
services. The first is mediation that has been successful in getting people to return to the

negotiating table, working toward common goals. The second is his efforts at
appropriating the h n d s necessary to carry out any of the solutions. Aside from this,
another key element in this stage is closing of the division within the community. A new
mayor's office has changed the city's stance on Camp Ellis and is providing a unified
voice to the state and federal government.

Holistic Analysis
Again, this project can be divided into three separate phases. The following is a
summary of how all three components previously analyzed interact to drive the final
outcomes.

Phase 1: Proiect Authorization
ARer the initial review of the economic data and engineering objectives, it was
determined that the project was not warranted based on marginal returns and uncertain
performance in the dynamic environment (Figure 5.9). Special interests within the
communities applied political pressure and were able to get a second review of the
project that produced favorable results and justified federal involvement. Project
authorization was based on flawed economic assumptions and an incomplete
understanding of the coastal processes defining the natural setting. The result was the
beginning of a marginal project with an uncertain outcome subject to federal regulations
and funding.

Phase 2: Proiect Construction

The present Saco River Navigation Project is the sum total of a history of
engineering and design changes. The changes were made to address problems
experienced at the project that impaired its intended function. Each change was preceded
by a feasibility study reviewing the economic and engineering data. Unfortunately, much
of the original data responsible for the problems was recycled. The result was a lifecycle
of alterations that perpetuated and amplified the existing problems (Figure 5.10).

Phase 3: Proiect Mitigation

All three factors, the natural setting, economics, and the political environment
contributed to an inability to move forward on a mitigation plan. The natural setting was
not conducive to the project desired. Solid structures had adverse effects on the
surrounding beaches. The setting has not become any more favorable and therefore
continues to be an obstacle. Economically, as the community deteriorated and
manufacturing moved off the river, the potential benefits generated from investment in
the region declined. As costs escalated with the size and scope of the project, there was
an inability to achieve a net benefit. Based on the federal guidelines, this precluded the
project from any further funding. The community had limited fbnds to begin with and
now as a result of the beach deterioration, they have even less. Politically, relationships
deteriorated over the project's life. Ideological differences in coastal management further
exacerbated existing problems. By the 1990s, parties walked away from the negotiation
table, and there was every indication that the problem would resolve itself only when the
last home fell into the ocean.

PROJECT AUTHORIZATION

Figure 5.9 Project Authorization Phase for the Saco River Navigation Project
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Figure 5.10 Project Construction Phase for the Saco River Navigation Project

New life was pumped into mitigation efforts in 2000 with the introduction of a
mediator. Effective mediation repaired enough of the damage to the political
environment to start negotiations once more. Further positive changes in the political
environment opened different avenues in both the economic and engineering segments of
the project (Figure 5.11). A new view of the economic situation found favorable grounds
for federal involvement and the appropriation of h n d s has allowed plans to move
forward. There has also been a move to gather new data directly from the site to
determine the best possible option to help slow erosion. This is a break from the
established routine and represents a move to consider different options. The problem has
not been solved and there is no guarantee that it will. The mitigation process is currently
moving forward.

PROJECT MITIGATION

Figure 5.11 Project Mitigation Phase for the Sam River Navigation Project

CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY 3: COLD SPRING INLET NAVIGATION PROJECT

Cold Swing Inlet and Cape May Harbor
The first attempts at navigation development in the Cape May area occurred in
1890. Local interests requested a breakwater located approximately 9.6 km east of the
Cape May Peninsula to shelter ships. An Army Corps survey was completed, and the
request was denied on the basis of poor economic and engineering conditions. There
already existed such a breakwater at the entrance of Delaware Bay, and the shifting
shoals the new one would be built on were unstable. More importantly, there was no
commerce in that area that warranted the public investment (USACE, 1890).
Four years later another survey was conducted, this time to investigate the
possibility of improving the Cold Spring Inlet for commercial use (Figure 6.1).
Once again, the project was rejected based on economic and engineering concerns.
Specifically, Army Corps Engineer, C.W. Raymond sited problems associated with
establishing inlets and harbors in such a sandy and tidally influenced environment. He
went on to make a broader statement about such endeavors on the whole.

"The construction of such jetties upon a sandy coast is costly and uncertain.
Owing to the instability of the beaches expensive works of shore protection are
required. As shown by experience the harbors thus formed always lack
accessibility. Finally the permanent maintenance of the requisite channel depths
[through] such entrances is apt to be a source of constant trouble and expense.
The improvement of an inlet on a sandy coast is one of the most difficult
problems of harbor engineering; its cost and uncertainty are so great that it should
be attempted only when necessary to improve the approach to some great port of
commerce." (USACE, 1894, p 2)

Figure 6.1 Aerial photo of Cold Spring Inlet, also referred to as Cape May Inlet, and
Cape May Harbor 1978 (photo courtesy of J.T. Kelley)

Thirteen years later the project was revisited. Commercial interests wanted a
stabilized inlet with a federally maintained channel extending into the back basin. By
this time considerable local resources were invested into the development of the area as a
commercial center. The Cape May Real Estate Company dredged 6.9 million m3 of sand
from the 60-acre basin behind the inlet to create a 500-acre harbor with 9.1 m mean low
water (MLW) depth. The entire shoreline was stabilized with bulkheads, and dredge
spoils were used to fill in the surrounding wetlands for commercial development. The
Pennsylvania and Reading Company installed tracks, extending their rail service to the
new harbor. Cruise line companies expressed interest in making the new port a stop
(USACE, 1907).
Army Corps surveys reported favorable engineering conditions, but they remained
concerned with the economics. They were asked to develop an area to attract commerce
as opposed to aiding existing commerce. No water-based commerce existed at Cold
Spring Inlet. Trains delivered everything to the area, and that amounted to only 100,000
tons per year. It was assumed that this would not change. Local parties pleaded their
case, and the Army Corps agreed to go forward with the project based on the $3 million
commitment already made by the community (USACE, 1907). Between 1907 and 1911
two jetties were constructed to stabilize the inlet, and a channel was dredged into the back
harbor. The jetties were placed 229 m apart, and a channel 7.6m deep MLW was
dredged into the harbor (Table 6.1).
Between 1907 and 1941 the Intracoastal Waterway was completed through New
Jersey, extending from Cape May Harbor in the south to Manasquan Inlet in the north.
Cape May Canal was completed around that same time, joining the harbor with the

Delaware Bay by cutting west across the Cape May Peninsula. At this point in time, the
commercial harbor was near completion, and the Coast Guard and Navy had established a
training base and air station on both sides of the inlet, extending from the ocean side
beach back to the harbor shore. Commercial and government interests wanted the
existing channel to be lengthened and deepened, citing commercial benefits and national
security. Existing conditions did not allow for easy access for larger ships into the port
on the west side of the harbor where they could seek shelter and service (USACE, 1941).

Cold Spring Inlet Navigation Project - 1907
East Jetty: 1386 m in length, rubble mound construction, 229 m inshore wing
West Jetty: 1344 m in length, stone and rubble mound construction, 91 m inshore wing
/channel:

7.6 m deep, 122 m wide at MLW, extending into back harbor

Table 6.1 Dimensions and design of the 1907 Cold Spring Inlet Navigation Project
(USACE, 1941).

The Army Corps authorized a project to expand the channel. The existing inlet
and channel were dredged to a depth of 7.6 m MLW under the authority of the original
project. The channel was then extended farther into the harbor under a new authority,
also to a depth of 7.6 m MLW. This allowed for military ships to dock at the base
without running aground on shoals in the channel and harbor (USACE, 1941). These
were the last changes made to the actual navigation project itself and the only other
development beyond the initial construction. Subsequent efforts focused on shore
protection and most recently, habitat preservation and restoration.

Erosion and Shore Protection Proiects
Erosion down drift of the inlet did considerable damage to the beaches on the
Peninsula. Cape May City lost nearly all of their beaches and their source of tourist
revenue. The following is an excerpt of a letter from a Cape May City official requesting
federal finds for shore protection. It conveys the severity of the situation at that time.

Our community is nearly financially insolvent. The economic consequences of
beach erosion are depriving all of our people of much needed municipal
services.. .The residents of one area or town, Frog Hollow, live in constant fear.
The Frog Hollow area is a 12 block segment of the town that becomes submerged
when the tide is merely 1 to 2 feet above normal. The principal reason is that
there is no beach fronting on this area.. . Maps show that blocks have been lost,
that a boardwalk has been lost.. . The stone wall, one mile long, that we erected
along the ocean front only five years ago has already begun to crumble from the
pounding of the waves since there is little or not beach.. . We have finally reached
a point where we no longer have beaches to erode. (Nordstrom et al., 1986, p39)

Local and state projects were instituted to address the erosion problems. It wasn't
until the late 1980s that the federal government instituted a federally finded nourishment
plan for the communities on the Peninsula. The following is a summary of a portion of
what has been done over the last 90 years. The historic records are good, but because
projects were managed by a number of different entities over time, the record is not
entirely complete. Other local and state projects may have, and most likely did, occurred.
The Army Corps conducted erosion studies in 1926, 1928, and 193 1. Their
findings did not just@ use of federal finds for shore protection projects. Local interests
were left to find mitigation on their own. The State of New Jersey offered some relief in
1922 when they began providing financial assistance to municipalities for the purpose of
shore protection (USACE, 1957).

The first seawall was built in 1914 to protect Cape May City (Table 6.2).
Alterations and repairs were made in 1930 and 1946. A bulkhead was constructed along
Cape May Point at the southern tip of the peninsula.

Area
1914 lcape May City
1 1930 k a ~ Mav
e Citv
1946 Cape May City
1914 - 1946Cape May Point

Work Completed
l~imberseawall
l~imberseawall redaced with steel wall
Repairs to existing wall
Bulkhead shorefront properties

I

Table 6.2 The history of seawall work on Cape May Peninsula from 1914-1946
(USACE, 1947).
Cape May City also invested in a substantial groin field (Table 6.3). From 1925
to 1946 over 24 groins were erected on the city's beaches. This groin field and a large
stone seawall protected Cape May City's entire beach frontage. The Coast Guard and
Naval station just west of the inlet, installed 7 groins along their beach. The community
of Cape May Point installed 20 groins along their beaches between 1930 and 1943.
Lower Township, between Cape May City and Cape May Point, remained undeveloped
and was not protected with structures (USACE, 1947).

Year
Area
1925-1929 C a ~ Mav
e Citv
1 1930-1932 k a ~ Mav
e Point
1936- 1940 Cape May Point
1939- 1941 Cape May City
1941- 1945 Coast Guard-Naval Base
1943 Cape May Point
1946 Cape May City

Work Completed
24 groins
1 16 groins
3 groins
8 groins; 13 repaired
7 groins
1 groin
5 groins

I

Table 6.3 The history of groin construction on Cape May Peninsula from 19251946 (USACE, 1947).

By 1953, the Army Corps acknowledged that the jetties were responsible for
some of the erosion experienced down drift. A shore protection study was begun in 195 1
and completed in 1953 (US ACE, 195 1; USACE, 1953). The findings justified federal
involvement and the use of public h n d s to assist in a shore protection project for Cape
May City. Lower Township and Cape May Point to the southwest did not produce the
economic benefits necessary for public hnding. Plans were offered to them, but no
money. The Coast Guard base was under a different federal authority, and they were
responsible for their own land.
The plan entailed an initial nourishment of the beach fronting Cape May City and
then the placement of sand near the Coast Guard Station in subsequent years to act as a
feeder beach for down drift Cape May City. The plan included repairing 5 existing
groins and allotted for the construction of 5 new ones, if conditions deemed them
necessary (Table 6.4).

Cape May City Shore Protection Plan - 1953
Nourishment: 636,110 m3of initial sand on Cape May beaches; 229,366 m3/3yrfor 50 years
Groins: Repair of 5 existing groins; construction of 5 new groins deferred

[~owerTownship and Cape May Point were given protection plans but no money
Table 6.4 The proposed design of the 1953 Cape May City Shore Protection Plan
(USACE, 1953).
This specific plan was never initiated but served as the basis for 40 years of subsequent
reports and recommendations prior to any federal project initiation.

A report on the condition of the New Jersey shoreline was completed in 1957
(USACE, 1957). It reaffirmed that shore protection options for Cape May City were
justified and should be initiated. The project specifications were modified in 1960 and
1962 (USACE, 1965b). In a 1976 survey of coastal inlets and beaches, additional
recommendations for the proposed shore protection plan at Cape May City were
presented (USACE, 1976). The Army Corps proposed a sand bypassing system to
transport impounded sediment along the east jetty, across the inlet, to the outside of the
west jetty. They also proposed building more groins and constructing dikes along Cape
May Point to address flooding in the community.

Recent Proiects

In 1976, a Section 111 Study officially concluded that the erosion experienced
down driR of the jetties was in part due to the presence of the federal project. Although
the government had previously acknowledged this, the Section 111 Study opened the
entire stretch from the inlet through Cape May Point up to the possibility of more federal
fhding and officially expanded the scope of the original navigation project to include the
shore protection plans (USACE, 1976; USACE, 1980b). Phase I and I1 design
memorandums were completed in 1980 and 1983, respectively, for the new shore
protection project (USACE, 1980b; USACE, 1983). The plan is summarized in Table
6.5.

Cape May City Shore Protection Plan - 1983
Nourishment: 275,240 m3/2yr (50 years); supplied to feeder beach on west side of inlet
Sand Bypassing System: Develop method for transporting sand from impoundment
area on east side of inlet to west side of inlet
Groins: Finish the repair of 5 existing groins from original project
Monitoring Program: Lower Township and Cape May Point were given protection
plans but no money
Table 6.5 The proposed design for the 1983 Cape May City Shore Protection Plan
(USACE, 1983).

Once again, Lower Township and Cape May Point were not included in the final
project funding due to economic considerations. The naval base at Cape May Point had
been purchased by the state and turned into a state park for beach recreation but was not
generating the revenue needed to justifjl federal funding. Lower Township remained
undeveloped. Monitoring programs were suggested for both these areas. After 40 years
of studies and plans and an economic reevaluation in 1987 (USACE, 1987b),
construction of the main beach restoration project for Cape May City finally began in
1989.
Nourishment maintenance continues today on an average of every two years
(USACE, 1997b). Nourishment in the 1960s was emergency in nature, related to the
March 1962 storm that caused considerable damage along New Jersey's shoreline
(Gebert, 2003). Since 1962, more than $166 million of nourishment was performed on
the Cape May Peninsula (Table 6.6).

Area
Cape May
Cape May
Cape May
h e Mav
[cape May
l ~ a p May
e
l ~ a p May
e
l ~ a p May
e
Cape May
Cape May
Cape May
C a ~ Mav
e
L ~ a v
P p e May Point
ICape May Point

1

1
1
(

1

1

1

1

Cape May State Park
C a ~ Mav
e
State Park
l ~ o w e Townshlp
r

1

Year
1962
1967
1969
1981
1989
1991
1992
1993
1993
1995
1999
1997
1999
1992

Funding Type
Federal: Storm & Erosion
Federal: Emergency
Federal: Emergency
hateLoca1

1

I~tateLocal
ILocaI/Private
I~ederal:Navigation
StateLocal
Federal: Storm & Erosion
Federal: Shore Protection
Federal: Shore Protection
I~ederal:Shore Protection
I~ederal:Emergency
Federal: Ecosystem
1999
Restoratiodshore Protection
1986 Federal: Emergency
1992 StateLocal

/

1986 I~tateLocal

1

1

I

Cubic Meters
325,097
NA
NA
265,561
9 1,747
34,405
3 13,467
76,456
NA
688,099
NA
279.827
305.822
182,729
1,813,520

1

1
1

1

1

/

691,985
NA

1

275,240

Cost (2002%)
$4,096,360
$972,663
$146,095
NA
$3,435,572
$259,675
$1,539,991
NA
$1 10,952
$5,173,380
$60,25 1,219
$2.662.455
$3.625.545
$2,303,755
$78,451,452
$1,217,624
$331.155

1

$1,854,454

Table 6.6 A history of nourishment projects on the Cape May Peninsula from 1962-1999
(Duke University, 2002).

Lower Township - Cape Mav Meadows
In 1986 there was a presidential decree to focus on ecosystem restoration projects
(Fraser, 2003). Projects could now be authorized based on the ecosystem restoration
benefits rather than strict economic criteria (Zapille, 2003). Lower Township, now Cape
May Meadows, included Cape May Point State Park and the Cape May Migratory Bird
Refuge. This area was chosen for ecosystem restoration, and a Section 111 Study
connected the restoration work to the original navigation project, making it eligible for
federal funding (USACE, 1997b). Ownership of the area is split between the State of

New Jersey and The Nature Conservancy. The area is valued worldwide as a critical
stopover for migratory birds along the Atlantic Flyway (USACE, 1998). The first
appropriations were made in 2002 and construction was to begin, pending the
appropriation of the remaining hnds (Fraser, 2003) (Table 6.7).

Lower Cape May Meadows Restoration Project - 1998
Nourishment: Initial duneherm construction 1.8 million m3; periodic
nourishment 496,961 m3 every 4 years
Wetlands: Seaward restoration of 35 acres of eroded wetland
Plants: Elimination of 95 acres of Phragmites australis; plant 105 acres of
emergent wetland vegetation
Fresh Water: Drainage ditches; 2 weir flow control structures; 6 new
fish reservoirs in existing ponds; shallow retention basin; tidal gate
Table 6.7 The proposed Lower Cape May Meadows ecosystem restoration
project - 1998 (USACE, 1998).

With the addition of the most recent ecosystem restoration plan, all areas from the
inlet through to Cape May Point have some form of active federal shore protection
project (Garafola, 2003). Nourishment is ongoing in Cape May City, and the
construction of the Cape May Meadows ecosystem restoration project has just begun.
State and local projects continue and include "innovative" programs like the Beachsaver
Reef study along Cape May Point (Fraser, 2003). Cold Spring Inlet and Cape May
Harbor continue to serve both recreational and commercial vessels.

Cold S ~ r i n Inlet
e
- The Natural Setting
New Jersey's Coastline
The New Jersey coastline is approximately 755 km long (USACE, 1971) (Figure
6.2). The coast begins with a northward extending barrier spit in Monmouth County
called Sandy Hook. South of Sandy Hook is a headland extending from Monmouth
Beach to Bayhead (Nordstrom et al., 1986; Nordstrom, 1994). This becomes barrier
islands for the next 145 km,extending south to Cape May (USACE, 1953; USACE,
1983b). The barrier islands are divided by 11 inlets, of which 5 are stabilized
(Nordstrom, 1994). Marshes, bays, and lagoons back the islands. At Cape May Harbor,
the barrier islands transition back to a headland on the Cape May Peninsula (USACE,
1953). Around the peninsula into Delaware Bay there is a stretch of bay-shore frontage,
leading into the Delaware River towards Philadelphia.
The original inhabitants of New Jersey spent summers along the Atlantic beaches,
harvesting the resources. They did not build permanent structures and left with the
changing season. During Colonial times, there was very little interest in establishing
settlements along the barrier island systems. It is reported that a Dutchman sold the
islands north of Cape May (the Wildwoods) in the 1700s for a total of 9 pounds in order
to buy his wife a dress. It wasn't until the 1800s, with the arrival of the railroads, that
interest grew. By the early 1900s, the New Jersey Shore had become a premium tourist
destination with resorts along its beaches (Nordstrom et al., 1986).

Figure 6.2 Map of New Jersey. Sandy Hook is the north-facing spit (Nordstrom,
1994).

Southern New Jersey Coast - Cold Spring Inlet

The southern limit of New Jersey's coast is at Cape May Peninsula (Figure 6.3).
The peninsula is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the east and Delaware Bay to the
west. Cold Spring Inlet is located on the Atlantic side of the peninsula approximately 9.7
km northeast of the peninsula's tip. Just to the north of the inlet is Two Mile Beach.

This is a heavily developed tourist area with large dunes and beaches 90-150 m wide
(USACE, 195 1). A Coast Guard station occupies the land on both sides of the inlet
(Figure 6.4). This area marks the southern transition from barrier islands back to
headlands. Southwest of the Coast Guard station is Cape May City, a national historical
landmark and popular tourist destination. Farther along the coast is Lower Township
(Cape May Meadows), consisting of undeveloped lands, a state park, and a bird
sanctuary. Cape May Point, a small private community, sits at the tip of the peninsula.
North along the Delaware Bay shoreline of the peninsula is the entrance to the
Cape May Canal, part of the Intracoastal Waterway, linking Delaware Bay to Cape May
Harbor. The total distance from Cold Spring Inlet to the entrance of the canal on the
Delaware Bay side is approximately 12.9 km. The entire area is 145 km from the
Philadelphia metropolitan area. The inlet is stabilized and has a maintained channel
extending into Cape May Harbor (Figure 6.4). It is predominantly a commercial harbor
with fish processing operations. The harbor connects both the Intracoastal Waterway
heading north and the Cape May Canal heading west. The waterway has private and
commercial wharves. The waterway extends north to Manasquan Inlet and is a small
portion of the 4,667 km eastern waterway stretching from the Gulf of Mexico north
(USACE, 1941; USACE, 1976).

Figure 6.3 Map of the southern New Jersey shoreline and Cape May Peninsula
(Nordstrom et al., 1986)
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Figure 6.4 Map of the Cape May Peninsula project area - 1983 (USACE, 1983b).

Geomor~holow
The project area sits on the Atlantic Coastal Plain. The plain extends from
Georges Bank off of Cape Cod to Florida in the south and east as far as the edge of the
Continental Shelf. It consists of unconsolidated layers of gravel, clay, sand, and silt of
Cretaceous age and younger (USACE, 195 1).
At the base of the sediment layers is crystalline rock, up to 1,829 m in depth near
the coast, dropping off seaward and then rising again. This rock is covered by semiconsolidated sediment beds of Lower Cretaceous age 4,054 m thick at the coast, tapering
to 2,713 m thick at the edge ofthe shelf (USACE, 1998). Unconsolidated sediment
layers of Upper Cretaceous to Tertiary age, up to 1,463 m thick, cover these beds
(USACE, 1957). Some Tertiary deposits outcrop in the area and are part of the Cohansey
Formation, characterized by yellowish-orange quartz grained layers of silt and clay. It is
both fluvial and marine in origin (US ACE, 1983b).
Above the Cohansey Formation is the Cape May Formation, also composed of
fluvial and marine origins and deposited during interglacial periods. It is of Pleistocene
age and is characterized by yellow to brown, medium to coarse-grained unconsolidated
quartz sediment (USACE, 1983b). The formation is dated to 125,000 years before
present (Ferland, 1985). This formation represents most of the surficial sediment layers
found throughout the New Jersey coastline, and makes up the Cape May Peninsula
headland (Ferland, 1985).

Ouaternarv Historv and Beach Formation
Beaches formed during interglacial periods at high stands of sea level and the
transition between transgressive and regressive seas (Uptegrove et a]., 1999; USACE,
1983b). Rivers and streams drove a cycle of repeated erosion and deposition of
headlands (USACE, 1983b). Rising seas reworked and consolidated sediments forming
beaches. Earlier beach materials are found landward and as far seaward as the edge of
the Continental Shelf. The cycles of sea-level rise and fall left a complex depositional
sequence found all over the Atlantic Coastal Plain (Uptegrove et al., 1999). Barrier
islands in the project area formed during the most recent rise of sea level (Ferland, 1985).
The last glaciation reached its farthest extent in the mid-Atlantic approximately
18,000 years before present (Ferland, 1985). A lowstand of the seas off the New Jersey
coast occurred at this time. Sea level was 122 - 137 m lower than currently (Nordstrom
et a]., 1986). From 18,000 to 6,500 years before present there was a rapid rise of sea
level. A small portion of this is attributed to the relatively high level of subsidence
present along the New Jersey coastline. This period was followed by a relative
slowdown in sea-level rise (SLR) from 6,500 to 2,000 years before present (Ferland,
1985)~~
Fluvial deposition occurred during the lowstand. As the sea began to rise, marine
forces reworked the deposits, forming barrier islands. As SLR continued, these islands
migrated farther inland, enclosing the backwaters, forming lagoons and bays. Inlets
opened when storms breached barrier islands connecting the ocean to the bays and
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Ve~yrecent records show a SLR of approximately 4.4 rnmlyr from the period 19 12 to 1980 (Ferland,

1985).

lagoons. Beaches along the headland fronting Cape May Point predate the barrier islands
found to the north (Uptegrove et al., 1999).

Coastal Processes - Winds, Waves, and Storms
Records from 1936 - 1947 report prevailing winds coming from the west and
northwest during winter and spring, switching to the south and west during the summer
and fall (USACE, 1% l;USACE, 1998). Dominant storm winds are from the northeast
and east. A 1951 study broke wind direction down as follows: 30% ofwinds blowing
onshore, 20% blowing southwest, and 47 % blowing offshore. This information is
supported by more recent studies (Ferland, 1985).
The majority of waves arrive at the Cape May Peninsula from the east-northeast
and the northeast. They have an average height of 0.7 m and travel at a velocity of 2 - 7
meters per second with a frequency between 6 and 13 seconds (USACE, 1983b). Wave
direction can also be broken down as 90% traveling south and 10% traveling north
(USACE, 1951; USACE, 1957).
Storms take the forms of hurricanes or extratropical storms.35 Hurricanes are
common during the late summer and fall (USACE, 1951). They travel a northeasterly
path, parallel to the coast and have little serious impact on the shoreline. Extratropical
storms are not as common, but they move much slower and can span two high tides
causing flooding (USACE, l965b). The peninsula's orientation shelters it from waves
and winds created by extratropical storms (Fraser, 2003).
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Coastal Processes - Tides, Currents, and Sand
Tides are semidiurnal with a mean tide between 1.25 and 1.31 m (USACE, 1998).
The highest tides coincide with storm events (USACE, 1951). Currents in the region are
heavily influenced by tides and, to a lesser extent, by waves. Due the peninsula's
proximity to the entrance of Delaware Bay, the tidal cycles have a strong influence over
the movement of water along the shoreface from Cape May Point in the south to Two
Mile Beach, north of the inlet (Herrington, 2002).
Ebb tides flow north and east along the project area, while flood tides move water
south and west (USACE, 1953). Both the Cape May Inlet and the Cape May Canal are
synchronized with the changing tide in Delaware Bay. Water located near the entrance of
the inlet is pulled in during flood periods. There is a tidal prism of approximately 2.5
billion m3 within the inlet (USACE, 1951). Water located at the bay entrance of the canal
is driven through the canal during ebb periods. Currents moving through the inlet and
canal move at approximately 1.2 - 1.5 m per second (USACE, 1951). Water located
away from either entrance bypasses and moves parallel to the coast at speeds of 0.76 0.91 m per second during ebb tides and 0.76 m per second during flood tides (USACE,
1980b). Tides and waves produce a longshore current, heading both north and south with
a net flow to the south (Ferland, 1985).
Originally, creeks and rivers supplied sediment to the shorefaces during
interglacial periods. Currently, creeks and rivers supply no sediment (Ferland, 1985;
USACE, 1976). Their sediment is deposited in the bays and lagoons of the estuary, never
making it to the ocean (USACE, 1998). Headlands were also a source of sediment for
Cape May beaches, but most of these were armored, preventing hrther transport of

sediment (Ferland, 1985). Delaware Bay may contribute sediment during ebb periods,
but the speed of the current likely prevents appreciable deposition along the southern
beaches of Cape May Point (Ferland, 1985; USACE, 1951).
The majority of sediment comes from the existing shorefaces along the New
Jersey coastline. There is a nodal point near Manasquan, New Jersey, from where
sediment travels south toward Cape May or north toward Sandy Hook (USACE, 1951;
USACE, 1957). Around the immediate project area, sediment is also supplied from the
continental shelf via waves (Ferland, 1985). The area has an overall greater rate of
erosion than deposition.

Pre-Jettv Conditions
Prior to construction of the jetties, there was shoaling both landward and seaward
of the inlet. The current location of Cape May Harbor was once a shallow lagoon with
flood tidal delta deposits (USACE, 1907). Ebb-tidal delta sandbars formed in front of the
entrance making travel difficult (USACE, 1894). Sediment either entered or bypassed
the inlet during flood tides. During ebb tides the longshore current changed direction,
and sediment moved in the opposite direction. There were periods of erosion and
accretion prior to jetty construction. The earliest profile data attest to this (USACE,
1951; USACE, 1953). The presence of revetments prior to 1907 also attests to this.
Beaches along the New Jersey Shore have also been moving southwest as sea level has
risen (USACE, 1983b). The Cape May Inlet migrated from the north to its current
location (USACE, 1907).

Post-Jetty Conditions
Construction of the jetties stabilized the inlet. The jetty length helped prevent the
introduction of sand into the inlet, and the width of the channel promoted self-scouring
during ebb and flood tides. The jetties also blocked the net southerly longshore
movement of sand, not allowing it to bypass the inlet and reach the southerly beaches.
Sediment is impounded along the outside of the eastern jetty. Two Mile Beach is
90-1 50 m in width in some places. Studies of sediment flow estimate a southerly
movement of 382,277 m3 each year and a northerly flow of 191,139 m3, creating a net
southerly flow of 191,139 m3 annually (USACE, 1976; USACE, l983b; USACE, 1998).
Any sand that is not impounded along the eastern jetty is directed offshore and away
from the shoreface. The impoundment area along the eastern jetty reached its capacity as
of 1934, and the system north of the inlet is believed to be in equilibrium. As a result,
some sediment is able to enter the inlet around the end of the eastern jetty and form
shoals in the entrance (USACE, 1951; USACE, 1953).
South and west of the inlet, there is considerable erosion. Rates accelerated after
introduction of the jetties. From 1927 to 1948 the area just west of the inlet, through the
Coast Guard station to the eastern edge of Cape May City, eroded at a rate of 5.2 m per
year. This rate decreased along the Cape May City beaches to 0.3 m year and increased
along the southern tip of the peninsula through Cape May Point to 2.1 m per year
(USACE, 1951). By 1951 an estimated 5 12,252 m3 had accreted east of the inlet while
1.04 million m3 eroded west of the inlet (USACE, 1951). Tidal forces from the Delaware
Bay compound the loss of longshore sediment. Tidal currents had a scouring effect,

removing existing sand from the southern beaches and depositing it in shoals at the
entrance of Delaware Bay (USACE, 1953).
Loss of beaches in areas like Cape May Meadows leads to breaching during
storms and inundation of saltwater into freshwater areas. This kills vegetation and
organisms (USACE, 1998). The extensive groin fields retard erosion to a point but are
unable to correct the problem. Nourishment is required to place sand back on beaches.

Cold S p r i n ~Inlet Natural set tin^ Analvsis
The project area and beaches to the south are fed by a longshore current providing
a steady supply of sand from the north and shore normal waves supplying sand from the
Continental Shelf. Despite this, erosive conditions have prevailed. A complicated and
powefil tidal current environment is created by Delaware Bay. There is some
speculation that these currents carry sediment, but it is more likely that the speed of the
currents has a scouring effect around the tip of the peninsula carrying sand offshore to
shoals found at the entrance of Delaware Bay. Army Corps reports support this assertion
(USACE, 1953).

Jetty and Inlet Construction
The two jetties at Cold Spring Inlet block the longshore movement of sand from
the north. As previously noted, the impoundment area along the eastern (northern) jetty
filled by the 1930s, creating wide beaches on the Wildwoods barriers. Some sand is able
to bypass the inlet, but is far enough offshore to miss the down drift beaches. Further
complicating the situation are the tidal currents from Delaware Bay. Prior to

construction, tidal currents moving sand from the peninsula were balanced by an inflow
of sand fiom the north. Currently more sand is removed than introduced, creating a sandstarved system.

En~ineera Res~onse

The effect of the jetties was almost immediate. They blocked flow of sand to
down drift beaches. No alterations were made and, for the most part, they have the same
configuration today that they had in 1907. This is mainly due to the fact that they served
the fbnction they were built for; they maintain a stabilized, self-scouring inlet. The jetties
have been left alone and not altered to address down drift erosion. Erosion was addressed
with groin construction where we see familiar response patterns.
Erosion was first experienced just down drift of the inlet, mainly the Coast Guard
station and eastern sections of Cape May City. The response was to engineer a solution
via shore-perpendicular groin structures to capture the sand bypassing the jetties. As time
passed, more groins were constructed farther and farther away from the inlet. This
passed the erosion problem farther down the peninsula until the entire tip of the peninsula
was covered with groins. Once the groin fields were completed and the problem was not
solved, the response was to lengthen existing groins. This again passed the erosion
problem on down the coastline and is typical for these projects. When solutions did not
rectify the problems, they were expanded in scope and size, amplifllng the existing
problems. The rationale for alterations was the same flawed rationale fiom which the
initial engineering responses originated. Groins do capture sand and are able to offer
some stabilization, but it begs the question of whether a better plan addressing the entire

peninsula coastline rather than segments might have been more effective and not resulted
in the sheer number of structures that exist today. Recent removal of some groins backs
this assertion (xw&n&-cxg,

1998).

Could Problems Have Been Avoided?

This project was initiated in the early 1900s. The current body of knowledge on
coastal processes is superior to that in 1907; however, the Army Corps' own engineers
predicted that this very thing would happen as far back as 1894 (USACE, 1894).
Stabilization of these inlets caused deterioration of adjacent beaches and required
constant attention to rectifl the problems. These determinations are in print and are a
part of the public record, yet they proceeded with the project regardless.
Mitigation responses focused on the immediate inlet vicinity, specifically the
developed area of Cape May City and the Coast Guard station. The system was
compartmentalized and responses did not reflect any future planning or vision. No one
assumed that undeveloped areas south of Cape May City might be of use to the public in
the future, even as the entire New Jersey coastline was experiencing intense development
throughout the 1900s (Nordstrom et al., 1986). This lack of vision was costly and
potentially disastrous for development and habitat. Although ecosystem restoration
projects are lauded as a positive change for the Army Corps, they are extremely costly
and could have been avoided with some long term planning.

Cold S ~ r i Inlet
n ~ - The Economics
Early Efforts
The earliest proposed development efforts were to build a breakwater off the coast
of the Cape May Peninsula in 1890. Engineers cited poor economic conditions, namely
no commerce in the area that would justifl the expenditure of public funds (USACE,
1890) on the project. The Army Corps looked into improving the inlet entrance four
years later. Again, they cited a poor economic environment lacking any commerce
(USACE, 1894). Local interests were not discouraged, and they continued to lobby. By
1907 they finally succeeded in initiating a federal navigation project at the Cold Spring
Inlet (USACE, 1907).

Jetty and Channel Construction - 1907 to 1941
Like other navigation projects, the economic objective of the Cold Spring Inlet
Project was to generate commercial benefits. The major difference between this and
other federal projects was that there was no existing commerce. Cold Spring was
undeveloped marsh and swampland with a shallow back basin and migrating inlet. There
was sparse development, and the small quantity of commerce that did pass through the
area arrived and lee by train. Essentially, a small group of private investors asked the
federal government to invest public funds into a speculative development project. Army
Corps engineers voiced their concerns regarding the role they were asked to play. Some
felt that this was a legislative decision and should be handed back to Congress. The
Board of Engineers reviewed the case and, based on the $3 million (over $47 million in
2003 dollars) already invested in the area by private developers, they were satisfied that

the business would come if the inlet and channel were built. They authorized the project
contingent on local interests completing their proposed development of the harbor area
(USACE, 1907).
The original project entailed the construction of two jetties at the mouth of the
inlet with a 7.6 m deep MLW channel. The project began in 1907 and was completed in
1911 (Table 6.8).

Cold Spring Inlet Navigation Project - Benefit Categories
1. Harbor of Rehge (vessels waiting for passage up the Delaware River)
2. Port of Commerce
3. Repair and Supply Port
4. Recreational Port (passenger liners)
5. Intracoastal Waterway Development
6. Military Port
Table 6.8 Projected benefit categories for the 1907 Cold Spring Inlet Navigation
Project (USACE, 1907).

Specific benefit figures were not included in the report. The project was approved
on the assurances of developers that the revenue would be generated. The Army Corps
approved the project and Congress appropriated the hnds (USACE, 1907) (Table 6.9).36

I

Jettv and Channel Construction Costs - 1907
Construction (initial)
Maintenance dredging (annual)

I
$1,300,000
$20,000

Table 6.9 Projected total construction costs for the jetties and the channel at Cold
Spring Inlet - 1907 (USACE, 1907)
36

All dollar amounts are in the year of the report unless otherwise noted.

No new work was done on the navigation project between 1911 and 1941. The total
costs, including construction and maintenance, up until 1940 were $1,494,59 1, slightly
under the projected costs from 1907 (USACE, 1941).
Commerce in the harbor developed as anticipated. Between 1934 and 1939,
11,000 - 22,000 tons of commerce passed through the harbor annually. In 1939 there
were 14,600 round trips from the harbor. At first, the harbor received a range of goods
but by 1933, the main commerce was fish and remains this way today. Trains continued
to carry the majority of the commerce in and out of the area as originally predicted.
In 1941 the military and commercial interests requested a channel modification
for the project. The existing channel design coupled with shoaling in the harbor did not
allow for passage of larger Navy and Coast Guard ships into Cape May Harbor. This
made service and repair a problem because ships were unable to dock. The desired
project entailed extending the existing channel into the harbor at a depth of 7.6 m I
Seaward, the channel would be extended to a depth of 6.1 m MLW (USACE, 194
(Table 6.10)

Channel Extension Costs - 1941
Construction
Maintenance Dredging (annual)

$71,000
$30,000

Table 6.10 Projected construction costs for the Cold Spring Inlet channel
improvements - 1941 (USACE, 1941)

Project benefits were listed as national security. The harbor was a port of
strategic importance along the Atlantic Coast. There was an interest in expanding its

capabilities with the threat of war. Local interests backed the plan, eager to expand the
dimensions of the harbor and accommodate larger commercial vessels (USACE, 1941).
Specific monetary benefits were not calculated, but it was believed that national
security issues warranted the changes. The project was expedited and the channel
expansion was completed (USACE, 1941).

Shore Erosion Proiects

Although erosion of down drift beaches was apparent soon after the completion of
the jetties in 1911, the Army Corps did not acknowledge any responsibility until 1951.
From 195 1 through 1991 numerous studies and plans were formulated for beach
restoration from Cape May Inlet through Cape May Point. Each plan drew upon
preceding reports adding to or adjusting some of the specifications. None of these plans
were initiated until 1991. The economic predictions and justifications through time
followed a familiar economic projection pattern. The following are examples of some of
the economic forecasting used in the different reports.

195 1 and 1953 Reports
In 195 1, Public Law 72737allowed for federal assistance in shore erosion control
projects (USACE, 1953). The federal government would provide up to one-third the
initial construction costs and none of the subsequent maintenance costs. Two Army
Corps studies determined that a portion of the erosion experienced down drift of the
project was due to the presence of the jetties. Specifically, they felt that the jetties were
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accelerating erosion from the Coast Guard station down to Wilmington Avenue in Cape
May City. They did not believe that areas south of there were being affected to the same
extent.
The original project proposal called for the repair of 5 groins and the construction
of 5 new groins. Additionally, there would be an initial nourishment of 636,110 m3 of
sand to build back the eroded beaches. Engineers left open the option to build a
revetment extending from the Coast Guard Station down through Cape May Point if the
groins did not "work" (Table 6.11).

I

Groin and Nourishment Costs - 1953
Groin repair and construction
Nourishment (636,110 m3 initial)
Revetment (optional)
Total Cost

$450,000
$525,000
$1,174,000
$2,149,000

Table 6.11 Projected total first costs for the 1953 Cape May City shore protection
project (USACE, 1953).

Total costs were converted to annual costs over a 50-year period using an interest
rate of 3% and amortization rate of 1%. Combined with an estimated $107,270 of annual
m a i n t e n a n ~ ethe
~ ~ ,total annual cost came to $148,120 (USACE, 1953). A plan for
construction of a groin field extending from Lower Township through Cape May Point
was presented to the communities by the Army Corps calling for 22 additional groins at a
cost of $535,000. No public fimding was offered.
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229,366 m3 of sand nourishment every 3 years

203

Several benefit categories were cited including damage prevention for existing
protective structures, the foregone cost of lost sand, land enhancement, and recreation
(Table 6.12)

Projected Annual Benefits - 1953
Protection of existing protective structures
Foregone cost of lost sand
Land enhancement
Recreational value
l ~ o t a Annual
l
Benefits

I

$233.3001

Table 6.12 Projected annual benefits by category for the 1953 Cape May City
shore protection project (USACE, 1953).

The annual costs and benefits produced a benefit to cost ratio of 1.58. Based on these
positive economic conditions, the project was recommended with the federal government
covering one-third of the initial construction costs.

1957 Report - Proposal Review
In 1957, the Army Corps reviewed their original 1953 plan and concluded that it
was still appropriate with minor design changes. The revetment option was not
considered, lowering the original first cost to $1,174,000. With some additions to the
design, the initial cost projections rose to $1,458,000. Using the same interest and
amortization rates and incorporating new maintenance charges the total annual cost
projection came to $153,000. Annual benefits were also adjusted. Land enhancement
was removed from the calculations and additional benefits were found in existing

categories raising total annual projected benefits from $233,300 to $275,000. The new
benefit to cost ratio was 1.8 and continued to justifL involvement (USACE, 1957).

1976 Proiect - More Review and a Section 111
Total expenditures including construction, dredging, and maintenance of the
navigation project totaled $3,302,309 by 1976. The annual average maintenance was
approximately $58,000. The Army Corps completed a Section 111 Study and determined
that the areas from Cape May Inlet through Cape May Point were eligible for greater
federal cost sharing due to the role the jetties played in the erosion of their beaches. The
annual benefits were recalculated for the shore restoration project (Table 6.13 and 6.14).

Projected Annual Benefits Cape May City- 1976
Protection of existing protective structures
Foregone cost of lost sand
Recreation
Reduced navigation project maintenance
Storm urotection
l ~ o t aAnnual
l
Benefits

I

$4.325.0001

Table 6.13 Projected annual benefits for the areas from the inlet through Cape
May City for the 1976 shore protection project (USACE, 1976).

I

Projected Annual Benefits Cape May Point- 1976
Protection of existing protective structures
Foregone cost of lost sand
Recreation
Storm protection
Land Enhancement
Total Annual Benefits

$4,000
$25,000
$9,000
$249,000
$7,000
$294,000

Table 6.14 Projected annual benefits for the 1976 Cape May Point shore
protection project (USACE, 1976).

The annual cost projections for the Cape May City segment of the project were
$1,285,000 and the annual cost projections for the Cape May Point segment were
$240,000. This produced benefit to cost ratios of 3.3 and 1.2 respectively (USACE,
1976). Again, this specific plan was not implemented, but it served as the justification
for the project currently in progress.

The Current Project - 1980 to Present
A Phase I General Design Memorandum (GDM) was completed in 1980,
redefining the proposed project. The plan maintained the general idea of the original
1953 proposal with some engineering changes. Once again areas south and west of Cape
May City were not included in the plan. Benefits and costs were recalculated. Benefit
categories included recreation, foregone cost of lost sand, enhanced property values,
protection of existing protective structures, and lower maintenance costs on the
navigation project39. A decision was made to include land enhancement benefits again
(USACE, 198Ob). The total predicted cost of the project was estimated at $13,287,000
(Table 6.15).

l~roiectedAnnual Costs and Benefits - 1980
I
Annual Costs
$1,591,000
Annual Benefit
$1,706,000
BenefitICost Ratio
1.07
Table 6.15 Projected annual costs and benefits for the 1980 Cape May Shore
Protection Project - Phase I General Design Memorandum, including the benefit
to cost ratio (USACE, 1980b)
39

Removal of the impounded sand on the eastern jetty preventing shoaling at the inlet entrance.

An interest rate of 7.375% was used to convert total costs to annual costs. Of the

$1,591,000 of annual costs, $809,000 represented annual maintenance (USACE, 1980b).
The Phase I GDM was followed with a Phase I1 GDM in 1983. Substantial
changes were made in the economic projections. This was due, in part, to additional
construction considerations. Storm water outtake extensions were needed to
accommodate the greater width of a nourished beach. This drove the total construction
costs up to $17,122,000 and maintenance to $943,100 per year translating to an annual
cost of $2,016,000 (USACE, 1983b). Annual benefits also changed (Table 6.16).

Projected Annual Benefits - 1983
Recreation
Foregone cost of lost sand
Enhanced property values
Protection of protective structures
Reduced maintenance cost on navigation project
Emdovment
l ~ o t a Annual
l
Benefits
$2,880,9001

1

Table 6.16 Projected annual benefits for the Cape May Shore Protection Project
1983 Phase I1 General Design Memorandum (USACE, 1983b).

Construction did not start until 1989. Changes in economic guidelines during the
interim restricted certain benefit calculations in shore protection projects. Specifically,
recreational benefits could not constitute more than 50% of the total

benefit^.^'

The most

recent calculations (Table 6.16) had recreational benefits accounting for over 70% of the
annual benefits.
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T h s guideline was an attempt to be more equitable in determining which coastal areas received federal
funding. The purpose was to take the emphasis away from large tourist areas and allow smaller coastal
areas the same opportunity at funding (Habel, 2003).
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The high percentage of recreational benefits and new guidelines prompted an
economic reevaluation in 1987, authorized by the Water Resource Development Act of
1986 (USACE, 1987b). Projected recreational benefits were reduced considerably (Table
6.17).

Reevaluated Annual Benefits - 1987
Recreation
l~nhancedproperty values
l~rotectionof protective structures
1
i~educedmaintenance cost on navigation project

1
I
1

Erosion protection (property)
Storm wave inundation reduction (property)
Total Annual Benefits

$856,000
$01
$38,000(
$122,0001
$2,780,000
$197,000
$3,993,000

Table 6.17 Projected annual benefits from the 1987 Cape May Shore Protection
economic reevaluation study (USACE, 1987b).

After reevaluation, recreational benefits only accounted for 2 1% of the total benefits.
The difference was made up in erosion protection and storm wave protection for
development. Employment and land enhancement benefits were removed from the
analysis. The annual cost projections were $2,352,500, relatively close to previous
projections. This produced a benefit to cost ratio of 1.7 and the justification to find the
project. The first federally finded sand was placed in 1989 (Duke University, 2002).
The project continues today on approximately a 2-year nourishment cycle.

Lower Cape May Meadows - Cape May Point Proiect
Amendments in the 1986 Water Resource Development Act directed the Army
Corps to become involved in ecosystem restoration (Zappile, 2002). They were required
to undertake these projects in a cost effective manner but were not constrained by
economic benefit to cost criterion. Ecosystem restoration projects had been difficult to
justify because these critical areas did not support the development and industry needed
to generate the economic benefits. Such was the case with Lower Township and Cape
May Point, now referred to as the Lower Cape May Meadows.
Prior to any federally backed plan, the communities were responsible for
mitigation. The State of New Jersey supported many of these projects financially (Table
6.18).

Agency

Location

Project

Dune repair
Meadows
Dune repair
Meadows
Beachfill
NJDEPJCMP~'Cape May Point
Meadows - Cape May Point Dune repair - beachfill
NJDEP
Dune Restoration
NJDEPICMP Lehigh Ave. Groin
Seawall repair
Lehigh Ave. Groin
CMP
Between Coral Ave &
Beachsaver reef
NJDEPICMP Lehigh Ave groins
State Park ocean frontage
NJDEPICMP to Lighthouse Ave. groin Dune reinforcement
Emergency dune 1groin repair
Cape May Point
CMP
Dune repair
Cape May Point
CMP
Dune repair
Cape May Point
CMP

NJDEP
NJDEP

Year
1986
1986
1991
1992
1993
1994

Cost
$332,019
$258,347
$192,300
$388,888
$87,000
$20,000

1994

$300,000

1996
1996
1996
1997

$429,000
$34,741
$20,000
$35,000

Table 6.18 A recent history of mitigation projects for Lower Township and Cape May
Point (USACE, 1998).
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Cape May Point

The federal restoration project was justified based on Environmental Quality (EQ)
benefits to the Meadows and on NED benefits to the surrounding communities. The
primary purpose of the plan was ecosystem restoration, and a secondary output was storm
damage reduction for the surrounding communities (USACE, 1998). Table 6.19
summarizes the EQ and NED benefits produced by the selected plan. The projected cost
of the project are summarized in table 6.20

Average Annual Benefits - EQ And NED

EQ
Acres not inundated by saltwater
Acres not eroded
Habitat Units
NED
Storm damage reduction
Local costs foregone
Benefits during construction
Total Annual NED benefits

175 acres
173 acres
388 H U
$719,500
$20 1,600
$23,700
$944,800

Table 6.19 Projected annual benefits for the 1998 Meadows and Cape May Point
project. Both environmental and economic benefits were calculated for the
project (USACE, 1998).

Total Cost Projections
Initial construction (total)
$15,403,000
l~nterestduring construction (7.125% for 2 years)l
$738,0001
l ~ e aestate
l
$145,0001
Total periodic nourishment (50 years)
$58,023,000
Total Project Costs (50 years)
$74,309,000

1
1

Table 6.20 Projected total costs for the 1998 Meadows and Cape May Point
project (USACE, 1998).

Using a discount rate of 7.375% and including all monitoring costs, the average annual
cost is $2,386,000 (USACE, 1998).
As of 2003, $1.5 million has been appropriated for the ecosystem restoration
project and more funds are expected for fiscal year 2004. Some initial work has been
done on controlling invasive species42. Construction of the berm and the initial
nourishment will have to wait until more funding is available due to the high costs of
setup and takedown of a dredging and pump operation (Fraser, 2003). There is every
indication that all the beaches from Cape May Inlet through Cape May Point will be
receiving sand nourishment via federal funds in the near future.

Cold Spring Inlet Economic Analvsis
The original project economically catered to a small segment of people, mostly
private land developers. The benefits, although considered to add to the overall national
economy, were realized by a few. Ideologically, the project was complicated in that it
was not the typical improvement project of an existing public facility. It was purely
development of private property that would later be accessible to the public. The
government was asked to partner in a private land development project and provide
support through public funds.
Despite this, it is reasonable to assume that economic objectives were achieved
for the navigation project. The harbor has been, and continues to be, active both
commercially and recreationally. Aiding its economic success is the presence of the
Intracoastal Waterway and the Navy and Coast Guard bases in the harbor. Its proximity
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Phragmites australis

to Philadelphia makes it an attractive recreational and commercial fishing location. The
project is heavy on incidental costs43and follows familiar cost patterns when considering
the mitigation efforts addressing the erosion.

Cost Patterns
The original navigation project was a one-time construction with only one
additional development in 1941. Once the Army Corps accepted responsibility for down
drift erosion in 195 1, subsequent shore protection projects were incorporated into the
overall navigation project. It is here in the proposals that we see the increasing cost
pattern often associated with these projects (Table 6 . 2 1 ) . ~The
~ proposed designs were
essentially the same from 1953 through 1987. There is a trend of increasing costs due to
underestimated projections or perhaps the delay in initiation allowed for more damage to
occur, driving up the cost of mitigation, or a combination of both.

1953

1957

1976

1980

1983

1987

Total
$5,645,055 $7,754,373 $39,469,399 $26,5 12,880 $27,919,133 $25,420,033
Construction
Total
$857,585 $813,731 $3,455,622 $3,174,681 $3,287,290 $3,407,832
Annual Costs

Table 6.21 History of the cost projections for proposed shore protection projects on Cape
May Peninsula from 1953 - 1987 in 2003 dollars.45

43

Incidental costs include groin construction, beach nourishment, and ecosystem restoration.
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None of the projects were initiated until 1989 but their forecasting shows a pattern common to projects

with increasing costs that evolve over time.
45

Dollars converted using a GDP deflator index with 1996 base year.

Benefit Patterns

There is a great variation in the projected benefits for the same proposed shore
protection projects. On the whole, they rise over time, keeping ahead of the increasing
cost predictions, justi@ing continued federal involvement (Table 6.22).

Table 6.22 Summary of projected annual benefits for proposed shore protection projects
on Cape May Peninsula from 1953 - 1987 in 2003 dollars.

This too might be due to the delay in project initiation. As more development and beach
were harmed, there were more potential benefits generated from fixing the problem.
Within this pattern of increasing benefits, there were also shiRs in benefit
categories. The original project of 1907 was based primarily on commercial benefits. As
commercial activity peaked, there was a shiR to national security benefits in the 1940s.
By 1953 the project focus shiRed away from the inlet and toward repairing the adjacent
beaches. Here there was an emphasis on recreational benefits. As times changed and
new economic guidelines emerged, recreational benefits declined sharply and were
replaced by shore protection benefits.
In 1953, recreational benefits accounted for 87% of the project annual benefits.
By 1983 this changed slightly to 72%. Between 1983 and 1987 a change in the economic
guidelines required that recreational benefits account for less than half the total benefits.
In 1987, recreational benefits only constituted 21% of the total benefits for the same
project. The loss was made up by shore protection benefits that now accounted for 75%

of the total benefits whereas in 1953 they were only 8%. The reasoning is not clear, and
there are no explanations for the drastic changes for the same projects. One could
speculate that the changes in benefits were, in part, to keep the total benefits at an
acceptable level for public fhding and in compliance with federal guidelines.

Incidental Costs
Beyond federally f h d e d mitigation, municipalities and the state shouldered a
great deal of the actual costs associated with shore protection. In Cape May Meadows
and Cape May Point alone, the state and community spent over $2.1 million on various
projects from 1986 to 1998 (USACE, 1998). There have been numerous revetment and
groin projects paid for by all communities on the peninsula and the state. These all
require annual maintenance. As existing structures are expanded, the cost of maintenance
increases.
Historically, Cape May City has been a famous recreational destination, at one
time frequented by the wealthy and elite (Nordstrom et al., 1986). Until very recently,
there was little to no dry beach. This not only impacts tourism but it also affects the
value of the beachfront homes (Pompe and Reinehart, 1994). There was a steady
deterioration in beach quality from the 1950s to the 1990s. A more in-depth study is
required to put a value on this loss.
Habitat loss added considerable costs to the overall project. It is difficult to place
a value on the loss of the freshwater wetlands located in the former Lower Township area
of the peninsula. It was for this reason that project planners were never able to justifjl use
of federal f h d s in protecting the area. The area is now considered a critical stopover for

migratory birds. The reason is that Lake Lilly is the only coastal freshwater lake between
Norfolk, Virginia and Sandy Hook, New Jersey along the Atlantic Flyway. Migratory
birds depend on its freshwater (Fraser, 2003). The Nature Conservancy deemed it
valuable enough to purchase a large segment of the wetlands in the 1980s (Laubengeyer,
2003).
With recent changes in the federal policy these wetlands are eligible for federal
funding. A Section 111 Study tied the problems along Cape May Meadows to the
original navigation project. Now the federal government and state are engaged in a highpriced ecosystem restoration project to remove invasive species and prevent the incursion
of saltwater into the freshwater system. The anticipated cost of the project is over $81
million (USACE, 1998). This is an area that has been denied federal assistance for 50
years, based on a lack of economic benefits, accounting for a small segment of the total
peninsula and now constituting 75% of the cost of the active federal mitigation projects
on the

(USACE, 1998).

Was the Navieation Proiect an Economic Success?

Again, the inlet and harbor appear to be active, supporting a range of recreational
and commercial interests. The location of the Intracoastal Waterway through the harbor
opens the area's potential to attract boat traffic; however, a more in-depth study of the
actual harbor and inlet activity are needed to substantiate these claims.
It is assumed, from the perspective of the federal government, that the navigation
project was successful economically. There was minimal effort on their part to provide
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Based on the projected cost figures of existing shore protection projects described in Army Corps reports.

the specified inlet and channel. The commerce and activity originally promised by
developers came. The navigation project has performed as was originally intended. The
project spans two economic lifetimes nearing 100 years in 2007. Despite the erosion
problems experienced down drift, the federal government has not invested heavily in
mitigation until very recently. The ecosystem restoration project at Cape May Meadows
will prove to be a costly venture, and more work is needed to determine the overall effect
it will have economically on the project in the future.
From the perspective of the state and community, the jetties are responsible for
much of the erosion they are experiencing and the money they have spent over the years
addressing the problem. Both parties acknowledge the worth of the harbor and the value
it brings to the region and the state as a whole and, therefore, view it as a condition they
have to live with (Fraser, 2003; Garafola, 2003). Time will tell how much the massive
New Jersey nourishment program will cost and whether federal monies will continue to
be available at current levels. The outcome may change the view of success and
economic value of Cold Spring Inlet and Cape May Harbor in the future.

Cold S ~ r i Inlet
n ~ - The Political Environment
Introduction
The political environment surrounding the Cold Spring Inlet Project is indicative
of other coastal projects around the country. There are multiple users, conflicting use
issues, and different levels of government involvement. The Coast Guard and Navy have
land holdings in the project area. Private developers have interests throughout the area as
does the commercial fishing industry. NGOs like The Nature Conservancy have land

holdings and a vested interest in the health of bird habitat. Additionally, the inlet and
harbor are connected to the Intracoastal Waterway running north from the Gulf Coast.
Recreational beaches, a New Jersey state park, and a nationally recognized bird sanctuary
draw thousands of visitors each year (USACE, 1998). Cape May Meadows is considered
a crucial stopover along the Atlantic Flyway for migratory birds (Laubengeyer, 2003).
The following section begins with a summary of interviews conducted with
representative members of some of the key participants in the project. The objective of
these interviews, as in the Maine cases, is to establish participants' perceptions of the
problems, potential solutions, and the state of relationships. This is followed by a brief
view of the politics associated with the project. The section ends with a review of state
planning efforts in New Jersey and how those efforts have guided coastal communities in
reassessing their future needs and goals.

Interviews
Interviews were conducted with several participants involved in the current
mitigation projects on the Cape May Peninsula. These include the NJDEP, the Army
Corps, the Town of Cape May Point, the State Planning Ofice, New Jersey Sea Grant,
and The Nature Conservancy. As with the Maine cases, the information gathered is
representative of a range of interests. Furthermore, the responses support the
interpretation of a positive, cooperative, political environment.

Perceptions
The exact details of perceived problems change from one party to the next. All
parties feel that the jetties on Cold Spring Inlet are responsible for erosion down drift but
they do not agree on the extent of the effect due to the scouring tidal forces from
Delaware Bay (Herrington, 2002; Zappile, 2002). All agree that the erosion problems on
the peninsula would not be as bad if the navigation project had not been constructed.
Some also believe that even without the current harbor there would be some issues due to
the amount of shore structures along the entire New Jersey coast (Fraser, 2003).
Concerns range from habitat loss and invasive species (Laubengeyer, 2003; Zappile,
2002) to loss of development and infrastructure (Fraser, 2003; Garafola, 2003; Gebert,
2003; Zappile, 2002). All concerns can be traced back to one common factor: erosion.
Regarding a solution to their problems, all interviewees seemed pleased with the
progress made on the current shore protection and ecosystem restoration projects. This
implied that their perception of a successf-bl outcome involves a replenished beach. A
replenished beach would ensure habitat restoration (Laubengeyer, 2003) and reduce flood
damage to development (Fraser, 2003). A major reason why stakeholders and agencies
are pleased with the current mitigation efforts is because strong healthy relationships
existed between the participants prior to the projects.

Relationships
All those interviewed cited good working relationships with the other participants.
Disagreements occur, but a strong foundation of trust and cooperation allows for
negotiation and resolution. The relationship between the Army Corps and NJDEP is
strong. Both respect each other's organization and role (Garafola, 2003; Gebert, 2003;
Keiser, 2003; Zappile, 2003) and they are able to coordinate efforts and collaborate on
projects. The relationship between NJDEP and the communities is strong. The engineers
in the coastal office are all coastal residents, living in the communities they serve.
Outside of work, engineers in the coastal office offer their assistance to planning boards
and committees to foster good relations along the coast (Garafola, 2003). Due to the role
NJDEP plays as project sponsor, the relationship between the Army Corps and the
communities is also strong (Fraser, 2003; Gebert, 2003).
There seems to be a good relationship between the coastal communities and state
government. The community of Cape May Point credits the efforts of Congressman
LoBiondo for advocating their case in Washington, D.C., and appropriating the funds
needed to begin the restoration project. They also speak favorably of the governor's
office. Specifically, past governor Florio was credited with making possible the
Beachsaver Reef project off of Cape May Point that has been successful in slowing
erosion along the tip of the peninsula (Fraser, 2003).
Another strong relationship has formed between The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
and the Army Corps. The Army Corps approached TNC to collaborate on the ecosystem
restoration project at Cape May Meadows. TNC was cautious at first due to the antienvironmental reputation the Army Corps has acquired. Over time, TNC opened up and

a cooperative relationship evolved. Both TNC and the Army Corps describe their
interaction as extremely positive (Laubengeyer, 2003; Zappile, 2002). The Army Corps
and TNC signed an agreement as a result of the good experience at Cape May Meadows
guaranteeing fbture cooperation with all national projects affecting TNC land holdings
(Zappile, 2002). TNC stated that they also had positive relations with NJDEP and the
surrounding communities (Laubengeyer, 2003).
All interviews reinforced the picture of a cooperative political environment.
Participants are moving forward in addressing their problems and decisions seem to be
consensus-based. Some of the keys to success include fbll participation by all
stakeholders and agencies, transparent transactions, and a flexible iterative problemsolving process defined by a fbture thinking, regionally based planning initiative.

The Overall Health of the Political Environment
Interviews revealed that all participants believed that the jetties were responsible
for their erosion problems and that the current nourishment projects were the means of
addressing those problems. Key participants seem to have mutually positive relationships
that foster affective mitigation efforts. The good relationships seem to encourage a
variety of response options outside the normal realm of mitigation responses. In
particular, the ability to address the problems at Cape May Meadows and the surrounding
communities through an ecosystem restoration project and the Beachsaver artificial reef
program that has enjoyed some success along Cape May Point.
This is indicative of a healthy political environment. It should be noted that a
more thorough investigation is needed to affirm these statements. It would be

particularly usefil to broaden the array of parties interviewed by speaking to NGOs other
than The Nature Conservancy, like New Jersey Audubon and the Littoral Society of
America, both critics of the ongoing nourishment programs in New Jersey. Another
important group would be community residents not affiliated with local, state, or federal
agencies.

A Brief Political Historv

The beginnings of the Cold Spring Navigation Project were very similar to the
Saco River Project in Maine. The project was rejected by engineers because of difficult
engineering conditions and then ultimately on poor economic projections (USACE, 1890;
USACE, 1894; USACE, 1907). Eventually commercial interests were able to persuade
the Army Corps to take on the project despite the protests of the Army Corps7 own
personnel. Developers "boot strapped the project by investing considerable finds in a
harbor and land reclamation project prior to getting any federal approval for an inlet and
channel. This is a common practice with questionable public works projects (Plater et al.,
1998). Commercial interests used this investment to plead their case and leverage their
position, eventually receiving authorization for the project and public finds.
The intervening years up until 1989 were spent fighting erosion and storm
damage. Municipalities and the State of New Jersey were the primary forces behind
mitigation efforts with a limited amount of federal assistance in the form of studies and
planning initiatives. New Jersey officially began offering financial and engineering
assistance to coastal communities in 1922 (USACE, 1957) and has been involved in
mitigation efforts in the Cape May area with numerous cooperative projects since 1930

(USACE, 1998). The state and municipalities continue to work together effectively
tackling management and development issues (Garafola, 2003).
Although there is every indication that the working relationships between local,
state, and federal parties have been positive, there is some discord, mainly with respect to
the massive publicly finded beach nourishment projects of which the New Jersey coast is
a recipient. Environmental groups, like the American Littoral Society, New Jersey
Audubon Society, and other concerned citizens, are critical of the Army Corps' massive
New Jersey nourishment projects. They cite huge costs, temporary results, risky
development, and isolated benefits focused on a small segment of the population (Gaul
and Wood, 2000; Grunwald, 1999; Neil, 1999). The Army Corps and coastal
communities counter these arguments by asserting first that such projects do not
encourage hrther risky development (Cordes and Yezer, 1995), and second that the costs
are justified due to the value of the business and the development these projects are
protecting (Gaul and Wood, 2000; Grunwald, 1999; Neil, 1999; www.climate.org, 1997).
This debate will continue as more people question the use of public finds to protect
coastal resort areas particularly in lean economic years; however, currently it has not
greatly hampered cooperative nourishment projects along the New Jersey coastline.

State and Coastal Communitv Coo~eration
New Jersey is considered a "home rule" state (Gualini, 2001; LuberofF, 1999;
Neuman, 1999). Communities have control over their growth and development
decisions. They greatly oppose the prospect of the state mandating these decisions and
have fought past legislative attempts to give the state more power (Garafola, 2003;

Luberoe 1999). This has not stopped the state and community from cooperating on
coastal projects.
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) was made
responsible for shore projects in the 1940s (USACE, 1998). Today they are essentially
two offices. There is a regulatory branch located in Trenton and a coastal office, known
as the Bureau of Coastal Engineering, in Toms River. The Bureau refers to themselves as
the "New Jersey Army Corps" (Garafola, 2003). The two are parts of the same
department but operate as separate entities.
Beginning in the 1940s the NJDEP had access to an annual state fund of $1
million to enter into projects with coastal communities. Additional monies were
appropriated when needed, usually in response to large storm events. The Shore
Protection and Tourism Act of 1992, passed by the state legislature, increased this annual
amount to $25 million. The money is raised via a real estate transfer tax paid by all
people in New Jersey when selling a home. The money is specifically used for beach
restoration and may not be used for other purposes without a vote in the legislature
(Garafola, 2003; USACE, 1998). NJDEP acts as the sponsor for all federal coastal
engineering projects. They assume the role of intermediary between the Army Corps and
the communities. They advocate for the communities while assisting the Army Corps
with New Jersey regulatory requirements and ensuring that the federal government
receives payments promptly.
Communities also have the ability to raise their own money. This can be done
through day-use charges on recreational beaches. The small community of Seaside Park
raises over $1 million each year that they are able to apply toward local shore protection

projects (Keiser, 2003). Money is also raised via local bond issues where NJDEP acts as
the lender. They are able to lend the communities money at an interest rate of
approximately 1% (Garafola, 2003). Communities eagerly borrow this money to initiate
coastal engineering projects.

Coastal Legislation
Although "home rule" is the norm, the state determined that it needed to take
greater control over increased coastal development in order to prevent the destruction and
loss of a great natural resource and asset to the state's economy (Nordstrom et al., 1986).
The Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) was passed to regulate development and
activity within a defined coastal zone (Neuman, 1999; NJDEP, 2003; Nordstrom et al.,
19861~~.
Other pieces of legislation like the Waterfront Development Act and the Wetlands
Act of 1970 also guide development and use of the coastal zone (NJDEP, 2003) but the
State Planning Act, signed into law in 1986, is the one that establishes the framework for
planning on the coast and around the state. The act instituted a cooperative process for
coordinating development and planning on the local and state levels. The act was in
response to a migration of people out of urban areas in the state and resettlement in
suburban and rural areas. The state wanted a means of containing services and costs
while the public expressed a concern over the effects this uncontrolled sprawl would have
on the natural environment. After much deliberation and opposition, a voluntary act was

47

Conceptually it is very similar to Maine's Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Act

created that stressed cooperation and communication but did not require compliance.
Despite this lack of "teeth the act was successfbl in its objectives (LuberofY, 1999).

The State Plannin~Act and "Cross-Accevtance"
A stated objective of the State Planning Act is to create the following:

"a cooperative planning process that involves the fbll participation of State,
county and local governments as well as other public and private sector interests
will enhance prudent and rational development, redevelopment and conservation
policies and the formulation of sound and consistent regional plans and planning
criteria" (NJ State Planning Act, 2003).

This is accomplished through a process known as "cross-acceptance" defined within the
act. There are three stages of the process: comparison, negotiation, and issue resolution
(Gualini, 2001; Neuman, 1999). Comparison requires the individual municipalities to
review a draft of the state plan, prepared by the State Planning Commission, and to
identifjl problems and inconsistencies with their community plans. This is in preparation
for a negotiation phase, between the state and the communities, where these
inconsistencies are discussed and either resolved or not. The final phase, issue resolution,
represents the culmination of negotiations and is the basis of the preliminary final plan
that is presented at a number of public meetings, before being finalized. The entire
process is transparent and iterative. Comparison and negotiations may go through several
different phases prior to reaching consensus and completion of a plan draft (Gualini,
2001). The plan itself is revised periodically, where the cross-acceptance process is
reworked.

Unexpected Success
At first many participants did not put much faith in the process. This was because
it lacked any mandatory compliance. Communities could go through the process and not
follow any of the suggested plans if they chose. It was also for this very reason that they
participated. They had nothing to lose and they did not feel compromised. They could
only gain from the experience because it offered an opportunity to participate and to be
heard (Luberoe 1999; Neuman, 1999).
The 17-member State Planning Commission is comprised of the different state
agencies, developers, and the governor's ofice, and represented a broad range of
interests. It was also under Executive control not Legislative which was appealing to
municipalities. They did not view the body as creating legislation and usurping local
power. The commission was given ample finding and resources to ensure that the job
would get done properly. It invested in the process through efforts like negotiation
training sessions for municipalities prior to them confronting the state, thus creating a
more valuable experience for all (Gualini, 2001; Neuman, 1999).
The State Plan originally did not include coastal communities in the crossacceptance process because it was felt that existing coastal legislation guided their
planning. The coastal communities felt differently and wanted an opportunity to
participate and rectify inconsistencies in CAFRA, which they felt compromised and
stifled their own development goals. Coastal communities participated in the crossacceptance process and through the negotiation and issue resolution phases were able
reduce some 500 inconsistencies with state regulations to 50 (Neuman, 1999).

The Benefits of the Process
There are mixed views of how successful the initiative has been. There are some
very real benefits, intended or not, that translate toward more effective cooperative
management along the coast. For instance, the process opened communications between
local and state government and between different agencies. People who did not know
each other now knew the other participants and what they did. This helped in
determining what they could do for each other (Gualini, 2001; Luberoff, 1999; Neuman,
1999).
Participants could see the fruits of their involvement as plans they negotiated were
enacted and funded. The process was strongly developmentally oriented, unlike the
command and control CAFRA legislation (Neuman, 1999). This satisfied concerned
property owners who felt they were losing the ability to earn any return on their
investments. It did not, however, replace the existing coastal legislation, thus pleasing
environmentalists. It made existing development plans more compatible with the existing
regulatory statutes. Most importantly, it succeeded at getting communities to think long
term on both a local and regional scale.

Cold Spring Inlet Political Analysis
Participants and Setting
It is important to note that even though this project is representative of many other
coastal management scenarios around the country, with multiple users and conflicting use
issues, the makeup of the users distinguishes the Cape May Peninsula somewhat from the

situations at Wells and Saco, Maine. The federal government is a majority landowner
and its lands have experienced some of the worst erosion problems in the area. The State
of New Jersey has land holdings in the area around Cape May Point. The Nature
Conservancy is also a landowner with valuable holdings in the wetlands south of Cape
May City. They are not a "typical" NGO. They have land holdings and assets in excess
of $3 billion worldwide. They are involved in resource extraction and development
projects and have ties to industry, government, and large development interests. They do
not take as hard a line on habitat preservation as other environmental NGOs do, oRen
times compromising with competing interests to achieve partial goals (Ottaway and
Stephens, 2003).
The setting also adds a unique component to the situation. Cape May Harbor and
Cold Spring Inlet are directly tied into the Intracoastal Waterway, and maintaining the
project is of national importance. The Coast Guard base is a training center on the East
Coast. All of Cape May City is a national historic landmark falling under the authority of
several state and federal agencies. Cape May Meadows is a unique freshwater coastal
wetland critical to the Atlantic Flyway, affecting migratory birds across international
borders. In addition to these factors, there is a state park at the bottom of the peninsula
and considerable infrastructure in an around the harbor. These factors, combined with
the list of participants above, most likely have something to with the area's ability to
initiate mitigation plans and receive hnding. There is much to lose in the way of
economic investment, and majority owners are the ones in charge of regulating activity
and appropriating money.

Proiect Beginninps
Three different proposals were rejected until the Board of Engineers decided that
the investment was in the best interest of the region and the nation (USACE, 1890;
USACE, 1894; USACE, 1907). This decision was made after a meeting with local
developers and the Board of Engineers. It appears as if, once again, special business
interests pressured the Army Corps and were able to get an otherwise marginal project
approved.
The only other development of the inlet and channel occurred in 1941. Even here,
special interests played a decisive role in seeing that the project was authorized and
completed. That time it was the military, where channel improvements were considered
a matter of national defense. The actual project was initiated prior to any study or report,
and the report that followed was more of post hoc rationalization for the current work
rather than a feasibility study (USACE, 1941).

Mitipat ion Efforts
The state and communities formed a strong working relationship along the coast.
Today NJDEP not only offers technical and financial support, but they are also able to
perform much of the construction (Garafola, 2003). Even with the cooperation and
partnerships formed prior to the 1980s, there was a lack of direction or planning along the
coast and throughout the state. This prompted the push for a statewide development plan.
Although coastal communities were not originally included in the process, they embraced
the idea and used the opportunity to address problems they had with existing zoning
legislation and to rethink their own development goals.

The existing partnership with the state improved as communities became more
familiar with different agencies and their functions. The agencies addressed a betterdefined group of stakeholders and interests and were forced to incorporate their concerns
in planning. This approach was also evident in communications with the federal
government improving as communities and the state were speaking more with one voice
and not competing agendas. The result was more effective mitigation efforts, with a
greater variety of options and flexibility.

Holistic Analvsis
The preceding sections addressed the individual components of the project. Each
had an effect on how the project progressed and, ultimately, on how problems were
addressed. It is clear that as much as the individual components drove the project. Their
interaction is just as important in understanding the history of the Cold Spring Inlet
Project. Again, the project is divided into three phases.

Phase 1: Proiect Authorization
Initially, the economics and coastal setting did not support a navigation project.
Developers in the area lobbied the Board of Engineers for the Army Corps and convinced
them to authorize the project despite the reservations held by the Army Corps' own
engineers (Figure 6.5).
A new survey was conducted, and it was determined that conditions would
support an improved stabilized inlet and channel. This was in direct opposition to a
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Figure 6.5 Project Authorization Phase for Cold Spring Inlet Project

report filed 13 years earlier that, in hindsight, accurately predicted the current problems.
These actions reflected either a poor understanding of the coastal processes or a disregard
for the existing information. Data used for economic justification came directly from
local business interests, which the Army Corps accepted in good faith. Economic
projections were purely speculative, based on no existing history of commerce in the
area. Nevertheless, the project was authorized even with this dearth of information, and a
federal project was established at the inlet.

Phase 2: Proiect Construction
There were two construction efforts (Figure 6.6). The first was the original
federal navigation project at Cold Spring Inlet. The project design was based on
questionable economics and misunderstood coastal processes. Construction proceeded,
and both the jetties and channel were completed. The navigation project performed as
planned, and it was not necessary to adjust the design to address problems within the
inlet, channel, or harbor.
There were no serious problems with the navigation project itself, but erosion
accelerated down drift along the beaches of Cape May Peninsula. This was due in part to
the navigation project design. The Army Corps conducted surveys and proposed several
projects, but no federally hnded project materialized until 40 years after their initial
shore protection report. The communities and the State of New Jersey instituted their
own projects in the interim.
These projects were mainly groin and revetment construction to trap sediment and
protect development. Project design was based on both economic data and coastal
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Figure 6.6 Project Construction Phase for the Cold Spring Inlet Project

process data. Initial efforts focused on the area just southwest of the inlet, the Coast
Guard station and parts of Cape May City. These projects revealed a limited
understanding of the complete coastal processes. The results were not satisfactory and
required a review of the project design. Economic and coastal data were recycled several
times as the projects first spread down the peninsula through Cape May Point and then
turned back to expand the size of existing structures. These projects amplified the effects
of erosion, down-drift requiring adjustments down the line until practically the entire
peninsula shoreline was armored. Again, these actions reveal an incomplete
understanding of the coastal processes and, based on the number of alterations,
incomplete economic data. Eventually, the proposed federal plan was authorized and
initiated, ending the cycle of groin construction and initiating other soft engineering
plans48.

Phase 3: Proiect Mitigation

Even with the typical economic patterns and engineering problems within the
coastal setting, Cape May communities were not locked into a limited number of
response options. They were able to pursue several options that fit the coastal setting,
economic criteria, and the political environment (Figure 6.7).
Economically, the area was able to produce the benefits to satis@ federal criteria for use
of public funds. Additionally, both the communities and the state had the ability to raise
the monies necessary to implement the project they desired. The natural setting offered
plenty of sand, extractable at an acceptable cost. By the 1990s, the coastal processes
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Soft engineering refers to practices like beach nourishment were no "hard structure", llke a groin, is
constructed.

affecting the area were better understood by engineers from the state and Army Corps
due to studies conducted in the immediate area. This allowed for a variety of response
options from nourishment to ecosystem restoration to newer engineering options like the
Beachsaver ~ e e f s It~ even
~ . led to the removal of some of the existing groins
(www.climate.org, 1997).
The political environment was conducive to implementing the chosen plans.
Strong positive relationships, established between the state and both the communities and
Army Corps, allowed for cooperation on mitigation efforts. A common coastal
management ideology, namely protecting coastal development, was also important in
reaching consensus. The formalization of the decision-making process through crossacceptance hrther strengthened the relationships. The results support the ability of a
process-based regulatory system to be more effective than a command and control system
in a home-rule setting (Plater et al., 1998). Ultimately this healthy political environment
translated into finding economic solutions to problems in the natural setting.
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Beachsaver Reefs are concrete structures placed offshore, parallel to the beach, and are designed to
dissipate incoming wave energy and block the offshore flow of sand.
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Figure 6.7 Project Mitigation Phase for the Cold Spring Inlet Project

CHAPTER 7
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS

Kelley and Anderson (2000) believe that the Wells Harbor Project followed a
similar history to the Saco River Project. They cited faulty project designs, inaccurate
economic predictions, and similar volatile political environments. Review of the two
case studies show that they were accurate in their assessment. Similarities are seen
between the individual project units. Two comparable natural settings presented
engineers with similar problems for each project. There are common economic
forecasting patterns, and both political environments developed similar divisions and
impasses.
When viewed holistically, the projects are also very similar. With the exception
of certain details, the authorization and construction phases followed the same paths for
both projects, with the natural setting, economic, and political units interacting in a
similar manner. The mitigation phase proceeded in a similar fashion but diverged with
the recent mediation efforts from Congressman Allen's office at Saco. Despite
differences in certain details, a general model can be used to depict the collective
histories of the Wells Harbor and Saco River Projects. This model helps identify the
problems faced at Wells.
Similarities and differences are seen on both the unit and holistic levels when
comparing the Cold Spring Inlet project to the general Maine case. Again, with the
exception of certain details, they both share common authorization and construction
phase histories. It is with the mitigation phase that we see a divergence between the New

Jersey case and the Maine cases. Review of the Cold Spring Inlet Project's natural
setting, economic, and political units and their interaction supports the findings from the
two Maine cases. These differences further help to explain the problems faced in Wells.

Wells Harbor Proiect And Saco River Proiect
Natural Setting
Both Maine projects lie on Maine's southern coast. They experience similar tidal
ranges, wind, and wave regimes. Wells Harbor is positioned more northerly within its
embayment then the Saco River Inlet in its embayment. This offers more protection from
extratropical winter storms, but both projects are still exposed to easterly storm waves
and the effects of sea-level rise.
Both areas have the majority of their sand coming from the existing shoreface
deposits. Sand is exchanged throughout both systems, maintaining equilibrium between
tidal bodies inside and outside the inlets. One noticeable difference between the areas is
the Saco River's contribution of sand to the system. Wells Embayment does not have
this type of sand source. The Webhannet River supplies no sand to the system, and
beaches are considered sand-starved. Overall, there is a smaller volume of sand in the
beaches of Wells Embayrnet then the beaches of Saco Bay (Kelley et al., 2002).
The Army Corps approached the projects much in the same way they would
inlets, like Cold Spring Inlet, with a dominant longshore component, continuously
supplying sand. Based on this assumption, they anticipated that shorelines would accrete
uniformly, and that sand in the inlets would disappear once the jetties were constructed
(USACE, 1910; USACE, 1959). This was not the case. The specific effect the jetties

had on their respective project areas differed. The jetties on the Webhannet Inlet acted as
headlands impounding beach sand transported towards the inlet from both directions,
whereas the jetties on the Saco River redirected the sand from the river offshore while
amplifj4ng erosion processes along local beaches.
The overall outcomes, however, were the same. Jetties interrupted the exchange
of sand in the system between inlets and beaches and upset the established equilibriums.
The result was accelerated erosion of the adjacent beach communities as the shorefaces
adjusted. Sand was removed from the system with no means of natural nourishment. At
Wells Harbor, the initial dredging placed sand inland and offshore, away from Wells
Beach and Drakes Island. At the Saco River, the length of the jetties funneled sand
supplied by the river out to sea where longshore currents camed it north, away from
Camp Ellis Beach.
At the root of these problems was an incomplete understanding of the
characteristics of longshore and tidal currents in the project areas, sand sources, and
system equilibrium coupled with a lack of observational data. Past actions reveal that the
Army Corps never tried to address these questions with observational data. In Wells, an
engineering study was commissioned to examine the shoaling problems, later supported
with the construction of a wave model in the 1970s (Bottin, 1978; Byrne and Zeigler,
1977). Byrne and Zeigler (1977) identified a connection between shoaling in the
anchorage and inlet through the exchange of sand between tidal bodies and the estuary.
Despite this, the Army Corps did not make an effort to substantiate or quantifL the effects
their actions had on this exchange. Subsequent studies were merely compilations of
previous work with no new observational data (Smith, 1994). It wasn't until recently,

with the relocation of the anchorage, that the Army Corps' actions reflected this
knowledge. Finally in 2001, over 20 years after the connection was first identified within
their study, a program was implemented to measure the loss of sand in the salt marshes
caused by dredging in the harbor and the inlet (Carter, 2002).
The same was true for the Saco River project. Army Corps studies recycled
previous work and reiterated the same opinions and suggestions based on observational
data obtained elsewhere along Maine's coast (USACE, 1955; 1968; 1982; 1992). Studies
existed that contradicted their findings and accurately described current flow, sand
movement to the north, and the role of the Saco River as a source of sand for the bay
(Farrell, 1970; 1972; Kelley et al., 1995b; Manthorp, 1995). The Army Corps rehted
these findings and stakeholder observations. They continued to rely on earlier reports
and the findings from an incomplete physical wave model." It wasn't until 2001 that
their views changed to the more commonly held beliefs of other researchers (USACE,
2001), and they acknowledged the need for site-specific observations to understand
where the sand at Camp Ellis was going before initiating any hrther actions (Kelley,
2003; Michaud 2003).
Response patterns were the same. The Army Corps did not approach these
problems with sound scientific or engineering methods. Their approach was very narrow,
based on their previous misconceptions. Engineering problems were addressed with
engineering solutions, a common pattern experienced at other federal projects discussed
in Chapter 2 of this thesis (Bregman, 1983; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996). Jetties were
extended several times, driven by the same misconceptions that produced the original

50

The model did not have the Saco River built into its design (Kelley, 2003).

flawed designs. This resulted in bigger projects with bigger problems. Overall, this
expansion magnified the effects of erosion while only temporarily alleviating shoaling at
the two sites.

Economics
From the late 1800s to the early 1900s, inlets served industrial uses. This shifted
to recreation and fishing as industry declined. The Saco River Project began as an
industrial endeavor and switched to recreation and fishing at the same time that the Wells
Harbor Project came online. Although the Saco River Project initially had a different
economic objective, it shared a common economic objective with the Wells Harbor
project by the 1960s, namely to improve conditions for fishermen and recreationists.
Benefits were considered part of national economic growth, even though they were
realized by a relatively small group of regional users.
Both projects have similar economic prediction hist~ries.'~
Costs were greatly
underestimated. Maintenance costs (dredging and jetty repairs), initially a small
percentage of annual costs, became a larger percentage of the annual costs due to the
expanding sizes of the projects and underestimations of sedimentation rates. Changes in
design and additional construction greatly increased the initial first costs. Wells alone
experienced an increase from $2.8 million to $5.1 million in initial construction costs
projections between 1959 and 1965 (Figure 4.14)"

Mitigation at both sites added

substantial "incidental" costs to the overall figure. Camp Ellis lost over 30 homes
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Refer to the Economic Justification sections of chapters 4 and 5 for the complete economic histories of
each project.
52 2003 dollars

(USACE, 2001), and Wells experienced loss of recreational beach, damage to bird
habitat, and increased exposure of homes to coastal hazards. Wells is yet to determine a
value for these costs.
Complementing underestimated costs were overestimated project benefits. As
projected costs increased, the projected benefits also increased, justieing use of public
hnds in compliance with federal benefit-cost criterion. On the Saco River, early project
benefits were increased commerce and decreased fieight rates. The increase in
commerce was not as expected. The river was mainly used for transporting coal also
being supplied by train (USACE, 1910; 1924; 1934). No finished goods left on the boats
(USACE, 1886; 1934). Rail freight charges initially dropped with the improvements on
the river, but this too was short lived (USACE, 1934). Records were poor but the
sentiment from the Army Corps reports was that the industrial benefits peaked in the
early 1920s prior to the completion of the remaining construction on the jetties and
channel (USACE, 1934).
From the 1960s to present, both the Saco River and Wells Harbor projects were
intended to produce economic benefits from improved commercial fishing and
recreational boating opportunities. This is questionable when reviewing records that
show poor lobster landings in York County in comparison to the state as a whole (Figures
4.10 and 4.11) and a declining ground fishery (Figures 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15),
statewide for that time period. Commercial fishing benefits are now considered
unpredictable and, as a result, the Army Corps no longer is permitted to use them in
benefit calculation without the express permission of the National Marine Fisheries
Service (Habel, 2003). Recreational data was incomplete for Wells Harbor, but mooring

records show that the anchorage has not accommodated the fleet size originally projected
for the project (Dickson, 2002; Lang, 2003; Wells Harbor, 1997; 2002; USACE, 1980).
The physical scope of these projects increased to generate the benefits that would
justifjr the greater expenditures. This drove up maintenance costs and overall costsS3 In
an effort not only to achieve a benefit to cost ratio greater than one but also to maximize
the net benefits, smaller projects were overlooked in preference to bigger, more invasive
projects with greater predicted benefits.54
Eventually both projects entered mitigation stages where all subsequent efforts
focused on addressing erosion problems. Costs exceeded the benefits of proposed
mitigation.55 Mitigation alternatives in the 1991 Section 111 Study for Camp Ellis
generated benefit-cost ratios ranging from 0.2 to 0.7 (USACE, 1991). Although no
specific economic calculations were made for nourishment options at Wells Beach and
Drakes Island, the fact that only nourishment in conjunction with dredging had ever been
considered indicated that the next best alternative was not economically justifiable. The
project areas had deteriorated to a point where potential benefits would not exceed the
costs of the subsequent projects, thereby losing eligibility for public hnding.
Communities lacked the hnds to finance the projects themselves. This was partially
responsible for a period of inaction during the 1980s in Wells and the 1990s in Camp
Ellis.

53 Decreased maintenance eventually became one

of the projected benefits of future project development.
Projects that incorporated additional dredging were popular due to the secondary benefit of spoil disposal
on eroding beaches.
54
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This was mainly nourishment, because the State of Maine no longer permitted armoring.

Political Environment

Business interests in both communities and the Army Corps were behind most of
the planning and decision-making responsible for the projects. State agencies served a
regulatory role. The majority of the stakeholders in the communities were not involved
in the process, but they entered the situation after their specific interests were negatively
affected by the project.
Specifics and timing differed between the projects, but the end results were the
same. Both communities divided early in the mitigation phases of the projects. In Saco,
the community was split between those who supported armoring and those who
supported relocation of properties. In Wells, the community split between those who
supported a dredge and those who were beach property owners who felt that firther
project activity would jeopardize their investments. Neither community entirely trusted
the Army Corps or their state government. Problems between the state and communities
revolved around a change in coastal management ideology embodied in regulations like
the 1983 Sand Dune Rules, later incorporated into Maine's Natural Resource Protection
Act (MDEP, 1988). This was also at the root of problems between the state and the
Army Corps. The state's management ideology was in conflict with Army Corps'
development directive. This is now the focus of many of the current problems and has
helped to serve as a unifying force between factions within the once divided
communities.
Later, problems in Wells arose between the community and groups with a
conservation and pro-environment focus like Maine Audubon Society and the USF&WS,
who opposed dredging due to the negative effects on bird habitat. This was not the case

in Saco due to an absence of valued bird habitat; however, the community of Camp Ellis
shares similar views and sees environmental groups as anti-development and a threat to
their interests (SOS Camp Ellis, 2003).
Divisions have prevented consensus on a common course of action. The delays
caused by such divisions allowed the physical and political environment to deteriorate
further, and all parties were caught in a downward cycle of inaction.56
There was some overlap between the cases. The poor relationship the State of
Maine had with the Army Corps during the Saco River Project carried over to the Wells
Harbor

Many of the same personnel from Maine agencies worked on both

projects, as did some of the Army Corps engineers. It is understandable that ill feelings
and perceptions carried over. This was also seen within stakeholder perceptions. Contact
between communities through groups like SOS and the Southern Maine Beach
Stakeholder Group spread ill feelings and distrust. Stakeholders were aware of what was
happening in other communities, and this guided their perception of their situation
(Foley, 2002; SOS Camp Ellis, 2003). State development regulations concerned both
communities because they faced the real possibility of losing their homes and of being
unable to rebuild5*.
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This inaction enabled both natural and economic conditions to worsen and further complicate the
problem.
57 Interviews revealed that there were positive one on one relationship between specific indwiduals but the
overall relationship with the State of Maine can be described as poor (Dickson, 2002; Habel, 2003; Kelley,
2003).
A dwelling damaged beyond 50% its value must be removed in accordance with state coastal regulations
(MDEP, 1988).

Divergence in the Cases
A very similar pattern is observed in both cases; however, their paths have
diverged in recent history, due in part to changes in the political environment. As
previously noted, Congressman Allen's office entered into the negotiations at Camp Ellis
in 2000. Participants are back at the negotiation table working toward consensus, feeling
they have a real stake in the successfid resolution of this problem. This helps keep all
engaged and drives the process forward (Ouellette, 2002).
This has not occurred in Wells. Attempts to help the process have been made by
Senators Snowe and Collins but not to the extent of involvement seen from Congressman
Allen's office in Camp Ellis (Carter, 2002; Ouellette, 2002). The efforts in Camp Ellis
have supplemented the efforts of the State Planning Office, which typically serves as
intermedia~y.~~
Interviews revealed a perception that the State Planning Office on their
l they could be in this role, citing critical missed
own has not been as s u c c e s s ~as
opportunities on the part of the office that have aggravated the situation (Habel, 2003;
Jones, 2003).

Holistic Analvsis: The General Maine Case
The natural settings, economic, and political units interacted in a similar manner.
The projects I have reviewed are viewed in three phases: authorization, construction, and
mitigation. Both Wells and Saco followed the same authorization and construction
phases. They also started out on the same mitigation paths but, as noted in the preceding
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The State Planning Office is the intermediary between federal agencies and communities along the coast
of Maine (Leyden, 2003).

section, there was a divergence in Saco's political environment that positively affected
the engineering and economic components of that project.

Phase 1 and 2 - Authorization and Construction
Specific details differ from case to case, but the overall patterns are the same in
both phases (Figure 7.1). Of note is the interplay between the coastal data and
economic predictions. Both are key elements in authorizing a project and in the
engineering design. The accuracy of the coastal data affects the accuracy of the
economic predictions, which leads to either the justification or rejection of a project
(Figure 7.2). For example, in Wells the underestimated shoaling rates in the harbor
produced underestimated cost predictions. In Saco, misunderstanding sediment flow
may produce a particular engineering design that is economically viable, whereas an
accurate interpretation of the setting might have produced a different and more costly
design, prohibiting the project from moving forward
Inaccurate coastal data doesn't necessarily mean that a marginal project is
authorized, but it does increase the probability of that happening6'. Regardless of these
points, the final outcomes will depend just as much on the political environment as they
do on the accuracy of the coastal process and economic data.

60

Accurate coastal data does not guarantee a problem-free project but it is desirable.
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Figure 7.1 Authorization and Construction Phases for the General Maine Case
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COASTAL DATA AND
ECONOMIC PREDICITONS
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Figure 7.2 Coastal process data and its effects on the economic predictions. The
accuracy of the coastal process data has a direct bearing on the accuracy of the
economic projections, which in turn will decide whether a project is undertaken,
committing communities and states to a certain path with restricted options.

Phase 3 - Mitipation
The mitigation phase of both projects followed a similar path. The interaction of
the natural settings, the economics, and the political units lead to an impasse in response
options (Figure 7.3). Flood tidal deltas were chosen as "deepwater" anchorages, and ebb
tidal deltas were turned into navigational channels, and as a result, there were not many
effective engineering options available for mitigation. Economically, the community was
restricted to a very limited number of options. All publicly hnded federal and/or state
options must meet the benefit to cost ratio criterion. This limited the possibilities to the
least expensive plans. As the area deteriorated, its ability to generate the benefits
necessary for federal involvement greatly diminished. This only worsened in time as
more problems emerged and mitigation costs rose. The communities were not able to
hnd these projects on their own
Problems in the political environment affected the entire process. Ideological
conflicts between all participants delayed any economically viable engineering option.
As previously stated, this delay amplified existing problems. The divergence of the Saco
River project from this pattern was due in part to efforts aimed at ameliorating the poor
political environment (Figure 7.4).
Addressing problems in the political environment have produced more
economically viable engineering options.61 Once a change in the political environment
occurred other options emerged.
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It wasn't the case that these options did not exist prior to mediation. It was more llkely a case where
poor relations created an environment where participants were not willing to search beyond the standard
response options.

I MITIGATION PEL4SE

Figure 7.3 Mitigation Phase for the General Maine Case.

I

MITIGATION PHASE SAC0 RIVER DIVERGENCE

Figure 7.4 The divergence of the Saco River Project's mitigation phase. Mediation
provide by Congressman Allen's office addressed problems in the political
environment and led to new economically viable engineering options for the
community of Camp Ellis.

Holistic Summary
The two Maine cases followed very similar paths on the unit and holistic levels.
Recent developments in improving the political environment at the Saco River project
illustrate the importance of this unit of the project and the effects it has on every aspect of
the project. Wells Harbor is not at this point, and every indication is that the community
is not ready (Dickson, 2002; Kelley, 2003). This is based on the level of distrust
communicated during interviews. Past cooperative efforts and mediation have failed, and
the community is wary of fbture attempts (Carter, 2002; Foley, 2002). They may have to
progress to the urgent situation faced at Camp Ellis before they are willing to participate
in any cooperative efforts that might otherwise be viewed as compromising their own
personal interests.

The General Maine Case and Cold S ~ r i n pInlet, New Jersev
Natural Setting
The Maine projects lack the dominant longshore component of sediment transport
found along New Jersey's coast. This is due entirely to the compartmentalized nature of
the coastline. No sand comes from outside the individual beach compartments in Maine,
whereas in New Jersey sediment historically arrived at Cape May Peninsula from the
north at a steady rate. For these reasons conventional shore-perpendicular structures are
not as effective in Maine at catching sand as they are in New ~ e r s e ~ . ~ ~
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This is not to say that groins are successful on the Cape May Peninsula. Beyond the Qrect negative
effects of the jetties, groins have actually aggravated the situation in some areas (Fraser, 2003).

Sand supply and sources are another critical difference Maine and New Jersey.
The Maine sites have relatively little new sand introduced into the system. The majority
of the sand is found in existing shoreface deposits, and Saco River's contribution does
not currently make it to Camp Ellis Beach. Nearshore glacial deposits are not
economically viable options for extraction. The Cape May site receives a continuous
supply of sand from the north that is trapped along the northern jetty of the inlet. Ridges
on the continental shelf are also a source, and there are viable sources inside the harbor
and Intra Coastal Waterway. Nourishment is more of an option in Cape May then at
either Wells or Saco where nourishment is only feasible when it coincides with dredging.
While the important differences in the coastal setting distinguish the Maine sites
from the New Jersey site, I think that the general engineering effects and response
patterns were somewhat similar. All three projects in differentways created extremely
sand-starved beaches for adjacent beach communities by blocking the flow of sand or
removing existing sand from a finite supply. The effects of the jetties at the Maine inlets
were discussed in the previous section. The jetties at Cold Spring Inlet impounded sand
from the north and, once at capacity, redirected sand offshore away from the Cape May
Peninsula beaches. Tidal and wave energy accelerated erosion in all three reconfigured
systems, resulting in areas where erosion greatly outpaced the rate of nourishment.
Response patterns to erosion were strikingly similar. Erosion that threatened
development was addressed with engineered solutions. In Maine, jetties were lengthened
at each site, while in New Jersey groins were constructed throughout the project area.
Neither achieved the desired results, and the process was repeated. The end result was
the same; erosion was accelerated and spread beyond the immediate project area.

Economics

Records show a common history of underestimated cost predictions for all three
projects. Although the general project design remained the same for the most part,
construction and maintenance costs increased. In New Jersey this was seen with the
increasing cost projections for the proposed federal shore protection plans (Table 6.21).
Complementing this was a steady increase in predicted benefits. Existing benefit
categories increased in value or categories were added or removed from plan to plan with
minimal explanation. In Maine, it was shown that these benefits were overvalued. In
New Jersey these predictions may have been more accurate due to the large populations
to the north and south supporting commercial and recreational businesses.
All three projects accumulated substantial incidental costs due to collateral
shoreline damage. They came in the form of property loss, loss of recreational beach,
erosion-control structures, or nourishment. The communities, states, and federal
government shouldered these costs. In New Jersey the state and the communities of Cape
May Peninsula spent considerable resources on groins, seawalls, and nourishment along
their beaches (Tables 6.3, 6.6, and 6.18). The communities, state, and federal
government are engaged in a multimillion-dollar habitat restoration project in Cape May
Meadows (USACE, 1998). There was also the cost of lost recreational opportunities and
bird habitat destruction. Camp Ellis did not have bird habitat to lose; however, both
Wells and Cape May have critical bird habitat that is threatened by the navigation
projects and proposed mitigation projects.
Currently there are also significant economic differences between Maine and New
Jersey. Cold Spring Inlet originated as a port of commerce and a military installation. It

evolved primarily into a commercial fishing port that also services recreational boaters
and the Coast Guard. The Tntra Coastal Waterway feeds commercial and recreational
traffic directly through the harbor. The proximity to Philadelphia and its suburbs
provides a tributary population that supports the fishing industry and recreation. The
beach communities attract thousands of recreational visitors during the summer months,
and the bird sanctuary adds to this.
Overall, the setting has supported economic growth throughout the project's life
and has the ability to produce the return that justifies investment. Cape May County had
2,900 employed fishermen in 1995. In that same year, they harvested approximately 177
million pounds of seafood at a value of $96 million. Fishermen in Cape May Harbor
alone accounted for 75 million pounds of the County's total landings (USACE, 1998).
Tourism in Cape May County during 1993 generated $1.9 billion in receipts and provided
for 20,000 jobs with an estimated payroll of $500 million. The State Park near Cape May
Point recorded 730,000 visitors during 1995, and the Cape May Bird Observatory
attracted more than 100,000 visitors during 1997, responsible for an estimated $3 1
million of economic impact (USACE, 1998).
The Maine sites produced recreational and commercial fishing opportunities but
not on a scale to justify the additional investment they required.63 The nearest large
population comparable t o Philadelphia is Boston. Because of the abundance of warmer
water beaches to the south and nearby Cape Cod, Boston does not provide the consumers
needed to generate the desired economic benefits. A more detailed study is needed to
quantify this effect.
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This is due in part to a decline in ground fisheries and the relatively poor lobster grounds referred to in
the previous case studies.

These differences have two effects on mitigation efforts. First, the inability to
generate predicted benefits limits the number of federally fknded projects available to the
Maine sites. They are unable to satisfjl the economic criterion required for public
fknding, particularly on the higher cost projects. The costs of mitigation go up, relative
to benefits due to inaction, making it even more difficult to satisfjl economic criterion in
the fkture. Second, the ability to generate business in the area provides the communities
and state with the economic resources necessary to fund their own projects. New Jersey
is able to do this, but the Maine communities cannot do so on the scale they need.

Political Environment

All projects had similar beginnings. They were initially rejected due to poor
economic and engineering conditions. Political pressure succeeded in obtaining project
authorization despite opposition from agencies and Army Corps engineers. All projects
began within a divided political setting.
The participants in the New Jersey and Maine cases represented the same sort of
constituencies. For both states, there were numerous local stakeholders including
fishermen, property owners, developers, and environmentalists. Town officers
represented local government. On the state level there were the Departments of
Environmental Protection, the State Planning Offices, and other state agencies like MGS
in Maine. On the federal level there was the Army Corps and the U S F & W S . ~NGOs
~
also played an active role in both states.
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Cape May also has the U.S. Coast Guard.

Both New Jersey and Maine operate through "home rule". There is a bottom-up
government structure where communities are in charge of their development, and the
state acts as more of a regulator, setting minimum standards for activity within the state,
and as a resource in providing assistance with planning and development (Gualini, 2001;
Leyden, 2003).
A difference between the Maine and New Jersey project sites centers on the

ownership of the land within the project areas. In Maine, the majority of the land at
Wells and Camp Ellis is privately owned. The only exception is the Rachel Carson
Wildlife Refige, bordering Wells Harbor. Ownership of the land on the Cape May
Peninsula is divided between the Coast Guard, the State of New Jersey, The Nature
Conservancy, and private residents, creating a different political setting. These
organizations have land of their own to lose; their Maine counterparts do not. This is not
to say that the participants in the Maine projects care any less about the area, but
ownership may put a different perspective on the situation encouraging New Jersey
participants to cooperate more effectively. This difference in land ownership is reflected
statewide. In New Jersey ownership of the coastline shoreward of the Mean High Water
mark is 14% federal, 28% non-federal public, and 58% private. In Maine there is less
than 1% federal, 2% non-federal public, and 97% private ownership (Ringold and Clark,
1980).
Ultimately, the defining difference in the political environments is coastal
management ideology. The State of Maine's approach to managing the sandy southern
coast is to preserve it as a natural resource. An objective is to avoid creating an armored
coast that protects development. This approach is in line with the limited resources of

coastal communities and the state and provides a means for Maine to maintain its natural
coastal identity. This approach is not always in line with the wishes of stakeholders, nor
is it always compatible with Army Corps directives (Foley, 2002; Habel, 2003). This
puts the state at odds with the two groups.
The State of New Jersey's approach is more development oriented. It has actively
encouraged development along the coast and has adopted a policy of armoring and
nourishment to protect that development. This is not to say that New Jersey does not
wish to preserve the natural character of the coast. Areas like Cape May Meadows have
restricted armoring; however, the majority of the bamer islands have some form of armor
and/or nourishment to protect beach and development. This ideology is in line with both
the wishes of the communities and the mission of the Army Corps, leading to cooperative
partnerships.
The State of New Jersey, as a federal project sponsor, is actively involved in
community projects, providing hnding, engineering support, and regulatory assistance.
The State of Maine no longer acts as sponsor for coastal projects.65 This is left to the
c~mrnunities.~~
The recent formulation of a voluntary state development plan in New
Jersey has hrther improved the political environment and the ability to enact mitigation
projects.

65

The state originally helped finance the Wells Harbor project and later the DOT assisted with certain
projects including the new anchorage in Wells Harbor (Kelley, 2003).
Connecticut is the only other state in New England where the communities act as their own sponsors. It
works well there because the communities are comparatively wealthier than Maine communities (Habel,
2003).

Holistic Analvsis: Maine And New Jersev
Specific details differ, but the overall interaction of the natural setting, economic,
and the political units is very similar between the Maine projects and New Jersey project
for the authorization and construction phases. The mitigation phase reveals some
differences and highlights reasons why the Maine projects have not been able to proceed
toward acceptable resolutions.

Phase 1 - Authorization
The same basic model describes the authorization phase for all 3 projects (Figure
7.1). Marginal projects were initially rejected. Special interests applied political pressure

to the Army Corps, and subsequent reviews of the projects returned favorable results.
Marginal projects were authorized based on questionable economic information and
flawed coastal process data.

Phase 2 - Construction
Again all three projects generally followed the same model (Figure 7.1). The
New Jersey case diverged somewhat with a history of local and state projects focused on
shore protection and not navigation, but the overall patterns are the same as the Maine
projects. Some problem emerged with the projects, whether it was with the navigation
component itself or erosion of adjacent beaches. This was addressed through changes in
engineering design. The same coastal process information and economic predictions
used on the original design were recycled into the new designs. This cycle amplified
problems and created more damage.

Phase 3 - Mitipation
It is in the mitigation phase where the divergence between the Maine projects and
New Jersey project is seen. This originated in the differences highlighted in the previous
economic and political environment analyses.
The political environment in New Jersey was and is conducive to cooperative
management. The strong relationships formed between local, state, and federal interests
allowed for consensus on mitigation efforts. This created more options both
economically and technically that worked within the political environment. Another
driving force was the strong economic environment within the communities and state that
presented more response options that met federal finding criterion (Figure 7.5).
The Maine projects lack this type of political environment (Figure 7.3). The
problems that exist between the participants delay mitigation response and compound the
issues. There are seemingly very limited engineering options that satisfl the economic
criterion. The communities and state are unable to orchestrate a mutually agreed upon
response due to a lack of finds, firther limiting their mitigation options. The assertion
that problems faced at Saco and Wells are due in large part to a poor political
environment is firther supported by the recent events at Camp Ellis. The progress made
in mending relationships and creating a cooperative environment has already produced
engineering response options that work with the economic constraints (Figure 7.4).

MITIGATION PHASE: NEW JERSEY

Figure 7.5 The mitigation phase for the New Jersey project. Better natural,
economic, and political conditions provide more mitigation options for the Cape May
Peninsula and allow for consensus to be reached on a plan.

Holistic Summarv

There are similarities and differences within the individual units of the general
Maine case and the Cold Spring Inlet Project. Combined, they interact in a very similar
manner through the authorization and construction phases of all three projects.
Similarities between Maine and New Jersey offer robust explanations for how these
projects progressed and created their associated problems.
The mitigation phase highlights the greatest differences, not only between the
Maine and New Jersey projects, but also between the individual Maine projects. These
differences provide explanations for why the community of Wells is unable to move
forward on an agreed upon response plan. This originates in the individual project units.
New Jersey's natural setting provides more mitigation options than Maine, but the
economic and political units are the driving forces behind the mitigation plans. With
those units in place, New Jersey has more options than the Maine communities and is
able to implement their plans
Again, this assertion is further supported by the recent emergence of mitigation
options for the Saco River Project. Nothing has been decided but efforts at reconciling
problems in the political environment have produced economically viable and federally
funded engineering possibilities. Actual costs may go well beyond existing funds, but the
general feeling is that as long as the current efforts continue additional monies will be
provided as needed (Michaud, 2003). The coastal processes haven't changed and, if
anything, economic conditions have deteriorated. This emphasizes the importance of a
working political environment in effectively addressing problems and moving forward.

CaAPTER 8
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Maine's Coastal Mana~ementIdeolow
The Cold Spring Inlet case study highlights certain components, missing from the
Wells Harbor and Saco River projects that are limiting managers' ability to effectively
respond to their problems. These predominantly occur in the economic and political units
of the projects where New Jersey is better positioned to address contingencies. This is
not say that Maine needs to adopt a management ideology that is in line with New Jersey.
Maine's current policy, although referred to at times as retreat, is much more than
running from the rising sea. The coastal management policy, particularly along the
southern sandy coastline, has received favorable marks from policy analysts as being
progressive and future thinking, specifically the Sand Dune Rules outlined in the Natural
Resource Protection Act (Van Arsdol et al., 2000). It is a policy that addresses the longterm effects of sea-level rise while taking into account the limited resources of the
communities and the state while balancing development needs and the health of the
natural environment.
Maine's sandy beaches account for approximately 2% of the total coastline
(MSPO, 1998), making them a scarce state resource amid thousands of kilometers of
bluffs, rocky headlands, and marsh. It is also this fact that makes them a draw for
tourism. Compared to New Jersey beaches, Maine beaches are less developed and
maintain much of their natural character without the same amount of armoring. If it is
this characteristic that people most value, adopting a policy of protecting development at

the expense of the resource does not make sense for the long-term social and economic
health of the region or the state. Having said this, there are lessons that Maine managers
need to understand from the Maine and New Jersey cases in order to implement better
management practices that support the current coastal management ideology, locally,
regionally, and statewide.

Coastal Process Data
The coastal processes along Maine's southern beaches are better understood now
than they were during the construction of Wells Harbor and the Saco River Inlet. Work
by Barber (1995), Byrne and Zeigler (1977), and Kelley et al., (1995b), to name a few,
provide a clearer picture of the coastal processes affecting the project areas. One place
still lacking site-specific data is Camp Ellis but it appears that with the current Section
111 work, data will be collected in the near future (Kelley, 2003; Michaud, 2003). The
current salt marsh monitoring program in Wells will add to the existing body of
knowledge of Wells Embayment and help engineers and planners design programs that
work within that natural system.
Whatever the state's management policy is in the future, it is essential to continue
the support of research that advances the body of knowledge on coastal processes of
southern Maine and the remainder of Maine's coastline. The sentiment of state planners
is "there is never enough data" (Leyden, 2003). The state needs to encourage continued
work from academic institutions, NGOs, state agencies, and the Army Corps through
financial and administrative assistance. This would provide more, balanced data from
which to make management decisions.

Another avenue is through voluntary stakeholder programs. One such successful
program is the State of Maine Beach Profiling Project (State of Maine Beach Profiling
2002). This voluntary project
Project Website, h.t_fpEd-m~geo!~e~.~uumIImaII~.ee~e!!uheea.c_h,
enlisted the help of stakeholders on the southern coast to record monthly beach profiles.
The program achieved several policy goals. First, it gathered essential data, at little to no
cost, that was and will be used in subsequent research projects (Heinze, 2001). Second, it
directly involved the stakeholders who responded positively to the experience. They
were involved in work along their properties and their knowledge of the processes
affecting their land grew as a result. This benefits all involved in formulating and
implementing a development strategy for the future.

Economic Policv
Along the lines of research, the State of Maine and its communities are in
need of better economic data for the coastal zone. This entails collecting information on
industry, housing, and tourism located along the coast. Additionally a non-market
valuation is needed for the vast natural coastal resources. The under or over-valuation of
resources leads to poor decision-making. With the limited resources available to
communities and the state, there is a need to prioritize objectives and maximize all
efforts. Accurate economic data is essential to achieving this goal.
Currently this information is lacking. The State Planning Ofice uses data from
the Saco Bay and Wells Bay regional plans. This consists of seasonal retail and service
receipts and tax-assessed values for the land and homes (SBPC, 2000; WBPC, 2002). It
is a very cursory economic analysis and the State Planning Office acknowledges the

data's limitations (Leyden, 2003). A rough recreational valuation was conducted for
Wells Beach and Drakes Island. This report is not available and has not been used in
planning (Carter, 2002).
The case studies reveal the limitations of Benefit Cost Analysis as a planning tool.
A positive Benefit Cost Analysis does not guarantee that a project will improve the social
well-being of all people. The traditional Benefits Cost Analysis used by government
agencies looks for the present value of a positive net benefit calculated from a stream of
future benefits using a discount rate that adequately represents the opportunity cost of the
funds and resources used in the project (Folmer et a]., 1995). This alone is not enough.
These analyses need to also "include estimates of any environmental damage or foregone
amenity benefits which the project might cause or induce" (Conrad, 1999). A policy of
net benefit maximization oRen times leads to a larger more destructive project over a
smaller less obtrusive one because the value of an undisturbed environment is not
represented in the analysis. As the previous paragraph points out, these non-market
valuation data are currently missing in Maine.
Other factors that need consideration when conducting the economic analysis of a
proposed project include the uncertainty of benefits and costs. The coastal zone is a
dynamic natural, economic, and social environment. Benefit and cost projections must
incorporate a range of uncertainty as they may change over time. This is in contrast to
the Army Corps' approach that assumes a constant, unchanging flow over the project's
life. A logistically simple way to address this uncertainty is to increase the minimum

benefit to cost ratio criterion (for example: 1.0 to 1.5). This acknowledges the
uncertainty in calculations and gives planners a greater margin for error.67
Another way of addressing these uncertainties would be to assign probabilities to
several potential outcomes. This would allow planners to compute expected values for
the benefits and costs, taking into account changes that might occur in the setting. One
area where this would be usehl in the coastal zone is with sea-level rise. A possible
application of this approach would be accounting for sea-level rise scenarios and the
effects on the project. This technique provides more accurate economic predictions that
acknowledge the uncertainty of the natural setting.
Another factor for consideration is the irreversible nature of large projects.
Planners must wait until economic conditions are optimal before starting. If projects are
initiated at the wrong time, their irreversible nature may not provide an opportunity for
benefits to cover the costs during the project's lifetime.68 A "trigger value" must be
established considering all environmental amenities and the uncertainty of benefits and
costs. "Trigger values" are defined as the minimum level of net benefits that a proposed
project must generate prior to planners committing to an irreversible course of action.
This provides planners with a minimum threshold for when to embark on a project
(Conrad, 1999).
Due to this uncertainty, planners must also consider the financial ability of states
and communities to address contingencies in a timely fashion. Considerations need to be
67

A proposed Army Corps of Engineers Modernization and Improvement Act of 2002, co-sponsored by
Senators John McCain, Bob Smith, and Russ Feingold attempted to establish a higher minimum benefit to
cost ratio criteria for federal projects for the same reasons listed above (McCain, 2002).

This is in contrast to the "now or never" nature of the Benefit Cost Analysis commonly used for federal
projects (Conrad, 1999).

made which take into account a state and communities' present and future economic
resources (Hayes, 1995). As the three case studies show, federal funding does not
necessarily mean lower costs to the community in the long run.
A limiting factor in both Maine projects is the communities' dependency on
federal funding. Both communities have limited funds relative to the work they want
done. Federal projects are cost shared and even if a project meets economic criteria the
community's share may be more than they are able to handle. Maine coastal
communities need to be given the ability to raise additional money to address
infrastructure needs. This is not advocating relinquishing any of their existing state taxburden. It is advocating instituting additional means of raising money locally, such as a
local option tax. Wells has different infrastructure needs than other communities off the
coast. Giving the communities the ability to raise more of their own money will provide
them with more options and is in line with the political ideology of the state. Maine's
1986 Coastal Management Policies Act states that financial support from the state will be

given priority to relocating structures and not development projects in beach areas
(MSPO, 1994).
At the heart of the economic debate is the question of whether these projects are a
proper use of public funds. Justification is based on the idea that these projects improve
the overall economic health of the nation. The reality is that many of these projects
benefit a very small segment of the society while costs are distributed across all
taxpayers. The stabilization of Cold Spring Inlet is an excellent example of where the
federal government provided public funds to a small group of investors allowing them to
profit from a development project but with no return to the government. This type of

inequity continues today in public projects where access to the public is difficult, or
denied in some circumstances, by those benefiting directly from the project.
Some groups feel that the billions earmarked for temporary nourishment would be
better spent on programs addressing other societal woes such as unemployment, housing,
and healthcare (Neil, 1999). Others feel that by removing public fbnds and making the
communities and states responsible for payment, attitudes would change and many of
these projects would not materialize (Kelley, 2003; Lang, 2003). For now, federal
fbnding of these projects continues and until this changes economic recommendations
must work within the current system.

Addressing the Political Environment
The three case studies clearly demonstrate the important role the political
environment plays in guiding the projects and subsequent mitigation efforts. This is the
area where Maine managers need to do the most work. Current and fbture work along
the coast must be inclusive. This requires identieing all stakeholders affected by the
actions in the short and long term. Once they have been identified they need to be
engaged in the process in such a way that their input is weighed equally from start to
finish. The process needs to be transparent so that participants do not feel that their time
is spent in vain and that their efforts will materialize into action.
In the same vein, work must be done to mend existing poor relations. This is
mainly between the State of Maine and the communities. Poor relations between the
Army Corps and the State of Maine can be overcome if the state and the communities are
speaking with a unified voice with the backing of their congressmen and senators.

These efforts need to be reinforced by an educational program. The State of
Maine invests in programs to educate its stakeholders about the coastal processes
affecting their beaches (Dickson, 2002; Kelley, 2003). More needs to be done in terms of
educating stakeholders about the State's management ideology.69 Although the Sand
Dune Rules have been on the books since 1983, many are still unaware of the
development restrictions outlined in the regulations. This is evident from stakeholders'
comments on websites, in public meetings, and in interviews (Cohen, 2002a; SOS Camp
Ellis website, 2003; SOS Camp Ellis, 2002). Efforts must go beyond the current practice
of providing ample notice of public meetings to the communities (Whiting-Grant, 2002).
The State of Maine needs to actively gather and bring people into the process to avoid
these problems in the future.
Once these efforts are underway, the State of Maine and its coastal communities
might consider a formalized negotiation-mediation process for addressing development
issues. This could be modeled after the efforts made by Congressman Tom Allen's ofice
in addressing the City of Saco and Camp Ellis' problems. Another model might be New
Jersey's State Planning Act (NJSA, 52: 18A-196). The voluntary non-committal nature of
the process is feasible in Maine's political environment. It offers communities a chance
to participate without the fear of legislation being thrust upon them. Their incentive
would be the opportunity to have a part in shaping regulatory policy.
Finally, the State of Maine needs to reassume the role of sponsor for federal
projects. The Maine Department of Transportation filled this role at one time but now the
individual communities act as sponsor (Habel, 2003). The purpose would not be to
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This also applies to state agencies. Agencies must be clear on the management ideology and be speaking
with one voice when representing the state.

assume a larger financial role or to become a developer, but to be directly involved with
what is happening on the coast beyond its regulatory function. If it is to act as the
manager of the public trust, a more proactive role is needed. This ultimately puts the
State of Maine in a better position and does not allow communities to isolate themselves
like Wells has done.

Maine and Bevond
Maine's coastal management ideology is a good fit for the economic and natural
resource constraints the state and communities face. Maine needs to do a better job of
conveying its message to the communities and the communities, in turn, need to
participate more fully to realize more benefits. Both need to coordinate and cooperate on
management to avoid situations like the one currently faced in Wells. Once the
groundwork is laid between the state and community, problems with the federal
government will be easier to address and should work themselves out.
The State of Maine must become even more aggressive and proactive along the
coast. The Maine State Planning Office is limited by their size as to what they can
accomplish. This is one more reason to get every state agency working together toward
common goals. Existing legislation is strong and has held up against legal challenges. It
cannot be assumed that this will happen forever. Decisions favoring property owners are
setting difficult precedents in takings cases around the country (Plater et al., 1998; Titus,
1998).
Recent efforts on the part of Maine municipalities and private citizens to pass
coastal development exemption legislation, allowing them to armor their shoreline,

reveals a more knowledgeable stakeholder base with greater political savvy. As time
goes on, the probability that some of these exemptions are accepted by a legislature more
sympathetic to property rights increases. The State of Maine needs to create an
environment where citizens don't view legislative and legal action as their only option.
A legislative act or court decision in favor of coastal property owners in Maine could
ultimately undermine the intent of current coastal policies and management ideology by
exempting others opposed to the state development restrictions.
Regarding Wells, even if the state were to follow through on these
recommendations, their problems may continue. The community of Wells needs to come
halfway first and that seems unlikely at this time. Their distrust and anger run deep, to
the point that it may be awhile before they feel comfortable with any state management
initiative (Foley, 2002). The state can still do much good by implementing these policies
elsewhere with the hope that Wells would eventually come around.
These recommendations are applicable to other coastal areas. For any project in a
dynamic environment a thorough and comprehensive economic picture is needed to make
accurate decisions. Analyses need to go beyond the immediate project and consider all
contingencies. Whether or not the political structure is bottom-up or t ~ ~ - d o wstrong
n,~~
ties between stakeholders and the states are essential for effective management,
particularly in the dynamic and ever-changing coastal zone.

A structure where the state makes all development decisions for the communities. California is an
example (Van Arsdol, 2000).
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Economic Benefit Formulas For Wells Harbor - 1959
Formulas for estimating recreational boating benefits from the 1959 Wells Harbor
study:
The benefits of recreational craft are based on the annual net return to the owners taken as
the amount the owners would receive if the boats were let out on a for-hire basis. This is
computed as a percentage return on the depreciated value of the boats equal to one half
the average value of the boats when new.

Transferred boats - benefits are calculated based on the increase in annual net return due
to a closer proximity. This is estimated as 20% of the total possible net return. (If the
total possible return is 11% this implies a current return of 8.8%. 20% of 11% is 2.2%.
The increase therefore is equal to 2.2%. This is the percentage used to calculate annual
benefits.)
New and transient boats - the benefits are calculated as 100% of the possible net return
Benefits for transferred, new, and transient boats would be adjusted by the average
number of days each type of boat may be away from the harbor.
Formulas for estimating commercial benefits from lobster boats from the 1959
study:

Tran<ferredboats - of the 3 transferred boats, 1 will be fulltime and 2 will operate part
time. A fulltime boat will bring in an average of 8000 Ibs each year and a part time boat
will bring in an average of 2000 Ibs each year. The benefit will equal 40% of the selling
price of lobster. As before, the transferred boat's total benefits are a result of the closer
proximity of the boat, and increase in catch. This has been calculated as a 20% increase.
Fulltime: 80001b * .40 * price per Ib * .20 * # of boats
Part time: 20001b * .40 * price per Ib * .20 * # ofboats

New boats - of the 11 new boats, 5 will be fulltime and 6 will be part time. The benefits
were calculated in the same way as the transferred boats but a new boat would realize
100% of its benefits.
Fulltime: 80001b * .40 * price per Ib * # of boats
Part time: 20001b * .40 * price per Ib * # of boats
Formulas for shore protection benefits:
The estimated value of the houses that would receive protection was $40,000. The
widening was estimated to provide $1000 of protection, or 2.5% of the value of the land.

Formulas for land enhancement benefits:
This is the land that can be created for development from the 200,000 cubic yards of
material being dredged from the project. The Corps predicted 10 acres of new
undeveloped land. At $4,000 per acre the total value came to $40,000. Approximately
$15,000 would be needed to stabilize the land with dikes. That leaves a net amount of
$25,000. The Corps predicted a 5% annual return on investment. This comes to $1,250
annually on average.

Appendix B
Economic Benefit Formulas For The Saco River Project - 1968
Formulas for estimating recreational boating benefits from 1968 Saco River study:
The benefits of recreational craR are based on the annual net return to the owners taken as
the amount the owners would receive if the boats were let out on a for-hire basis. This is
computed as a percentage return on the depreciated value of the boats equal to one half
the average value of the boats when new.

Transferred boats and existing transient activity- benefits are calculated based on the
increase in annual net return due to a closer proximity. This is estimated as 20% of the
total possible net return. (If the total possible return is 11% this implies a current return of
8.8%. 20% of 11% is 2.2%. The increase therefore is equal to 2.2%. This is the
percentage used to calculate annual benefits.)
New boats and additional transient activitv - the benefits are calculated as 100% of the
possible net return.
Benefits for transferred, new, and transient boats would be adjusted by the average
number of days each type of boat may be away from the harbor.
Formulas for estimating commercial benefits from lobster boats:

Existing boats - 20 boats bring in an average of 60,000 Ibs each year. They were
expected to increase this by 10,000 pounds or $6000. The benefit will equal 80% of the
selling price of lobster. 20% goes toward costs. The resulting benefit is $4800.
New boats - 6 new boats were predicted to land 21,000 pounds of lobster. This was a
value of $1 2,600. They would be able to realize 40% of this with 60% going toward their
costs. The resulting benefit is $5040.
Formulas for foregone boat repairs:
It was estimated that normally 5 lobster boats and 12 sardine boats would suffer $200 in
damage a year from ice flows coming down the Saco River. The benefits amount to
$3400 in savings.
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